Stern & Co. v. State Loan and Finance Corporation
Decision Date | 10 February 1965 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 2429. |
Citation | 238 F. Supp. 901 |
Parties | STERN & CO., Plaintiff, v. STATE LOAN AND FINANCE CORPORATION, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
E. N. Carpenter, II, Richards, Layton & Finger, Wilmington, Del., William R. Hudson and Bernard V. Lentz, White & Williams, Philadelphia, Pa., of counsel, for plaintiff.
Carl Bauersfeld, Washington, D. C., Howard L. Williams, Wilmington, Del., of counsel, for defendant.
This is a civil action to recover damages in the amount of $28,675.77, plus punitive damages, for breach of contract.
1. Plaintiff is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
2. Defendant is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Washington, D. C.
3. The plaintiff, prior to September 20, 1956, operated a chain of department stores in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware engaged in the business of selling home furnishings and clothing at retail. In each of plaintiff's stores, or very close to them, plaintiff's wholly owned subsidiaries operated a loan and finance business. The loan and finance businesses were operated by the following wholly owned subsidiaries of plaintiff; Interstate Loan Company, a Pennsylvania corporation; Interstate Consumer Discount Company, a Pennsylvania corporation; Interstate Finance Company, a New Jersey corporation, and Interstate Finance Company, a Delaware corporation.
4. The defendant, State Loan and Finance Corporation, is a holding company that owns the stock of a number of small loan companies. Defendant is not an operating company. Its business consists of raising capital and loaning the money to its subsidiary corporations to conduct their operations.
5. Prior to August 23, 1956, plaintiff had a loan agreement with a number of banks in Philadelphia. Following the death of Harry I. Stern, President of plaintiff, in May 1956, the banks called upon plaintiff to pay the loans within a year. The banks suggested that the plaintiff sell its wholly owned loan and finance companies. Plaintiff first attempted to sell the business of its loan and finance companies to Ritter Finance Company in August 1956 for $2,500,000, but Ritter Finance Company was unable to finance the purchase.
6. On August 23, 1956, officers of the defendant met with officers of the plaintiff for purposes of discussing the possibility of purchasing the loan and finance business operated by plaintiff's subsidiaries. At that meeting, defendant's officers advised plaintiff's officers that defendant was primarily interested in acquiring the loans receivable of plaintiff's subsidiaries. Plaintiff advised that it wanted $2,500,000 for the business and, in addition, the purchaser was to pay off the liabilities of plaintiff's subsidiaries. The purchase price, together with the assumption of liabilities, totalled approximately $7,000,000. Plaintiff advised that it would take $1,250,000 in cash and $1,250,000 in notes in payment of the purchase price, but that it would not simply sell the assets of the business but would only sell the corporate stock of its subsidiaries because of the time element involved.
7. At the meeting of August 23, 1956, defendant advised plaintiff that because of its policy of having each of its loan offices a separate corporation, it could not make the transaction unless it could work out a method of having each office a separate corporation. In addition, defendant advised plaintiff that because the loan offices operated by plaintiff's subsidiaries were located in its stores, and the customers of the stores were the same persons who were customers or borrowers of the loan companies, it desired plaintiff to agree not to compete for a period of time. Defendant advised that it was going to discuss with its tax counsel a method whereby each loan office could be operated as a separate corporation. Maurice Fierman, President of the plaintiff, then requested defendant's officers to inquire of their tax counsel what the tax consequences of the transaction would be to plaintiff and to write him a general summary of the discussion and basis of the proposed sale, and include in the letter what tax counsel had advised about plaintiff's tax situation.
8. Pursuant to the request of plaintiff's President, defendant, by its Executive Vice President, on August 30, 1956, sent the plaintiff a letter which states:
The letter was mailed from Washington, D. C. and was received in Philadelphia.
9. The form of contract submitted with defendant's letter of August 30, 1956, contained the following paragraph:
10. Joseph Shanis, Vice President of the plaintiff and a lawyer, participated in the...
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