Smith v. Freeman

Decision Date29 December 1989
Docket NumberNo. 88-1925,88-1925
Citation892 F.2d 331
PartiesSMITH, Jerry Lee, Appellant, v. FREEMAN, Robert F., Superintendent; and the Attorney General of the State of Pennsylvania: Leroy Zimmerman and the District Attorney of Montgomery County.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Michael J. Kelly (argued), Defender Ass'n of Philadelphia, Federal Court Div., Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.

James W. Steark (argued), Asst. Dist. Atty., Norristown, Pa., for appellees.

Before BECKER, COWEN and WEIS, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

COWEN, Circuit Judge.

This appeal arises from an order of the district court denying appellant Jerry L. Smith ("Smith") a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982). Because we conclude that Smith was not afforded a full and fair evidentiary hearing in state court on his claim that his guilty plea was involuntary due to mental incompetence, we will vacate the order of the district court denying the writ of habeas corpus and remand for further proceedings.

I.

According to the prosecution, on February 19, 1981, Smith and his co-conspirator and ex-wife, Brenda Meinkrantz ("Meinkrantz"), drove from Missouri to Schwenksville, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania for the purpose of stealing money from the apartment of eighty-year-old Martha Thomas ("Thomas"). Late in the evening of February 20, after they checked into a local motel, Meinkrantz drove Smith to the apartment of Thomas and left him there.

A few hours later, Meinkrantz returned to Thomas' apartment, met Smith inside and helped him carry out a tan overnight bag. The bag contained $700 in stolen cash. Later that day, the body of Thomas was discovered in her bedroom by police. A post-mortem autopsy revealed that she had died of manual strangulation.

Smith was apprehended a month later and charged with numerous crimes in connection with this incident, including the murder of Thomas. On September 11, 1981, Smith entered a plea of guilty to the charges of second-degree murder, conspiracy and burglary in exchange for a recommendation from the prosecution that he be given a life sentence on the murder charge and suspended sentences on the conspiracy and burglary charges. All the remaining charges were nol prossed. Smith was thereafter sentenced to life imprisonment by Judge William T. Nicholas. 1 Since the defects present at the September 11 guilty plea colloquy between Judge Nicholas, Smith and Smith's court-appointed counsel, Thomas J. Speers ("Speers"), form the basis of Smith's current habeas claim, we discuss this colloquy in some detail.

Before accepting Smith's plea, Judge Nicholas ascertained that Smith was being held in Norristown State Hospital ("Norristown"), a psychiatric facility, had been committed there for two weeks prior to his decision to plead guilty, and received medication the night before. App. at 32-34. Smith told the court that this medication was to soothe his nerves and help him sleep, but that it did not affect his judgment. App. at 42. The court accepted Smith's characterization of his medication and sought neither its name nor any expert opinion as to its effects. 2

Smith also informed the court that he had experienced mental problems in the past, including a psychiatric episode while in the Air Force which resulted in discharge after a period of hospitalization. App. at 34-35, 37. At this point in the proceeding, Judge Nicholas, noting that Speers had been authorized to retain a psychiatrist, asked what that psychiatrist's opinion was as to Smith's competency. Speers represented to the court that the psychiatrist, Dr. Robert L. Sadoff, in consultation with two other specialists, had informed Speers by letter that it was their opinion that Smith was competent. App. at 38-39. In addition, Speers stated that he had spoken by telephone with Dr. Sadoff that very morning and that Dr. Sadoff had recently received "various reports from various agencies and other individuals who ha[d] examined" Smith. App. at 39-40. Speers told the court that, based on these contacts, Dr. Sadoff was still of the opinion that Smith was competent. Id.

As later revealed, Speers' representations to the court were false. Dr. Sadoff's August 17 letter stated, contrary to the representation of Speers, that it was his opinion that Smith "is not mentally competent to proceed at the present time." App. at 301. 3 Moreover, because Dr. Sadoff did not re-examine Smith during the interim, he could not have told Speers in a later telephone conversation that he was still of the opinion that Smith was competent. In order for Speers' representation to the court of Dr. Sadoff's opinion on the day of the guilty plea to be true, the doctor would have had to completely reverse his professional opinion in the space of less than a month with no basis appearing in the record for such an about face. Furthermore, in his letter to Speers, Dr. Sadoff referenced only one other psychologist, Dr. Gerald Cooke, whose psychiatric opinion he had sought. As actually reported by Dr. Sadoff to Speers, Dr. Cooke also diagnosed "Smith as borderline with a question about his competency." App. at 300.

