Hinkle Metals & Supply Co. v. Feltman

• Decision Date: 15 February 2019
• Docket Number: 1170512
• Citation: 280 So.3d 1031
• Parties: HINKLE METALS & SUPPLY COMPANY, INC. v. Diane Brown FELTMAN
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

280 So.3d 1031

HINKLE METALS & SUPPLY COMPANY, INC.

v.Diane Brown FELTMAN

1170512

Supreme Court of Alabama.

February 15, 2019

A. Joe Peddy and Thomas M. Little of Smith, Spires, Peddy, Hamilton & Coleman, P.C., Birmingham, for appellant.

James Michael Perry of Wettermark Keith, LLC, Birmingham; and D. Brett Turnbull of Cory Watson, P.C., Birmingham, for appellee.

SELLERS, Justice.

Hinkle Metals & Supply Company, Inc. ("Hinkle"), appeals from a judgment based on a jury verdict in favor of Diane Brown Feltman. We affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Hinkle is in the business of selling heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning supplies and equipment. Hinkle maintains an office in both Birmingham and Pelham and a warehouse at its Birmingham office. At all times relevant to this action, Gabriel Butterfield was employed as a branch manager at Hinkle's Pelham office.

On September 11, 2015, a GMC Sierra pickup truck, owned and driven by Butterfield, struck Feltman, a pedestrian, as she was attempting to cross 20th Street in downtown Birmingham. As a result of that accident, Feltman sustained multiple injuries. On January 7, 2016, Feltman sued Butterfield and Hinkle, alleging that Butterfield, while acting within the line and scope of his employment with Hinkle, had been negligent and wanton in causing the accident and that Hinkle was vicariously liable based on a theory of respondeat superior.

Hinkle filed a motion for a summary judgment on all claims against it, arguing that it was not vicariously liable for Butterfield's alleged actions because, it said, Butterfield was not acting within the line and scope of his employment with Hinkle at the time of the accident. Following the submission of briefs and a hearing on that motion, the trial court denied Hinkle's motion for a summary judgment.

The case eventually proceeded to trial on the issue whether Hinkle was vicariously liable for Butterfield's negligence and the extent of damages.¹ At the close of Feltman's case and again at the close of all the evidence, Hinkle moved for a judgment as a matter of law ("JML") on the ground that Feltman failed to submit substantial evidence showing that Butterfield was acting within the line and scope of his employment at the time of the accident; each of those motions was denied. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Feltman in the amount of $375,000, finding Hinkle vicariously liable for Butterfield's negligence. After the trial court entered a judgment on the verdict, Hinkle filed a renewed motion for a JML or, in the alternative, a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment. That motion was denied, and Hinkle filed this appeal.

II. Motion for a JML

On appeal, Hinkle first argues that the trial court erred in denying its renewed motion for a JML on the respondeat superior claim.

"The standard of review applicable to a ruling on a [renewed] motion for [a JML] is identical to the standard used by the trial court in granting or denying [a motion for a JML]. Thus, in reviewing the trial court's ruling on the motion, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, and we determine whether the party with the burden of proof has produced sufficient evidence to require a jury determination....

"....

"... In ruling on a [renewed] motion for a [JML], the trial court is called upon to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to submit a question of fact to the jury; for the court to determine that it was, there must have been ‘substantial evidence’ before the jury to create a question of fact. See, § 12–21–12(a), Ala. Code 1975. ‘[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.’ West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989)."

American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 624 So.2d 1362, 1366-67 (Ala. 1993) (internal citations omitted); see also Cheshire v. Putman, 54 So.3d 336, 340 (Ala. 2010).

"To recover for damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident against the driver's employer upon a theory of respondeat superior, it is incumbent upon [the] plaintiff to prove that the collision occurred while the driver was within the scope of his employment, and happened while he was in the accomplishment of objectives within the line of his duties."

Perdue v. Mitchell, 373 So.2d 650, 653 (Ala. 1979) (citing Cook v. Fullbright, 349 So.2d 23 (Ala. 1977) ). Thus, Feltman had the burden of presenting substantial evidence showing that the accident occurred while Butterfield was acting within the line and scope of his employment with Hinkle. See Williams v. Hughes Moving & Storage Co., 578 So.2d 1281, 1283 (Ala. 1991).

