Nachtman v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.

Decision Date04 August 1955
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 8906.
Citation134 F. Supp. 392
PartiesJohn S. NACHTMAN, Plaintiff, v. JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORPORATION, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

Patterson, Crawford, Arensberg & Dunn, Pittsburgh, Pa., Newmeyer & Bress, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.

Blenko, Hoopes, Leonard & Buell, Walter J. Blenko, Walter J. Blenko, Jr., Pittsburgh, Pa., Edgar J. Goodrich, James M. Carlisle, Washington, D. C., for defendant.

WILLSON, District Judge.

This patent case was tried to a jury. Plaintiff, John S. Nachtman, in his complaint alleged that the defendant, Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, in its electro tin line has infringed four of plaintiff's patents, that is Reissue Patent 20,788, issued July 12, 1938; Patent 2,240,265, issued April 29, 1941; Patent 2,459,674, issued January 18, 1949; and Patent 2,576,074, issued November 20, 1951. The defense was invalidity of the patents and noninfringement. The jury, in answering an interrogatory as to each patent, found that each was valid and infringed. In the general verdict on the issue of damages the jury found for plaintiff. That portion of the general verdict on damages is as follows:

"* * * we, * * * find the defendant guilty of infringement as charged and fixed royalties 2½% or $1,474,495.72 on estimated tonnage and price per ton from 1944 through 1949."

At the close of all the evidence, defendant moved for a directed verdict. Decision on this motion was reserved, except as to that part of the motion relating to an issue of misappropriation, which was granted. Judgment on the verdict was entered on February 28, 1955. Defendant filed a timely motion to set aside the verdict and judgment and for judgment for the defendant n. o. v., pursuant to the provisions of Rule 50(b), Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 28 U.S.C.A. Defendant also filed a timely motion for a new trial.

Oral argument has been had on the motions. Prior thereto, it was suggested to counsel that they cite authorities on the weight and effect to be given the jury verdict on the issue of validity. On that question, counsel have been most helpful. Defendant's position is that in the circumstances of this case, the question of validity of the patents is solely for the court and the jury verdict should be given no weight or effect whatsoever. In support, defendant cites Ryan Distributing Corp. v. Caley, 3 Cir., 1945, 147 F.2d 138; Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 1950, 340 U.S. 147, 71 S.Ct. 127, 95 L.Ed. 162; Packwood v. Briggs & Stratton Corp., 3 Cir., 1952, 195 F.2d 971, certiorari denied 344 U.S. 844, 73 S.Ct. 61, 97 L.Ed. 657; Fischer & Porter Co. v. Brooks Rotameter Co., D.C., 107 F.Supp. 1010; and the opinion of Judge Marsh in Fraver v. Studebaker Corp., D.C., 112 F.Supp. 209, affirmed 3 Cir., 208 F.2d 794.

Defendant says the case is not one where the validity of the patents is contingent upon the resolution of disputed questions of fact. To the contrary, defendant says this is a case where legal rules and standards of patentability are to be applied to undisputed facts. In such circumstances the question of validity is to be determined solely by the court and the finding of the jury can have no weight or effect in the determination, says the defendant.

Plaintiff, on the other hand, takes a sharply contra position to defendant on the weight and effect to be given the jury verdict in this case. Plaintiff cites familiar and cardinal rules and says that they have application in this case, that is:

"(a) The Court must consider the testimony in a light most advantageous to the plaintiff, all conflicts therein must be resolved in plaintiff's favor and plaintiff must be given the benefit of every fact and inference in his favor deducible from the evidence. Van Sant v. American Exp. Co., 3 Cir., 1948, 169 F.2d 355; Patton v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., D.C.W.D.Pa.1953, 120 F. Supp. 659; Grobengieser v. Clearfield Cheese Co., D.C.W.D.Pa.1950, 94 F.Supp. 402.
"(b) The Court is not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdict, merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions, or because the Court regards another result as more reasonable. McFadden v. B altimore & O. R. Co., D.C.W.D.Pa. 1951, 95 F.Supp. 255; Patton, supra.
"(c) It is the jury's sole and exclusive function and prerogative to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and select from the entire evidence that which is to be believed or relied upon. Gunning v. Cooley, 1930, 281 U.S. 90, 94 50 S.Ct. 231, 74 L. Ed. 720; Loew's, Inc., v. Cinema Amusements, 10 Cir., 1954, 210 F. 2d 86, 93. In so doing the jury alone must `* * * consider many separate strands of circumstances, and from these circumstances * * * draw its ultimate conclusions. * * *' Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 1948, 336 U.S. 53, 63 69 S.Ct. 413, 93 L.Ed. 497. And when the jury has done this
`Only when there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion reached does a reversible error appear. But where, as here, there is an evidentiary basis for the jury's verdict, the jury is free to discard or disbelieve whatever facts are inconsistent with its conclusion.'"