Other facts lend credence to a strong inference that Speers misrepresented the contents of his telephone conversation with Dr. Sadoff on the day of the plea. Contrary to Speers' suggestion in court, the various "individuals who ha[d] examined" Smith up to this point appear to have had serious concerns about his mental health. Smith had been committed to Norristown because prison staff psychologists believed he was suicidal. App. at 108. Upon commitment, the hospital staff placed Smith on "suicidal precautions." App. at 110. While at Norristown, Smith was extremely disturbed, showed an inability to process information and manifested physical disturbances such as twitching movements. App. at 110-15.

As the testimony of Dr. Paul A. Grayce, one of Smith's treating physicians at Norristown, and Nancy Haines, a case worker at Norristown, established at Smith's later nunc pro tunc hearing, the mental health professionals in contact with Smith during the period immediately after his plea had grave doubts about his competency. Dr. Grayce testified that although Smith was not immediately diagnosed upon admission, his eventual diagnosis sometime after September 11 was that of a "border-line personality disorder." App. at 124. Dr. Grayce explained that this condition is marked by instability in mood, feeling and perception of oneself. Id. Under stress, persons with this disorder can rapidly "decompensate," and become psychotic and disorganized in their thinking. App. at 125. In addition, Dr. Grayce noted some marked dependency characteristics of Smith, as well as his "border-line personality disorder." Dr. Grayce stated that Smith tended to make decisions and responses based on "outside influences, which he perceives to be significant," e.g., "other people's opinions, comments and/or statements...." App. at 125-26, 208. Haines testified that, as of September 14, Smith appeared extremely anxious--"as though he were a frightened child"--and constantly repeated nonsense phrases in response to most questions. App. at 201-02.

However, without the benefit of Dr. Sadoff's true opinion, and also without the benefit of any other expert opinion as to Smith's competency, Judge Nicholas accepted the representation of Speers, as well as the statement of Smith himself, that he was competent. Thus, the court concluded that "[b]ased upon the colloquy with the defendant ... the Court finds that [Smith] has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered a plea of guilty to these three bills of information." App. at 86. 4

Little more than a month later, on October 27, 1981, Smith filed a motion to challenge his guilty plea nunc pro tunc on the grounds that he had been incompetent both to enter his plea and to have understood his limited right under Pennsylvania law to challenge his guilty plea. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 321(a) (West Supp.1989). 5 Speers was allowed to withdraw from the case and a newly-appointed counsel, Blake Dunbar, filed an amended motion adding additional allegations. Those allegations included that the guilty plea colloquy was defective and that trial counsel was ineffective both during the colloquy and for a period in excess of ten days thereafter.

The amended motion was heard by Judge Nicholas, the same judge who took Smith's guilty plea. An evidentiary hearing was held, but only for the purpose of determining whether Smith was competent during the ten days following the entry of his plea. App. at 103-04, 226. Judge Nicholas reaffirmed his original finding of competency at the time of the guilty plea without hearing any evidence bearing on the competency of Smith at the time he pled guilty. His decision was based solely on his own recollection and the colloquy record. App. at 220-21, 230.

Although four witnesses were called at the hearing, none were permitted to testify as to Smith's competency at the time of his guilty plea. As to Smith's competency during the ten day period following his guilty plea, the only witnesses called by Smith were Dr. Grayce and Nancy Haines whose testimony has already been summarized. The prosecution called Speers who testified that he met with Smith during the ten days following the guilty plea and that Smith was competent and unwilling to challenge his plea despite appearing even more "distraught" than at the colloquy. App. at 154-55, 158-59, 163-64. The prosecution also called Meinkrantz's mother who testified that she spoke to Smith during the ten day period and he appeared rational, although upset and depressed. App. at 188-91.

Based on this testimony, the court gave greater credence to the testimony of Speers 6 and Meinkrantz's mother 7, and found that Smith was competent during the ten day period after his guilty plea. App. at 220 ("I credit Mr. Speers' testimony as an officer of ...

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