Atchison, T. & SFR Co. v. United States

• Decision Date: 26 January 1914
• Docket Number: No. 590.,590.
• Citation: 232 U.S. 199
• Parties: ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

232 U.S. 199

ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY v. UNITED STATES.

No. 590.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued December 1, 2, 1913.

Decided January 26, 1914.

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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COMMERCE COURT.

Mr. Gardiner Lathrop and Mr. F.H. Wood, with whom Mr. Robert Dunlap, Mr. T.J. Norton, Mr. A.S. Halsted, Mr. C.W. Durbrow and Mr. W.F. Herrin were on the brief, for appellants.

Mr. Blackburn Esterline, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, with whom The Solicitor General was on the brief, for the United States.

Mr. P.J. Farrell for the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Mr. William E. Lamb, with whom Mr. George E. Farrand, Mr. Rush C. Butler and Mr. Stephen A. Foster were on the brief, for the Arlington Heights Fruit Company et al., intervenors.

MR. JUSTICE LAMAR, after making the foregoing statement of facts, delivered the opinion of the court.

There are many cases between shipper and carrier in which each insists that the other is bound to furnish service or facilities connected with the transportation of freight. The present record, however, presents an instance where both parties are contending for the privilege of supplying an article needed in the proper shipment of fruit — the consignor claiming that icing is a necessary part of the loading, which he is authorized to supply; while the carriers insist that icing is a part of refrigeration, by statute made transportation, which they are bound to provide and for which they are entitled to collect reasonable compensation. The determination of these conflicting claims necessitates an examination of the two methods under which, in warm weather, oranges are shipped from California to the East.

In what is called Standard Refrigeration, the boxes, of the aggregate weight of 27,200 pounds, are so placed as to leave spaces between them wide enough to admit of a free circulation of air chilled by ice in the bunkers. Subsequently the carriers put in a system of pre-cooling, under which after the cars had been loaded they were taken from the point of shipment to Refrigerating Plants owned by the carriers, where whole trainloads are pre-cooled at one time by means of blasts of very cold air driven into the car through and around the boxes. At the end of three or four hours the fruit is sufficiently chilled, the bunkers are then filled with about 10 tons of ice, furnished by the carrier, and the train is started on its journey to the East — the bunkers being re-iced from time to time as needed at stations along the route. For this entire service the Commission held that the carrier's charge of $62.50 was reasonable.

A different method obtains where the icing of the car is done by the shipper at his own expense. In that class of cases the oranges are taken from the grove directly to a cold room having a temperature of about 33° F. There the boxes are allowed to remain for periods of from 24 to 48 hours, and until the fruit is chilled to the center. When thus pre-cooled, the boxes are ready for shipment. A refrigerator car is then placed on the track opposite the door of the cold room of the warehouse with which it is connected by a collapsible enclosed passageway, so arranged as to exclude the outside air, while at the same time allowing that from the cold room to enter and cool the interior of the car. Through this passageway the oranges are trucked from the warehouse to the car and, as they have been chilled to the center, the boxes are packed close together forming a solid mass weighing 33,000 lbs., with a temperature of about 35° F. The doors and vents of the car are promptly and tightly closed, the bunkers are immediately filled with unusually large cakes of ice, in order to reduce the rate of melting, and the fruit is then forwarded under a filed tariff which provides that re-icing is unnecessary, and that the shipper will make no claim for damage occasioned by failure to re-ice in transit. For their services in connection with such pre-cooled shipments the carriers were allowed to charge $7.50 but the Commission refused to permit them to charge for the ice needed to keep the fruit cool between warehouse and destination.

1. This ruling is attacked by the appellants, who contend that icing' is a part of refrigeration, which the Hepburn Act¹ makes a part of the transportation they are bound to furnish upon reasonable request. They insist that in order to meet the duty, thus imposed by statute, they have been compelled at great expense to erect immense plants where trainloads of fruit can be cooled and where an enormous quantity of ice is manufactured for refrigeration purposes. They argue that, being bound to furnish all necessary icing and re-icing and having at great cost prepared to furnish the supply, it is not only just, but a right given by statute, that they should be allowed to provide all needed icing or refrigeration at a rate to be approved by the Commission.

Whatever transportation service or facility the law requires the carrier to supply they have the right to furnish. They can therefore use their own cars, and cannot be compelled to accept those tendered by the shipper on condition that a lower freight rate be charged. So, too, they can furnish all the ice needed in refrigeration, for this is not only a duty and a right, under the Hepburn Act, but an economic necessity due to the fact that the carriers cannot be expected to prepare to meet the demand, and then let the use of their plants depend upon haphazard calls, under which refrigeration can be demanded by all shippers at one time and by only a few at another.

This contention was sustained by the Commission, which recognized that "the shipper has no right to provide refrigeration himself today and call upon the railroad company for that service tomorrow. To permit such a course is to demoralize the service of the defendants and prevent them from discharging their duty with economy and efficiency. . . . It is the duty of the carrier to furnish refrigeration upon reasonable demand, and in so far as the furnishing of that refrigeration is a part of the service rendered by the carrier, the carrier may insist upon its right to furnish that service exclusively." 20 I.C.C. 116.

2. But of course this does not mean, that because the carriers have ice on hand, they can compel the shipper to have his fruit refrigerated, when, on account of the state of the weather or for other cause, he prefers to have it forwarded under ventilation only. When, however, ice is actually needed and is actually used, the question arises as to whether icing is a part of preparation which can be done by the shipper; or a part of refrigeration (transportation) which, by statute the carrier has the exclusive right to furnish.

To this question no answer can be given that will apply in all cases. For in the shipment of fruit, as in that of other articles, it is impossible to lay down a rule which definitely fixes what loading includes and by whom it must be done. Nor is there any consistent practice on this subject, since from reported cases it appears that the claims of the parties are based rather on interest than on some definite principle. Sometimes the shipper, as here, insists on the right to load and provide necessary appliances. At other times he demands that such service and appliances be furnished by the railroad company. Conversely the carriers sometimes claim, as here, the right to furnish service and facilities, while in other cases insisting that one or both must be supplied by the consignor. Cf. National Lumber Dealers Association v. Atlantic Coast Line, 14 I.C.C. 154; Schultz v. Southern Pacific, 18 I.C.C. 234; In re Allowance for Lining and Heating Cars, 26 I.C.C. 681; 25 I.C.C. 497.

These inconsistent and conflicting demands serve to emphasize the fact that, before the haul actually begins, the right or duty of each party, where not absolutely fixed by statute, must be decided with reference to the special facts of each...