Hotel & Restaurant Emp. Intern. Alliance v. Greenwood

• Decision Date: 24 April 1947
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 515.
• Citation: 30 So.2d 696,249 Ala. 265
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Parties: HOTEL & RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES, INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE, et al. v. GREENWOOD et al.

30 So.2d 696

249 Ala. 265

HOTEL & RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES, INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE, et al. v. GREENWOOD et al.

6 Div. 515.

Supreme Court of Alabama

April 24, 1947

Rehearing Denied June 12, 1947. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Earl McBee, John L. Busby and D. G. Ewing, all of Birmingham, for appellants.

Herbert S. Thatcher, of Washington, D. C., and Warren E. Hall, Jr. of Atlanta, Ga., for American Federation of Labor and appellant Union.

Horace C. Wilkinson, of Birmingham, for appellees.

The following are provisions of the proposed contract:

'Article I. Type of Shop: The Employer agrees to hire and retain in his employ, no other of the employees herein mentioned but members in good standing in the Union and to hire them through the office of the Union. The Union shall have a 24-hour limit in which to furnish the requested employees. If the Union is not in a position to furnish the employees requested within that time, then the Employer shall have the right to hire from the open market, provided, however, that the employees so hired shall not be objectionable to the Union, and that employees so hired shall perfect their membership in the Union within fifteen days after being hired. All employees so hired shall be on probation for the first fifteen days of their employment and subject to dismissal without cause.

'Article XIV. Dues and Initiations: The Employer hereby agrees to deduct from the wages of each employee, the monthly dues and assessments as directed by the Union. The Employer also hereby agrees to deduct from the wages of new employees who are not members of the Union, any monies as directed by the Union. Deductions for dues are to be made from the first pay of each month, and are payable to an accredited representative of the Union.'

SIMPSON Justice.

The plaintiffs (appellees) are partners in the cafe business in Birmingham, Alabama, known as 'Greenwood Cafe', and the defendants are international and local unions of the American Federation of Labor and the union's respective agents, Hacker and Hardwick. The defendants have appealed from a final decree of the circuit court in equity permanently restraining the striking and picketing of the Cafe. The union employees struck as a result of a labor controversy with the cafe owners.

Alabama as well as many other states, has sanctioned the primary strike. Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Vol. 1, § 84, p. 247. Of this right this court in the case of Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 14, 18 So.2d 810, 820, speaking through our present Chief Justice, said: 'And we think it is well-settled that the members of a labor organization--that is, workmen who are not bound by contract for a definite period and have not, by agreement freely made, given up such rights--may, without liability, abandon their employment at any time, either singly or in a body, as a means of compelling or attempting to compel, their employers to accede to demands for better terms and conditions. As the Massachusetts Court observed in Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N.E. 753, 6 L.R.A.,N.S., 1067, 116 Am.St.Rep. 272, 7 Ann.Cas. 638, laborers, in the exercise of the common-law rights of citizens to pursue their callings as in their judgment they see fit, have a right to organize unions and to utilize such organizations by instituting a strike. See also Bossert v. Dhuy, 221, N.Y. 342, 117 N.E. 582, Ann.Cas.1918D, 661. Numerous authorities are found cited in 31 Am.Jur. p. 929.'

This is the settled general American rule and 'under the rule, laborers who have a just or fancied grievance as to hours of work, wages, etc., about which there is a dispute with their employer, may strike to coerce compliance with their demands. Some courts even hold that they may strike irrespective of whether they have cause for quitting. It is not material that laborers quit their employment by a preconcerted arrangement, that the strike is ordered and carried on by the action and through the instrumentality of a labor union, or that it is known at the time that the act of quitting employment will be attended with injury and damage to the business of the employer.' 31 Am.Jur. 929, 930, § 192. (This statement of principle is supported by numerous authorities appearing in the note to the text. See footnote hereto. ^[1]

The right to strike is generally rested on the lawfulness of the object or purpose for which the strike was inaugurated and modern authorities are now in general agreement that labor possesses the right to strike where their complaints are in good faith referable to wages, hours, or other conditions of immediate employment. When the strike is so aimed it is regarded by the courts as lawful. Teller, supra, § 85, p. 249; McAdory Case, supra; Hardie-Tynes Mfg. Co. v. Cruise, 189 Ala. 66, 66 So. 657; authorities in footnote supra.