Plaintiff says that in a patent case it is a function of the fact finder to resolve questions: as to the equivalency of structures, Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 1950, 339 U.S. 605, 70 S.Ct. 854, 94 L.Ed. 1097; whether combinations of old mechanical constructions involve patentable new results, Williams Mfg. Co. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 1942, 316 U.S. 364, 62 S.Ct. 1179, 86 L.Ed. 1537; whether there was prior use, Webb v. Frisch, 7 Cir., 1940, 111 F.2d 887; whether the patent claim was sufficiently specific, Bank v. Rauland Corp., 7 Cir., 1944, 146 F.2d 19; which of conflicting experts is to be believed, Hazeltine Research v. Admiral Corp., 7 Cir., 1950, 183 F.2d 953, certiorari denied 340 U.S. 896, 71 S.Ct. 239, 95 L.Ed. 650; whether improvement involves mere mechanical skill or invention. Trico Products Corp. v. Delman Corp., 8 Cir., 1950, 180 F.2d 529.

It is believed that Judge Hastie in the Packwood case has stated the correct view as to the weight to be given to the verdict of the jury in this case. He said, 195 F.2d at page 973:

"* * * A jury in a patent case is not free to treat invention as a concept broad enough to include whatever discovery or novelty may impress the jurors favorably. Over the years the courts of the United States, and particularly the Supreme Court, have found meaning implicit in the scheme and purpose of the patent laws which aids in the construction of their general language. In this process, rules and standards have been developed for use as guides to the systematic and orderly definition and application of such a conception as invention in accordance with what the courts understand to be the true meaning of the Constitution and the patent laws. Once such standards and rules are authoritatively announced any finding of `invention' whether by a court or a jury must be consistent with them. (Emphasis supplied.)
"This is no peculiarity of patent law. Jury findings of negligence or proximate cause must comport with common law rules devised to give reasonable and systematic meaning to those generalities. For such rules, see Restatement of the Law, Torts, Negligence, Chs. 12-16. And so it is throughout the body of the common law. This authority and responsibility to keep jury findings within reasoned rules and standards is an essential function of United States judges today as it long has been of common law judges. Citing cases. It stands as a great safeguard against gross mistake or caprice in fact finding."

In considering the motion for judgment n. o. v., this Court has in mind the proposition that I —

"* * * was not free to reweigh the evidence or set aside the verdict because the jury might have drawn different inferences or conclusions or the court might have thought another result more reasonable, but must take the view of the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff. * * *" Magee v. General Motors Corp., 3 Cir., 213 F.2d 899, 900.

Nevertheless, a review of all of the evidence and the law compels the conclusion that defendant's motion for judgment n. o. v. must be granted.

* * * * *

As historical background of the issues raised in this case, a portion of an article under the name of plaintiff, John S. Nachtman, published in the trade magazine "Steel" on June 12, 1939, which publication is widely circulated in the steel industry and which article is in the evidence, is clarifying. The title of the article, the heading, name of author and a portion of the article are as follows:

"Title: Electrotinning Strip Steel "Heading: New continuous electrotinning line fuses deposited tin coating to steel strip in an oil bath, giving excellent uniformity. Speeds up to 400 feet per minute with an output of 96 tons per 8-hour turn are obtained. Tin loss is practically eliminated. "Author: John S. Nachtman Manager Electrochemical Processes Division Blaw-Knox Co. Pittsburgh

"When the 4-high strip mill established itself and when continuous methods began invading many phases of steel production, continuous electrotinning and plating of strip products became inevitable, particularly since basic principles of electroplating have been understood and the process applied commercially to a limited extent for three-quarters of a century.
"It may be considered that the continuous electrotinning process has been a long time in `arriving' — but that is because there has been much of a new nature to develop. From 1927, when the writer supervised the installation of possibly the first continuous unit for electrogalvanizing wide steel, there has been steady research and development to attain the most efficient and economical electrotinning process. The early electrogalvanizing unit was directly followed by similar units for plating of strip with copper, tin, cadmium and nickel. All of these
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    ...is covered by the reissue patent was intended to be covered and secured by the original patent. See also, Nachtman v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 134 F.Supp. 392 (W.D.Pa.1955), aff'd., 235 F.2d 211 (3rd Cir. 1956) cert. denied, 352 U.S. 971, 77 S.Ct. 363, 1 L.Ed.2d 324 In both United Stat......
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