892 F.2d 610 (7th Cir. 1989), 89-1196, Camden v. Circuit Court of Second Judicial Circuit, Crawford County, Ill.
|Citation:||892 F.2d 610|
|Party Name:||Julia CAMDEN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. CIRCUIT COURT OF the SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, CRAWFORD COUNTY, ILLINOIS, Honorable Patrick McLaughlin, and Neil F. Hartigan, Illinois Attorney General, Respondents-Appellees.|
|Case Date:||December 28, 1989|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit|
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Feb. 5, 1990.
Submitted Sept. 20, 1989.[*]
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Feb. 5, 1990.
Fred Johnson, Robinson, Ill., for petitioner-appellant.
Nathan P. Maddox, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of Atty. Gen., Crim. Appeals Div., Springfield, Ill., for respondents-appellees.
Before WOOD, Jr., POSNER, and COFFEY, Circuit Judges.
HARLINGTON WOOD, Jr., Circuit Judge.
Appellant Julia Camden's state trial on charges of aggravated battery, armed violence, and attempted murder ended on June 28, 1984, when Judge A. Hanby Jones of the Circuit Court of Crawford County, Illinois determined that juror bias required his sua sponte declaration of a mistrial. Camden subsequently moved to bar her reprosecution on the ground that the fifth amendment double jeopardy clause prohibited a second trial. 1 The majority of an Illinois appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of Camden's motion and found that the trial court's mistrial declaration was neither supported by manifest necessity nor consented to by Camden. People v. Camden, 140 Ill.App.3d 480, 488 N.E.2d 1082, 94 Ill.Dec. 835 (5th Dist.1986). In a dissenting opinion, Justice Karns found that Camden had impliedly consented to the trial court's mistrial declaration and that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion. 140 Ill.App.3d at 488-89, 488 N.E.2d at 1087, 94 Ill.Dec. at 840. The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the appellate court in a unanimous opinion and held that Camden implicitly consented to the mistrial. People v. Camden, 115 Ill.2d 369, 504 N.E.2d 96, 105 Ill.Dec. 227, cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1070, 107 S.Ct. 2464, 95 L.Ed.2d 873 (1987). In finding implied consent
in the particular circumstances of this case, the supreme court found that defense counsel did not avail himself of the opportunity to object before or after the declaration of the mistrial. Id. at 378-79, 504 N.E.2d at 99-100, 105 Ill.Dec. at 230-31. Instead, the supreme court noted that defense counsel actively participated in the arrangements for a new trial. We also shall examine these same matters. After exhausting all state court remedies, Camden petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied the writ, and we affirm. 2
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On June 26, 1984, Camden's trial began on offenses she allegedly committed in a Crawford County, Illinois tavern. 3 At trial, Camden raised the defenses of insanity and diminished capacity by reason of intoxication. A jury was sworn, the State presented its evidence and rested, and the defendant began to present her case-in-chief. During the lunch recess on the third day of trial, one of the jurors informed Sheriff Richard Hunnicutt, the custodian of the jury, that he had misgivings about his personal ability to render an impartial verdict because of his own prior drinking problem. The sheriff immediately reported this incident to the trial judge, who conducted a hearing in his chambers in the presence of Camden, her counsel, and the State's Attorney. The trial judge proceeded to examine Sheriff Hunnicutt and the concerned juror, Donald D. Hatton.
Sheriff Hunnicutt testified that he was seated at a table with Hatton and the other jurors when Hatton stated: "I have something I have to tell you that I think you should report. I cannot give an impartial judgment because of my drinking." The sheriff stated that the other jurors overheard "every word" of his conversation with Hatton and discussed Hatton's remarks among themselves.
