Se. La. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Louisiana ex rel. Jindal

Decision Date27 May 2015
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 13–370.
Citation107 F.Supp.3d 584
Parties SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION TRADES COUNCIL, AFL–CIO, An Unincorporated Association v. State of LOUISIANA, ex rel. Bobby JINDAL, In his Official Capacity as Governor of the State of Louisiana. James D. "Buddy" Caldwell, In his Official Capacity as Attorney General of The State of Louisiana.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

Louis Leo Robein, III, Christina Leigh Carroll, Robein, Urann, Spencer, Picard & Cangemi, APLC, Metairie, LA, for Southeast Louisiana Building and Construction Trades Council, AFL–CIO, An Unincorporated Association.

Angelique Duhon Freel, Emily G. Andrews, Louisiana Department of Justice, Katherine K. Green, U.S. District Court, Baton Rouge, LA, for James D. "Buddy" Caldwell, In his Official Capacity as Attorney General of The State of Louisiana.

ORDER AND REASONS

STANWOOD R. DUVAL, JR., District Judge.

Before the Court are the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. Doc. 39, and Defendant's and Intervenors' Joint Motion for Summary Judgment, R. Doc. 40. The parties' cross-motions for summary judgment present a challenge to a Louisiana statute as being constitutionally preempted by the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., and the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Having considered the motions, memoranda, exhibits, and relevant law, the Court GRANTS the Defendant and Intervenors' Motion for Summary Judgment and DENIES the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment for reasons stated herein.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Southeast Louisiana Building and Construction Trades Council, AFL–CIO ("Plaintiff" or "The Council"), is an unincorporated association comprised of member labor organizations or building and construction trade unions throughout Southeast Louisiana. (Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. 12, R. Doc. 39). The Council exists to represents its members' interests, providing bargaining power and advancing the union sector of the construction market. Id. at 5. The Council's activities include negotiation of project labor agreements ("PLA" or "PLAs"), a type of collective bargaining agreement, on behalf of its members. Id. In 2011, the Louisiana legislature passed Act No. 134 ("Act 134") of the 2011 Regular Session, codified at La. R.S. 38:2225.5 (2014). On March 19, 2013, the Plaintiff was informed by the City of New Orleans that it could not enter into a potential PLA with the Council for the construction of the New Orleans East Hospital District A by virtue of the prohibition of such agreements as circumscribed by Act 134. (See Def.'s & Inter. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 3 at 5, R. Doc. 40). In turn, Plaintiff filed a Complaint on February 27, 2013, alleging that Act 134 is unconstitutional and unenforceable naming Bobby Jindal, Governor of Louisiana, and James D. Caldwell, Attorney General for the state of Louisiana, as Defendants. On May 2, 2013, the Louisiana Chapter, the New Orleans–Bayou Chapter, and the Pelican Chapter of Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc., (collectively "ABC" or "Intervenors") intervened. On December 18, 2013, the Court granted Defendants' motion and dismissed Governor Jindal from the action. Order, Dec. 18, 2013, R. Doc. 23.

In its instant Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction prohibiting the enforcement of Act 134 and a declaration that Act 134 is preempted by federal law. See Pl. Mot. 1.1 Defendant and Intervenors maintain, however, in their joint Motion for Summary Judgment, that the controlling law compels judgment in their favor as the Louisiana statute is not preempted by the NLRA. (Def.'s & Intervenors' Mot. Summ. J. 1, R. Doc 40).

A party is entitled to summary judgment only if "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The determination of whether a genuine issue of material fact exists is a question of law that must be decided by the court when raised by motions for summary judgment, despite the fact that the parties agree no factual issues exist.2 "[A] party moving for summary judgment concedes the absence of a factual issue and the truth of the nonmoving party's allegations only for purposes of his own motion."3 Cross-motions for summary judgment must be considered separately, as each movant bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.4 If there is no genuine issue and one of the parties is entitled to prevail as a matter of law, the court will render summary judgment for that party.5 Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Stahl v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 263 (5th Cir.2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

No party contends that genuine issues of material fact exist and each party seeks summary judgment in its favor as a matter of law. Upon review of the competent summary judgment evidence, including the record and any admissible exhibits attached to the parties' motions,6 the Court finds that no genuine issue of material fact exists.7 Thus, the Court must determine the party in whose favor judgment should be granted as a matter of law. As Congressional intent is the "touchstone" of preemption,8 a review of the relevant NLRA provisions is necessary in addition to an examination of the state legislation at issue.

