Wilson v. Prince George's Cnty., 17-1856

Citation893 F.3d 213
Decision Date18 June 2018
Docket NumberNo. 17-1856,17-1856
Parties Damon WILSON, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND; PFC Gill, ID #3361, Prince George's County Police, Defendants–Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

ARGUED: George Aubrey Harper, Law Offices of George Harper, Upper Marlboro, Maryland, for Appellant. Gessesse Teferi, Prince George's County Office Of Law, Upper Marlboro, Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Jared M. McCarthy, County Attorney, Andrew J. Murray, Deputy County Attorney, Prince George's County Office Of Law, Upper Marlboro, Maryland, for Appellees.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and KEENAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge:

Damon Wilson was shot several times during an encounter with Officer Brendan Gill, a Prince George's County, Maryland, police officer. The incident occurred while Officer Gill was investigating an emergency call that Wilson had committed a burglary of his former girlfriend's dwelling and had assaulted her.

Wilson filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Gill and Prince George's County (collectively, the defendants), alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Wilson also alleged in his complaint that Officer Gill's conduct violated certain provisions of Maryland state law. The district court awarded summary judgment in the defendants’ favor, holding that Officer Gill was entitled to qualified immunity, and that the County was not liable because no constitutional violation occurred.1

Upon our review, we hold that the district court erred in determining that Officer Gill's conduct did not violate Wilson's Fourth Amendment rights. Nevertheless, we affirm the district court's determination that Officer Gill is entitled to qualified immunity, because we hold that the constitutional violation was not clearly established when the incident occurred. We also affirm the court's judgment on the common law intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Officer Gill and on the respondeat superior claim asserted against the County. However, because questions of immunity under state law remain, we vacate the court's award of summary judgment on Wilson's remaining state-law claims against Officer Gill, and remand those claims to the district court for further proceedings.

I.

The parties largely agree on the events that occurred from the moment that Officer Gill first saw Wilson until the time that Officer Gill fired his weapon. We note any disputes of fact below.

On October 7, 2012, late in the afternoon, Wilson walked to the home of his former girlfriend, Mynia Johnson, because he wanted to see his two daughters who were in Johnson's care. After "knocking" and "banging" on Johnson's apartment door and receiving no response, Wilson began shouting that he wanted to see his children. As his anger increased, Wilson "kicked down" the front door of Johnson's apartment and walked inside, cursing and yelling at Johnson and one of her male guests.

After greeting one daughter, Wilson left the apartment. Johnson followed him outside and, during an argument that ensued, Wilson slapped Johnson. When Johnson threatened to call the police, Wilson attempted to take her phone, which fell into a drain.

Wilson left the area and walked to his brother's home. Because his brother was preoccupied with other matters, Wilson once again became angry, seized a pocket knife, and left his brother's home. Wilson walked back toward Johnson's apartment, intending to commit suicide in front of her so that she would blame herself for his death.

Meanwhile, Johnson had placed a telephone call to a 911 operator and had informed the operator that her ex-boyfriend had broken into her apartment and had assaulted her. Officer Gill arrived at the apartment in response to the 911 call. Johnson showed Officer Gill the damaged apartment door, and informed him that Wilson had assaulted her after breaking into the apartment. Johnson later accompanied Officer Gill outside the building. As Officer Gill and Johnson were leaving the building, Johnson observed Wilson some distance away and identified him to Officer Gill, who directed Johnson to return to her apartment.2

Officer Gill began walking toward Wilson, attempting to engage him in a dialogue. Moments later, Wilson pulled a shiny object out of his pocket.3 However, due to the distance between him and Wilson, Officer Gill was unable to identify the object.

Because Wilson continued walking in Officer Gill's direction, Officer Gill drew his service weapon and commanded Wilson between ten and fifteen times to drop the object in his hands, which object Officer Gill later identified as a knife. After Wilson failed to drop the knife, Officer Gill called for assistance on his radio. Wilson told Officer Gill to leave so that Wilson could "do what [he] wan[ted to] do." Wilson ignored Officer Gill's repeated command that Wilson drop the knife.

Instead, Wilson began directing obscene remarks at Johnson. Rather than drop the knife, Wilson took some steps forward, started "poking" himself with the knife, and "slit his throat." He then took a few more steps toward Officer Gill, and began "stab[bing]" and "poking" himself in the chest, which he testified caused him to "stumble[ ]" forward about four steps.

According to Wilson, at this point he was about 20 feet away from Officer Gill. Officer Gill, however, disputed Wilson's estimate and stated that he was between 10 and 15 feet away from Wilson. Johnson, who was standing about one or two feet behind Officer Gill, estimated that Wilson stopped eight feet away from Officer Gill. Although Officer Gill stated that Wilson "closed the distance" after stabbing himself in the chest, Officer Gill did not describe Wilson's movement with any particularity. However, sensing that Wilson was "too close," Officer Gill discharged his firearm five times, aiming for the center of Wilson's body. The record does not indicate whether Officer Gill issued a further warning to Wilson before shooting him. The record also lacks information regarding how quickly Officer Gill deployed the five shots.

Wilson suffered multiple gunshot wounds

to the torso, but the record does not indicate which shots, or how many shots, hit Wilson. The gunshot wounds caused Wilson to fall to the ground. With the assistance of another police officer who arrived shortly after the shooting, Officer Gill rolled Wilson away from the knife, placed handcuffs on him, and began performing CPR.4

In his complaint filed against Officer Gill and Prince George's County, Wilson asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, as well as several claims under Maryland law.5 The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that Officer Gill's conduct was reasonable and that he otherwise was immune from suit under the doctrine of qualified immunity. In granting the defendants’ motion, the district court concluded that Officer Gill's use of force was objectively reasonable and, therefore, did not constitute excessive force. Based on this conclusion, the district court also dismissed Wilson's remaining claims against Officer Gill, as well as his claims against Prince George's County.6 Wilson timely noted this appeal.

II.
A.

We review de novo the district court's award of summary judgment. Meyers v. Balt. Cty., Md. , 713 F.3d 723, 730 (4th Cir. 2013). Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no material facts in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Meyers , 713 F.3d at 730.

In conducting our review, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to Wilson, the non-moving party. Lee v. Town of Seaboard , 863 F.3d 323, 327 (4th Cir. 2017). We do not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations.

See Ray Commc’ns, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc. , 673 F.3d 294, 305 (4th Cir. 2012) (stating that credibility determinations are not part of summary judgment proceedings); Gray v. Spillman , 925 F.2d 90, 95 (4th Cir. 1991) (assessing witness credibility and weighing evidence are functions of the jury, not of the trial judge ruling on motion for summary judgment).

B.

Qualified immunity is a doctrine that "balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). The doctrine of qualified immunity protects from liability officers who commit constitutional violations, but whose conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights known to a reasonable person. Meyers , 713 F.3d at 731. The burden of proving the affirmative defense of qualified immunity rests on the party seeking to invoke it. Id .

Our application of the qualified immunity doctrine is guided by the Supreme Court's analysis in Saucier v. Katz , 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), later modified by the Court's decision in Pearson , 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565. Under the Court's two-step approach, we may first determine whether the facts alleged or shown, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, establish that the officer's conduct violated the plaintiff's constitutional right. Saucier , 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. If this initial prong is satisfied, we evaluate whether the right at issue was "clearly established" at the time of the officer's conduct.7 Id. Accordingly, even when the facts in the record establish that the officer's conduct violated a plaintiff's constitutional rights, the officer still is entitled to immunity from suit "if a reasonable person in the [officer's] position...

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