Brown v. Serenity C&C, Inc.

Decision Date17 July 2019
Docket NumberCivil No. 4:18cv112
Citation391 F.Supp.3d 546
Parties Athena G. BROWN, Plaintiff, v. SERENITY C & C, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

Steven Blythe Wiley, Wiley Law Offices PLLC, Norfolk, VA, for Plaintiff.

James Richard Theuer, James R. Theuer, PLLC, Norfolk, VA, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

Mark S. Davis, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on a motion for summary judgment filed by defendant Serenity C & C, Inc. ("Defendant" or "Serenity"). ECF Nos. 14, 15. The parties have requested a ruling on the briefs. ECF No. 20. After examining the briefs and the record, the Court agrees that oral argument is unnecessary because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented, and oral argument would not aid in the decisional process. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) ; E.D. Va. Loc. R. 7 (J). For the reasons stated below, Defendant's motion is GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant is a corporation licensed in Virginia to provide support and training to their clients who are individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities ("Clients"). Def.'s Br. 1, ECF No. 15; Hernandez Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 15-1. One of the services that Defendant provides for its Clients is the Sponsored Residential Program where the Clients live with family sponsors ("Sponsors"), who have contracted with Defendant to provide appropriate food, lodging, sanitation, and a residential home environment for the Clients. Def.'s Br. 2; Hernandez Decl. ¶¶ 4, 6. The Sponsors agree to adhere to Defendant's guidelines and regulatory requirements and to complete the necessary training and certifications. Def.'s Br. 2; Hernandez Decl. ¶ 6. Defendant compensates the Sponsors based on the level of service they provide to the Clients. Def.'s Br. 2, Hernandez Decl. ¶ 6. While participating in the Sponsored Residential Programs, Clients receive services from other providers such as mental health professionals and counselors. Def.'s Br. 2; Hernandez Decl. ¶ 5.

In September of 2017, Defendant hired plaintiff Athena Brown ("Plaintiff") as a "Program Coordinator" whose job was to supervise the Clients and their Sponsors in the Sponsored Residential Program. Def.'s Br. 2; Hernandez Decl. ¶¶ 7-8. Specifically, the job description given to Plaintiff on the day she was hired provides that the primary duties of a Program Coordinator consist of the following:

1. Develop and ensure on-going implementation of Individual Support Plans, Behavioral and Therapeutic Treatment Plans. Ensure adherence to Licensure, Human Rights, and/or other State, Federal, or Local regulations.
2. Develop and coordinate meetings and training for staff, individuals and families regarding supports and services within the sponsored residential.
3. Provide 24-hour on call accessibility for staff related to issues of individual support plans or advanced behavioral issues.
4. Maintain current and accurate files on each person served.
5. Coordinate and conduct intakes.
6. Processing of all files/individual as well as provider.
7. Have contact with families, guardians, CSB', and social workers etc.
8. Coordinate and conduct monthly meetings and complete minutes.
9. Provide input and recommendations (verbal and/or written) regarding issues of admissions, transfers, and discharges
10. Review, receive and maintain the sponsor training folder
11. Collect and review monthly documentation from providers
12. Conduct monthly visits/inspections of sponsor residential homes.
13. Conduct Home studies.
14. Review support data and progress notes in order to modify/revise individual support plans, behavioral supports, treatment plans, etc. as needed.
15. Participate in sponsored residential. Conduct/report monthly on-site observations (e.g. Residential)
16. Maintains a valid Virginia driver's license insurable under Serenity C & C INC. auto insurance.
17. Follow all applicable policies and procedures of Serenity C & C Inc.
18. Perform other duties as assigned.