A. Construction Industry under the NLRA and Project Labor Agreements

In 1935, Congress enacted the NLRA, Pub.L. No. 74–189, 49 Stat. 449, codified as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., in which it articulated a national labor policy and created the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") to implement it. See N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 22–24, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893 (1937). The NLRA declared that it was the public policy of the United States that employees shall be free from interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor in self-organization for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid.9 The NLRA is concerned primarily with establishing an equitable process for determining terms and conditions of employment and not with particular substantive terms of the bargain that is struck when the parties are negotiating from relatively equal positions. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 753–54, 105 S.Ct. 2380, 2396, 85 L.Ed.2d 728 (1985) ; see H.K. Porter Co. v. N.L.R.B., 397 U.S. 99, 108, 90 S.Ct. 821, 826, 25 L.Ed.2d 146 (1970).

Section 7 of the NLRA guarantees employees the right to organize and join unions, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. 29 U.S.C. § 157. Section 8, on the other hand, concerns unfair labor practices. See 29 U.S.C. § 158. In 1947, the Taft–Hartley Act amended the NLRA and outlawed the closed shop, curtailed the strike and boycott, and declared that employees had the right to refrain from union activity, Labor Management Relations Act (Taft—Hartley Act), Pub.L. No. 80–101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), codified as amended 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. See N.L.R.B. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 740, 83 S.Ct. 1453, 1458, 10 L.Ed.2d 670 (1963). In 1959, the Landrum–Griffin Act further restricted labor's picketing and boycott activities, and regulated internal union affairs. SeePub.L. No. 86–257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959); Nat'l Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. N.L.R.B., 386 U.S. 612, 633, 87 S.Ct. 1250, 1262, 18 L.Ed.2d 357 (1967) ; Marriott In–Flite Servs. v. Local 504, Air Transp. Div., Transp. Workers of Am., AFL–CIO, 557 F.2d 295, 298 (2d Cir.1977) (citation omitted). One of the major aims of the 1959 Act was to limit "top down" organizing campaigns, in which unions used economic weapons to force recognition from an employer regardless of the wishes of its employees. Connell Const. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 632, 95 S.Ct. 1830, 1840, 44 L.Ed.2d 418 (1975).

Among the amendments made were the addition of Section 8(f) and modification of Section 8(e) of the NLRA, both of which made specific exceptions for the construction industry. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) and (f) ; see Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors of Mass./R. I., Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 230, 113 S.Ct. 1190, 122 L.Ed.2d 565 (1993) ("Boston Harbor "). Section 8(f) specifically allows "prehire agreements," or agreements made between and employer and a labor organization covering employees not yet hired—only for those employees in the construction industry. 29 U.S.C. § 158 ; see John Deklewa & Sons, 282 N.L.R.B. 1375, 1380–81 (1987). "These agreements may be signed before the union represents a majority of the employer's employees, and may continue in duration through more than one of the employer's jobs, even if the employer goes through a high employee turnover." Todd v. Jim McNeff, Inc., 667 F.2d 800, 801–02 (9th Cir.)aff'd, 459 U.S. 1013, 103 S.Ct. 370, 74 L.Ed.2d 505 (1982) and aff'd, 461 U.S. 260, 103 S.Ct. 1753, 75 L.Ed.2d 830 (1983). Without this exception, forming a prehire agreement might have constituted an unfair labor practice, "for such an agreement (naming the unions to which all employees of all contractors and subcontractors must belong) might be seen as interfering with employees' rights to bargain through representatives of their own choosing, in violation of §§ 8(a)(1) and 7, see id. §§ 158(a)(1) & 157, or unreasonably discriminating against those who are not...

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