Anglin & Stevenson v. United States

• Citation: 160 F.2d 670
• Decision Date: 02 June 1947
• Docket Number: No. 3410.,3410.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)
• Parties: ANGLIN & STEVENSON et al. v. UNITED STATES et al.

160 F.2d 670 (1947)

ANGLIN & STEVENSON et al. v. UNITED STATES et al.

No. 3410.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

March 21, 1947.

Writ of Certiorari Denied June 2, 1947.

Joseph C. Stone, of Muskogee (Charles A. Moon, of Muskogee, on the brief), for appellants.

Fred W. Smith, of Washington, D.C. (David L. Bazelon, of Washington, D. C., Cleon A. Summers, of Muskogee, Okl., and Roger P. Marquis, of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellees.

Before BRATTON, HUXMAN, and MURRAH, Circuit Judges.

Writ of Certiorari Denied June 2, 1947. See 67 S.Ct. 1514.

MURRAH, Circuit Judge.

The sole question presented by this appeal is whether interest is chargeable on a judgment against the United States as guardian for full-blood restricted Indian heirs, payable out of restricted funds belonging to the Indians in the custody of the Secretary of the Interior.

In Scott v. Beams, 122 F.2d 777, certiorari denied 315 U.S. 809, 62 S.Ct. 795, 86 L.Ed. 1209, we sustained the trial court's decree determining heirship and settling the Estate of Jackson Barnett, a full-blood Creek Indian, who died seized of a restricted estate in the custody and control of the Secretary of the Interior, having a net value of more than one million dollars. See also Brady v. Beams, 10 Cir., 132 F.2d 985. In United States v. Anglin & Stevenson et al. 145 F.2d 622, we sustained the supplemental decree of the trial court awarding attorney fees and expenses to the attorneys for the successful heirs to the Estate and ordering the same paid out of the distributive shares of such claimants. The supplemental decree, entered June 23, 1943, was silent with respect to interest, as was the mandate of affirmance, and when the fees and expenses were paid into the registry of the court in satisfaction of the judgment, no interest was included. Under the order of disbursement entered by the trial court, the respective attorneys were allowed to accept the sum ordered paid without prejudice to their right to claim interest thereon from June 23, 1943 until the date of payment, the court reserving jurisdiction for the purpose of hearing and determining all matters incident or ancillary to the case.

The attorneys applied the disbursements first to the payment of interest, then to the principal, and thereafter made formal demand upon the Secretary for the balance claimed, representing 6% interest on the judgment from the date of rendition until payment. Acting under the advice of the Attorney General, the Secretary denied the claim, stating that since the payments were made without prejudice to the claim for interest, and since the trial court had reserved jurisdiction, the question was one for the decision of the trial court. Accordingly, the attorneys made formal application in the original proceedings for the allowance of interest. The trial court denied the claim on the grounds (1) that the judgment was against the United States, and interest was therefore not recoverable in the absence of explicit authority; and (2) if the Court had known that interest would be claimed, he would have "probably lessened the amount" of the original judgment.

On appeal from that order, the attorneys invoke Rule 25 of this Court which provides: "In cases where the judgment or decree of the inferior court is affirmed, interest thereon shall be calculated and levied from the date of the judgment or decree until the same is paid, at the same rate that similar judgments and decrees bear interest in the courts of the state where such judgment was rendered * * *." It is said that this Rule having the force of law, operated as a mandate to the trial court to calculate the interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from June 23, 1943 until date of payment, and to include the same as a part of the affirmed judgment. We are asked to so construe our mandate, and to direct the payment of interest as a part of the judgment in accordance with the Rule.

The Rule is in harmony with the related statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 811, and has the force of law. Weil v. Neary, 278 U.S. 160, 169, 49 S.Ct. 144, 73 L.Ed. 243, and cases cited; Perkins v. Fourniquet, 14 How. 328, 55 U.S. 328, 14 L.Ed. 441; Schell v. Cochran, 107 U.S. 625, 2 S.Ct. 827, 27 L.Ed. 543. It thus operates to automatically and mandatorily impose the legal rate of interest upon a judgment from the date of its rendition until paid. Blair v. Durham, 6 Cir., 139 F.2d 260; Huntley v. Southern Oregon Sales, 9 Cir., 104 F.2d 153; Amis v. Smith, 16 Pet. 303, 41 U.S. 303, 10 L.Ed. 973. But the Rule has no application to judgments or decrees against the United States, unless it has expressly consented to waive its traditional immunity therefrom. "In other words, in the absence of constitutional requirements, interest can be recovered against the United States only if express consent to such a recovery has been given by Congress. * * * The consent necessary to waive the traditional immunity must be express, and it must be strictly construed." United States v. N. Y. Rayon Importing Co., U.S. 67 S.Ct. 601, 603. See also United States v. The Thayer-West Point Hotel Co., U.S., 67 S.Ct. 398; United States v. Goltra, 312 U.S. 203, 61 S.Ct. 487, 85 L.Ed. 776; Reed v. Howbert, 10 Cir., 77 F.2d 227; Huntley v. Southern Oregon Sales, supra. It follows that if this judgment is against the United States, Rule 25 has no application here, and the trial...