Def.'s Ex. 3, ECF No. 15-4; see Def.'s Br. 3; see also Hernandez Decl. ¶¶ 9-10. According to Plaintiff, Plaintiff's duties as a Program Coordinator included

supervis[ing] or ... oversee [ing] the sponsor providers and individuals with guidance from our supervisor, from the directors.... writing reports ... going to home visits, inspecting home visits, on-call situations or emergencies, holding annual meetings, meeting other entities, going to ... different job fairs, auditing books, ... trainings with individuals, sponsor providers[,] ... ensuring that the sponsor providers follow the guidelines under Serenity and licensure[,] ... filing papers and reports, writing monthly documentation, [and] care coordination.

Brown Depo. 8, ECF No. 15-2. As a part of her job in carrying out these duties, Plaintiff supervised approximately 18-20 Clients and 15-20 Sponsors at a time and had the authority to remove Clients from their Sponsors' homes if the Sponsor was not fulfilling the criteria for the program. Def.'s Br. 5; Hernandez Decl. ¶ 10.

During her employment, Plaintiff was placed on probation for failure to perform her duties properly and on time. Def.'s Br. 5; Hernandez Decl. ¶ 11. As a result, Plaintiff received on-going performance counseling in which she was reminded of the duties she was expected to complete as stated in her job description. Def.'s Br. 5; Hernandez Decl. ¶ 11; Def.'s Ex. 16, 17, 18, ECF Nos. 15-6, 15-7, 15-8. In one of those written counseling documents, Plaintiff was reminded that " [i]t is imperative that all Program Coordinators be proactive and take[ ] initiative in accordance to [sic] the job description." Def.'s Ex. 18; Brown Depo. 87, ECF No. 15-2; Def.'s Br. 6. In response to the counseling, Plaintiff maintained that she was "fully competent and handling [her] caseloads as well as the responsibilities [as] a program coordinator with the company." Def.'s Ex. 18 at 5; Brown Depo. 88-89; Def.'s Br. 6. On August 3, 2018, Plaintiff took a leave of absence from work for medical reasons. Def.'s Br. 6; Hernandez Decl. ¶ 7. Plaintiff never returned to work for Defendant following her medical leave. Def.'s Br. 6; Hernandez Decl. ¶ 7.

Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court against Defendant on September 7, 2018, alleging that Defendant violated the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") by failing to pay her overtime wages for the hours she worked when she was a Program Coordinator. Compl., ECF No. 1. Defendant answered the Complaint on October 9, 2018. Def.'s Ans., ECF No. 4. On May 28, 2019, Defendant filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 14, and an accompanying brief and evidence in support, ECF No. 15, asserting an affirmative defense that Plaintiff was not entitled to overtime because she was properly classified as "exempt" from overtime under what is known as the "administrative exemption." Defendant argues that there is no dispute of material fact relevant to the application of the exemption and that the undisputed facts prove, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff was exempt. Def.'s Br.6-7. On June 11, 2019, Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment arguing that Defendant has failed to meet is burden to prove that Plaintiff is exempt. Pl.'s Resp., ECF No. 18. Defendant replied on June 14, 2019. Def.'s Reply, ECF No. 19. Trial is scheduled to begin in this case on July 23, 2019. Having been fully briefed, this matter is now ripe for review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a district court shall grant summary judgment in favor of a movant if such party "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties "will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

If a movant has properly advanced evidence supporting entry of summary judgment, the non-moving party may not rest upon the mere allegations of the pleadings, but instead must set forth specific facts in the form of exhibits and sworn statements illustrating a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "A genuine question of material fact exists where, after reviewing the record as a whole, a court finds that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 673 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). "Because ‘credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge,’ " the Court must only evaluate the evidence to the extent necessary to determine whether there is " ‘sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether [the evidence] is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’ " McAirlaids, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 756 F.3d 307, 310 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ). In making such determination, "the district court must ‘view the evidence in the light most favorable to the’ nonmoving party." Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 568 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) ).

III. DISCUSSION
A. Local Rule 56(B)

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff has failed to comply with Local Civil Rule 56(B), which states that a brief in response to a motion for summary judgment "shall include a specifically captioned section listing all material facts as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue necessary to be litigated and citing the parts of the record relied on to support the facts...

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