The judge then examined juror Hatton. Hatton testified that he had informed the sheriff during lunch that he might be unable to render an impartial verdict because of a previous drinking problem. Hatton verified the sheriff's statement that the other jurors had overheard their conversation. Hatton also stated that the alternate juror told him, "You're going to stick me yet, aren't you." When the trial judge expressed his concern that Hatton's remarks might have influenced the other jurors, Hatton responded that he "really, honestly couldn't say" what effect his statements had on his fellow jurors. Hatton conceded that his own prejudice might "place a bigger burden on the State than could be overcome."
Upon concluding his examination of Hatton, the judge allowed the attorneys to question Hatton. The interrogation of the juror proceeded with queries from the State's Attorney:
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: You're saying that you had a prior drinking problem?
[JUROR HATTON]: Yes, definitely. Really did.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: Why would a prior drinking problem affect your deliberation?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, I object. That's just improper. You've conducted your inquiry. We've got our record--
THE COURT: Do you have anyy questions?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Absolutely no questions.
At the conclusion of Hatton's testimony, the following colloquy between the State's Attorney and defense counsel occurred:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Thank you, Mr. Hatton. I think [the State's Attorney] and I ought to talk. It might save the county a lot of money.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: Put that on the record.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Put that on. Ten minutes to talk?
THE COURT: Yes, sir.
The court took a recess while the State's Attorney and defense counsel had an unreported discussion. Court reconvened and the jury was brought into the courtroom. The judge then informed the jury and counsel that he was declaring a mistrial due to juror bias:
THE COURT: All right, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the Court, at this particular moment, has made the following minutes on its docket: The Court is advised by an officer of this Court that one of the jurors has indicated before other members of the Jury and the Alternate that they [sic] cannot be giving an unbiased verdict or render an unbiased verdict in this cause. And so it is the duty of the Court at this time to declare a mistrial. And this juror and the officer of the Court were both duly sworn by the Court and did testify out of the presence of the Jury. The bond of the Defendant will be continued for a further trial setting. And the jury is now discharged.
I want to thank you very much for your kindness and attention. I realize that this has been a long ordeal, but this is one of the main theories that we have here is justice for all. And it would not be fair to all concerned if this juror did continue to sit and the fact that the other jurors heard the statements that he made. I do want to thank you and you are now excused.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Thank you ladies and gentlemen; I appreciate it very much.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: Appreciate your attention.
After the judge dismissed the jury, the attorneys discussed a new trial date. Defense counsel conceded that the case might be assigned to a different trial judge and then waived his client's speedy trial rights in response to the assertion by the State's Attorney that Camden had earlier filed a speedy trial demand. At no point during the judge's explanation to the jury of the need to abort the trial did Camden's attorney object to the mistrial declaration. On July 19, 1984, the trial court reset the case by agreement of the parties for a trial to begin on November 13, 1984. Camden first raised her objection to the mistrial declaration on September 11, 1984, by filing a motion to dismiss on the ground that the mistrial had been declared peremptorily, affording defendant no opportunity to object.
On appeal from the district court's denial of her petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Camden claims that the magistrate erred in finding that she impliedly consented to the trial court's mistrial declaration. Camden also claims that the magistrate should have conducted an evidentiary hearing on her petition for a writ of habeas corpus and summary judgment motion in order to assess defense counsel's subjective state of mind during the trial court proceedings. 4
II. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Camden maintains that a retrial is barred by the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment, which is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 2058, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). The double jeopardy clause safeguards a
criminal defendant's "valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal," as well as the public's interest in "fair trials designed to end in just judgments." Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689, 69 S.Ct. 834, 837, 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949); see also United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484, 91 S.Ct. 547, 556, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971); Lovinger v. Circuit Court of the 19th Judicial Circuit, 845 F.2d 739, 743 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 136, 102 L.Ed.2d 108 (1988). The double jeopardy clause bars retrial unless the trial court's mistrial declaration was occasioned by "manifest necessity," United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130, 101 S.Ct. 426, 433, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980) (citing United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824)), or consented to by the defendant, Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2089, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982).
Under the manifest necessity standard, a court may declare a mistrial only if a "scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion leads to the conclusion that the ends of public...
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