Baltimore & O.&C.R. Co. v. Paul.
| Decision Date | 23 April 1895 |
| Citation | 40 N.E. 519,143 Ind. 23 |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
| Parties | BALTIMORE & O. & C. R. CO. v. PAUL. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from circuit court, Steuben county; Doak R. Best, Special Judge.
Action by Frank S. Paul against the Baltimore & Ohio & Chicago Railroad Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.
J. H. Collins, for appellant. W. L. Penfield and R. W. McBride, for appellee.
The distinct theory of the appellee's complaint was that the appellant was the owner and operator of a line of railway, in the operation of which it employed him as a brakeman; that in the course of his said service the appellant negligently supplied to him certain defective appliances, and negligently employed a reckless and incompetent engineer; that by reason of such negligence of the appellant the appellee sustained injuries, for which he sought damages. A jury returned a general verdict in favor of the appellee, and answered certain interrogatories. One question in this court arises upon the action of the circuit court in overruling the appellant's motion for judgment in its favor notwithstanding the general verdict. The parties agree in the conclusion that, if the answers to the special interrogatories stand in irreconcilable conflict with the general verdict, the verdict must go down, and the appellant should succeed; otherwise, that upon this question the appellee should succeed. It is also agreed that in passing upon the alleged conflict the court should indulge, in favor of the general verdict, every reasonable hypothesis consistent with the issues, and without reference to the evidence. The propositions in which the parties thus concur are of constant application, and admit of no doubt. Upon the general verdict and the special answers of the jury there is no dispute that the appellant owned the railway upon which the appellee was injured, but the bitterest conflict arises between the parties as to the issues that the appellant was operating the line, and that the appellant was the employer of the appellee, or in any manner responsible for his misfortune. Of the special answers returned by the jury were the following: The thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth answers find that the train master of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company employed the appellee, and that when injured he was in the service of that company. Reducing these special answers to their exact import, they find that there were two distinct corporations, the appellant and the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company; that the latter company, and not the appellant, owned, controlled, and operated the train by which the appellee was injured, and that the appellee was employed by, was serving, and was paid by the latter company. Here is an apparent conflict. The general verdict finds, presumptively, that the appellant was the master of the appellee, and as such owed him the duty of protecting him against its negligence in supplying defective appliances and reckless or unskillful coemployés. This was, as we have shown, the theory of the action, and the issue submitted. But the jury find specially that the appellant was not the master of the appellee, and that another owed the duty charged, and found generally against the appellant. Can this conflict be reconciled upon any reasonable presumption consistent with the issues? The appellee's counsel urge several supposed contingencies in which the facts specially found would not stand in conflict with the general verdict. They say: “Our contention is that, unless the special findings show by what right or authority the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company operates this railroad in Indiana, and show that such right or authority is conferred by a statute empowering one railroad company, a domestic corporation, to abrogate and abandon the sovereign franchise delegated to it by the state, and transfer to another corporation the attribute of sovereignty delegated to it, in such a manner, so prescribed by statute, as to exonerate the proprietor of the railroad from liability for the acts of the other corporation in operating its road, whether as assignee, servant, agent, partner, stockholder, lessee, licensee, or trespasser, the proprietary corporation remains jointly or severally liable, at the option of the plaintiff, precisely the same as if it continued in the sole rightful and lawful management of its railroad.” If this were an action by a stranger to the operating company, this argument would appear to possess much strength, and we are not prepared to say that the charter company could, by any of methods suggested, escape liability for an injury done by one permitted to employ its functions to another, a member of the general public, to whom the charter company owes duties arising as the consideration for charter privileges, without having delegated those functions by virtue of and pursuant to authority under the law. Here we have no such question. Whatever the attitude of the operating company, that also is the attitude of the appellee, since he was an operative of the operating company; and the appellant, so far from any liability, owed him no duty whatever, unless possibly that of doing him no willful injury. By the answers to interrogatories we learn that the companies were distinct; that the appellant was not the appellee's master; that the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company employed him, paid him, and owned, controlled, and operated the train that injured him. If the latter company operated as a trespasser or a licensee, no liability could exist as against the appellant. Parker v. Pennsylvania Co., 134 Ind. 673, 34 N. E. 504;Faris v. Hoberg, 134 Ind. 269, 33 N. E. 1028;Woodruff v. Bowen, 136 Ind. 431, 34 N. E. 1113. This conclusion is reached by the ordinary rule, but have we here an exception to the ordinary rule? This appellee's contention has strong support in authority if it has application to the case in hand. The rule so contended for, and its reason, are tersely stated in 19 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 899, as follows: “The lessor, in consideration of the grant by its charter of extraordinary rights and privileges has assumed a quasi public character, and becomes subject to unusual obligations towards the public, and public policy requires that it should not be allowed to release itself therefrom by transferring its rights and franchises to a lessee, without express legislative consent.”
Many cases are cited in support of the text. In all of the cases and text writings we have examined the rule has been stated with reference to the obligations of the charter company to the public, and which are created by the enactment of state legislatures or by the franchise; as where some duty is enjoined upon such company by the charter or laws of the state as to the...
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