Atchison, T.& S.F. Ry. Co. v. Locals Nos. 70, 85, and 315, of Intern. Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America

• Decision Date: 18 February 1975
• Docket Number: No. 73--3221,73--3221
• Citation: 511 F.2d 1193
• Parties: 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2971, 76 Lab.Cas. P 10,712 The ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, a corporation, Appellant, v. LOCALS NOS. 70, 85, AND 315, OF the INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, an unincorporated association, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1193

511 F.2d 1193

88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2971, 76 Lab.Cas. P 10,712

The ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, a corporation, Appellant, v. LOCALS NOS. 70, 85, AND 315, OF the INTERNATIONAL

BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN

AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, an

unincorporated association, Appellees.

No. 73--3221.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Feb. 18, 1975.

John J. Balluff, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant.

Duane B. Beeson, of Brundage, Neyhart, Grodin & Beeson, San Francisco, Cal., for appellees.

OPINION

Before BARNES and CHOY, Circuit Judges, and EAST, District Judge. ^*

PER CURIAM:

For the reasons stated in the opinion of Judge Peckham filed in the district court which we incorporate herein by appendix, we affirm the judgment below.

APPENDIX

In the United States District Court Northern District of California

The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, a

corporation, Plaintiff,

vs.

Locals Nos. 70, 85, and 315, of the International

Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen

and Helpers of America, an

unincorporated association, Defendants.

No. C--73--1219 RFP

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Defendant union locals are parties to a collective bargaining agreement with Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. ('Trail'), a motor carrier, dealing in part with the loading and unloading of trailers or vans. Trail in turn has an oral contract with Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co. ('Railway') under which Trail hauls highway trailers to and from customers of Railway, before or after said trailers have been carried 'piggy-back' style by Railway.

One of the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, requiring loading and unloading to be performed by employees working under the agreement, was found by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to violate Section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(e). Prior to this determination and the ensuing injunction against enforcement of the provision in question, the union locals extracted substantial payments from Trail to union members for work which would otherwise have been performed by the consignees, and Trail passed these costs on to Railway under a provision of the hauling agreement between the latter two. Railway now sues the union locals to recover these extra costs which were imposed upon Railway as a result of the union's unfair labor practice.

Railway's motion to amend its complaint, adding 28 U.S.C. § 1337 as a basis for jurisdiction, is granted as a matter of course, no responsive pleading having been filed. F.R.Civ.P. 15(a).

Defendants now move this court for an order dismissing the complaint on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction.

Plaintiff has cited, as the basis for jurisdiction, the following statutes: 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337; 29 U.S.C. §§ 185, 187.

As to the former two, this court is of the opinion that it is barred from taking jurisdiction of this matter by the so-called preemption doctrine, explained at length in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959), and reaffirmed more recently in Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 91 S.Ct. 1909, 29 L.Ed.2d 473 (1971). Simply stated, the doctrine holds that 'the National Labor Relations Act preempts state and federal court jurisdiction to remedy conduct that is arguably protected or prohibited by the Act.' Lockridge, supra, 403 U.S. at 276, 91 S.Ct. at 1913. This doctrine has been consistently applied to block efforts of state and federal courts to regulate conduct 'arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act,' namely, unfair labor practices. Id. at 284, 91 S.Ct. at 1916; see also, e.g., Marydale Products Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers of America, AFL--CIO, 322 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1963); Comb Construction Co. v Hospital Board of Memorial Hospital, 57 CCH Lab.Cas. 12,403 (W.D.Wisc.1968). The doctrine represents a judicial attempt 'to delimit state and federal judicial authority over labor disputes in order to preclude, so far as reasonably possible, conflict between the exertion of judicial and administrative power in the attainment of the multifaceted policies underlying the federal scheme.' Lock-ridge, supra, 403 U.S. at 286, 91 S.Ct. at 1918.

The Supreme Court has, of course, recognized a number of exceptions to this preemption doctrine. See, e.g., id., at 297--98, 91 S.Ct. 1909. The sole exception which concerns us here deals with situations in which Congress has affirmatively indicated that jurisdiction should exist; this leads us to a discussion of the final two statutes asserted as grounds for jurisdiction herein, both of which provide statutory exceptions to the preemption doctrine.

Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, provides for jurisdiction in the district courts over 'suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization.' Even reading this statute most favorably to plaintiff, there has been no violation of any contract or bargaining agreement; indeed, plaintiff complains precisely of the fact that the provisions in question, subsequently determined to be an unfair labor practice, were fully complied with. Assuming, for the moment, that plaintiff has been wronged by the actions in question, it is clear that the wrong...