Butterfield and three other individuals who were employed by Hinkle at the time of the accident testified at trial: Tim Pate, the general manager of Hinkle; Randy Bergman, the branch manager of Hinkle's Birmingham branch; and Mike Violet, the manager of Hinkle's warehouse in Birmingham. Karen Milbrodt, a records custodian for Verizon Wireless, a cellular-telephone-service provider, introduced Butterfield's call records into evidence. And, finally, Trent Draper, a former radio-frequency engineer, provided an expert opinion regarding historical cell-site analysis of Butterfield's call records from the date of the accident.

The undisputed evidence presented at trial indicated that, as a branch manager, Butterfield was responsible for managing the Pelham branch's employees, inventory, customer orders, deliveries, and sales. At times, his job duties required him to make deliveries to customers or to travel to Hinkle's Birmingham office to pick up parts or equipment needed at the Pelham branch. Butterfield was paid a car allowance as part of his compensation, and he received fuel reimbursement, which was intended to compensate him for travel to and from work and for travel related to company business.

It was further undisputed that, on the day of the accident, Butterfield drove from Hinkle's Pelham branch to Birmingham in his GMC Sierra pickup truck between 10:00 a.m. and 10:30 a.m. Using the navigation system installed in the truck, Butterfield activated voice directions to the Jefferson County courthouse, where he intended to file for a homestead exemption for his personal residence. The accident occurred at approximately 10:30 a.m. at the intersection of 20th Street and 5th Avenue North while Butterfield was attempting to make a left turn onto 20th Street. At 10:34 a.m., Butterfield called 911 to report the accident, and the police arrived shortly thereafter. Immediately after the accident, Butterfield placed three calls to Randy Bergman and notified him of the accident. Butterfield then continued to the courthouse to file for the homestead exemption; his filing was time-stamped at 11:16 a.m.

The primary factual dispute at trial related to Butterfield's actions after filing for the homestead exemption. Butterfield testified that on the morning of the accident he delivered breakfast to one of Hinkle's regular customers, Champs Air Solutions ("Champs"),² but that he did not recall running any other work-related errands for Hinkle that day. Butterfield further testified that he thought he returned directly to Pelham after filing for his homestead exemption, but he was not certain.

At trial, counsel for Feltman questioned Butterfield about a transfer-request form that was completed at 9:00 a.m. on the morning of the accident. Butterfield testified that the transfer-request form concerned an air-handler unit ordered by Champs that needed to be transferred from Hinkle's Birmingham warehouse to the Pelham branch for delivery to Champs. Butterfield acknowledged that this form included the term "PU PICKUP OUR TRK," which he stated "means anything other than shipping, FedEx, UPS, or putting on our transfer truck." However, Butterfield testified that he did not know when or how that part was actually transferred from Birmingham to Pelham.

Counsel for Feltman also questioned Tim Pate about a sales-order form for an air-handler unit and a condensing unit Hinkle sold to Champs. Pate testified that the sales order was printed in Pelham at 2:06 p.m. on the day of the accident and that it included Butterfield's initials as the person who had entered the sale. Pate acknowledged that the sales order included a signature at the bottom that indicated that it was received by the customer sometime after 2:06 p.m. Pate testified that he did not have any personal knowledge as to when or how the air-handler unit was transferred from the Birmingham warehouse to the Pelham branch on the day of the accident.

During the testimony of Milbrodt, a records custodian for Verizon Wireless, Butterfield's call records from the date of the accident were admitted into evidence. Subsequently, Draper was called as a witness to provide an expert opinion based on historical cell-site analysis of Butterfield's call records. Draper testified that he had over 20 years experience in the telecommunications industry as a radio-frequency engineer and that, although he was working in south Alabama at the time of trial, he had previously worked as a radio-frequency engineer in the Birmingham area. Draper testified that Butterfield's call records included cell-site information for each call, such as the cell tower and the sector through which the call was connected.³ Draper testified that he used a propagation modeling software, Atoll,⁴ to generate coverage maps of the Verizon Wireless cell towers in parts of Jefferson County and Shelby County that highlighted the areas best served by each cell tower. Draper testified that, based on those maps and the cell-site information included in a person's call records, he could make certain conclusions, such as: the approximate geographic area a given cell tower is most likely to serve; the cell tower that best serves a given address; the general...