Gaddy v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.

• Decision Date: 30 November 1967
• Docket Number: 17426.,No. 17425,17425
• Citation: 386 F.2d 772
• Parties: Hazel GADDY, Administratrix of the Estate of James Brown Gaddy, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE RAILROAD CO., Defendant-Appellant, and Dorothy M. Gaddy, Intervenor-Appellee (two cases).
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

386 F.2d 772 (1967)

Hazel GADDY, Administratrix of the Estate of James Brown Gaddy, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE RAILROAD CO., Defendant-Appellant, and Dorothy M. Gaddy, Intervenor-Appellee (two cases).

Nos. 17425, 17426.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

November 30, 1967.

G. Wayne Bridges, Covington, Ky., for Hazel Gaddy, Bridges & Nelson, Covington, Ky., Lohren F. Martin, Jr., of Sutton, Martin & Forcht, Corbin, Ky., on brief.

Charles S. Adams, Covington, Ky., for Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., M. D. Jones, J. M. Terry, Louisville, Ky., on brief.

James N. Stein, Covington, Ky., for Dorothy M. Gaddy, Ralph P. Rich, Covington, Ky., on brief.

Before PHILLIPS, CELEBREZZE and McCREE, Circuit Judges.

PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered in an FELA case, arising out of the death of James B. Gaddy, a railroad employee. Two women, Mrs. Dorothy Marie Husted Gaddy and Mrs. Hazel Gaddy, claim to be his widow. It is undisputed that Dorothy was the first of the two to be married to Gaddy and that they were married in 1954 in a formal ceremony. In 1959 Dorothy filed a divorce action in Las Vegas, but failed to prosecute it. Three years after Dorothy had left him, Gaddy married Hazel in 1962 in a formal ceremony. At the time of his death in 1964 Gaddy was living with Hazel. He had two minor sons by his marriage to Dorothy. Dorothy had no contact with Gaddy after their separation, but she had obtained a support order requiring him to contribute to his children born to their marriage.

Hazel qualified as administratrix and filed this suit. Dorothy filed a motion for leave to intervene which initially was overruled. The suit was tried on the assumption that Hazel was the surviving widow. Judgment was returned for $100,500, of which $62,500 was designated for Hazel and $19,000 for each of the two children.

After the judgment had been entered, Dorothy tendered an intervening complaint for declaratory judgment, still contending that she was Gaddy's widow. The District Judge permitted this complaint to be filed. Neither party demanded a jury. The District Judge held that Dorothy was never divorced from the decedent and that she, not Hazel, was his lawful wife at the time of his death. The District Judge thereupon amended his order so as to direct the administratrix to pay over to Dorothy the $62,500 originally awarded to Hazel.

The opinion of the District Judge is reported in 249 F.Supp. 305.

At the time the jury returned its verdict, it was not aware that any person other than Hazel was claiming to be the surviving widow of the decedent. All proceedings concerning the claim of Dorothy were conducted outside the presence of the jury.

The railroad has appealed, contending that the correct measure of liability of the FELA action is the loss or damage sustained by dependents of the decedent and that the railroad has no liability except for pecuniary damage to the lawful widow and children. The railroad does not dispute the reasonableness of the $19,000 verdict returned in favor of each of the children, but appeals from the $62,500 awarded to Dorothy upon the ground that Dorothy had not lived with the decedent for a number of years and that she did not suffer so large a pecuniary loss as the $62,500 awarded Hazel. Hazel also has appealed, contending that the trial judge erred in holding that Dorothy is the surviving widow.

In Michigan Central R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 68, 33 S.Ct. 192, 195, 57 L. Ed. 417, the Supreme Court defined the measure of damages in an FELA action as follows:

"The obvious purpose of Congress was to save a right of action to certain relatives dependent upon an employee wrongfully injured, for the loss and damage resulting to them financially by reason of the wrongful

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