On this question the American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Torts, pp. 118-120, § 783, Topic 2, comments as follows:

'* * * the propriety of the object of workers' concerted activity does not depend upon a judicial determination of its fairness as between workers and employers. The issue is, rather, whether the workers are demanding something which is reasonably related to employment and to the purposes of collective bargaining. Is the object one the attainment of which the workers believe will strengthen their bargaining power in the labor market, or will constitute an immediate benefit to themselves in their present jobs?

'Again, the issue as to propriety of the object does not require a judicial determination that the attainment of the object will in fact benefit the workers as stated. The inquiry is, rather, whether the workers are really seeking this object and believe that its attainment will benefit them. * * *

* * *

* * *

'Finally, in the absence of applicable legislation to the contrary, the propriety of an object of concerted action by workers does not depend upon whether the object has the support of a majority of the workers affected. Concerted movements which ultimately gain the support of majorities are frequently begun by minorities.'

We have carefully studied each of the cases cited in briefs but will not burden the opinion with the purposeless inclusion here of the vast array of authorities (sometimes conflictory even in a single jurisdiction). Our view is that the present state of the law is substantially as epitomized in the foregoing texts. In short, as a general proposition it may now be said that 'workmen may lawfully combine to assert various forms of economic pressure upon an employer, provided the object sought to be accomplished thereby has a reasonable relation to the betterment of labor conditions, and they act peaceably and honestly.' Steiner v. Long Beach Local, 19 Cal.2d 676, 123 P.2d 20, 24.

As a corollary to this general principle, and to further illucidate the doctrine, the following quotation from the opinion of Chief Justice Cardozo, then of the New York Court of Appeals, in the case of Nann v. Raimist, 255 N.Y. 307, 174 N.E. 690, 693, 73 A.L.R. 669, 674, is illustrative: '* * * the legality of the defendant's conduct is not affected by the fact that no strike is in progress in any of the plaintiff's shops. Exchange Bakery & Restaurant v. Rifkin, 245 N.Y. 260, 157 N.E. 130. If the defendant believes in good faith that the policy pursued by the plaintiff and by the shops united with the plaintiff is hostile to the interests of organized labor, and is likely, if not suppressed, to lower the standards of living for workers in the trade, it has the privilege by the pressure of notoriety and persuasion to bring its own policy to triumph. Exchange Bakery & Restaurant v. Rifkin, supra; Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N.Y. 342, 117 N.E. 582, Ann.Cas.1918D, 661.'

The limit of judicial authority to restrain a strike without impairment of the freedoms guaranteed by the several amendments to the federal constitution is to be determined by the lawfulness of the object aimed at and the manner in which the strike is conducted. If the object is within the scope of union activity, that is, reasonably related to wages, hours or other conditions of immediate employment and is lawfully and peaceably carried out and not attended with violence or other unlawful acts, it should not be subjected to judicial restraint. This principle, as we view it, is implicit in the guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment to our federal constitution as an incident of freedom of speech, as lately declared by decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093; American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S.Ct. 568, 85 L.Ed. 855; Steiner v. Long Beach Local, supra.

Recent such decisions have somewhat trenched upon the soundness of earlier cases formerly regarded as authoritative and it is now the settled modern rule that such a strike may be lawfully supported by various forms of advertising, including peaceful picketing. 'Dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution. * * * The safeguarding of these means is essential to the securing of an informed and educated public opinion with respect to a matter which is of public concern. It may be that effective exercise of the means of advancing public knowledge may persuade some of those reached to refrain from entering into advantageous relations with the business establishment which is the scene of the dispute. Every expression of opinion on matters that are important has the potentiality of inducing action in the interests of one rather than another group in society. But the group in...