Prairie View A&M Univ. v. Chatha

• Citation: 381 S.W.3d 500,55 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1267
• Decision Date: 16 November 2012
• Docket Number: No. 10–0353.,10–0353.
• Parties: PRAIRIE VIEW A & M UNIVERSITY, Petitioner, v. Diljit K. CHATHA, Respondent.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

381 S.W.3d 500

55 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1267

PRAIRIE VIEW A & M UNIVERSITY, Petitioner,
v.
Diljit K. CHATHA, Respondent.

No. 10–0353.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued Dec. 6, 2011.
Decided Aug. 31, 2012.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 16, 2012.

[381 S.W.3d 502]

Gregory C. Douglass, Gregory C. Douglass, P.C., Austin, TX, for Amicus Curiae George Lueck.

Clara B. Burns, Jose Abelardo Howard–Gonzalez, Kemp Smith LLP, El Paso, TX, for Amicus Curiae Texas Association of Business.

Beth Ellen Klusmann, Assistant Solicitor General, Daniel T. Hodge, First Asst. Attorney General, David C. Mattax, Director of Defense Litigation, David S. Morales, Deputy First Assistant Attorney General, Greg W. Abbott, Attorney General of Texas, Jonathan F. Mitchell, Solicitor General, Madeleine Connor, Assistant Attorney General, Ruth A. Hughes, Director of Defense Litigation, Thomas Matthew Lipovski, William (Bill) J. Cobb III, Deputy Atty. General for Civil Litigation, Office of the Attorney General, Austin, TX, Clarence Andrew Weber, Kelly Hart & Hallman LLP, Austin, TX, James C. Ho, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Dallas, TX, for Petitioner Prairie View A&M University.

Brian J. Levy, Ellen Sprovach, Rosenberg & Sprovach, Houston, TX, for Respondent Diljit K Chatha.

Justice GUZMAN delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justice HECHT, Justice WAINWRIGHT, Justice MEDINA, Justice GREEN, Justice JOHNSON, and Justice WILLETT joined.

The Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA) ¹ is a comprehensive

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fair employment practices act and remedial scheme, modeled after Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), ² that provides the framework for employment discrimination claims in Texas. At issue here is section 21.202 of the TCHRA, which obligates a claimant to file a complaint with the Texas Workforce Commission civil rights division (TWC) or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) not later than the 180th day after the date an allegedly unlawful employment practice occurs. The term “occur” is not defined in the TCHRA, but we have previously interpreted it to mean when a discriminatory employment decision is made—not when the effects of that decision become manifest in later events. Our interpretation mirrored the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII until recently. But, in 2009, Congress enacted the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act (Ledbetter Act), amending Title VII to provide that a discriminatory pay decision occurs each time a paycheck is received and not just when an initial salary decision is made.³ Thus, when a claimant files a discriminatory pay claim under federal law, the 180–day limitations period begins each time a claimant receives a paycheck containing a discriminatory amount. The Texas Legislature has not similarly amended the TCHRA.

As a matter of first impression, we must determine whether the federal Ledbetter Act applies to a claim brought under the TCHRA so that the 180–day limitations period begins anew each time a claimant receives a paycheck containing a discriminatory amount. Because Title VII and the TCHRA are no longer analogous where discriminatory pay claims are concerned, and because the Legislature—and not this Court—is the proper governmental branch to amend the TCHRA, we hold that the federal Ledbetter Act does not apply to a claim brought under the TCHRA. Thus, in accordance with the TCHRA and our precedent, we conclude that a pay discrimination complaint must generally be brought within 180 days of the date the claimant is informed of the compensation decision. We further hold that the 180–day filing requirement is a mandatory statutory requirement that must be complied with before filing suit, and, as such, is a statutory prerequisite to suit under section 311.034 of the Government Code. Because the claimant here failed to timely file her complaint with the TWC, we conclude that her suit is jurisdictionally barred by section 311.034. We therefore reverse the court of appeals' judgment and render judgment dismissing the suit.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Respondent Dr. Diljit K. Chatha is a professor at Prairie View A & M University (the University). Chatha began employment at the University in 1987 and applied for a promotion from associate professor to full professor in 2003. She was initially denied the promotion but received it in 2004. At that time, she complained to the University that her salary was inequitable but was told there were no funds available for a salary adjustment. About two years after her promotion, Chatha filed a complaint with the EEOC and the TWC, alleging race and nationality-based pay discrimination. Chatha is of Indian national origin. In her complaint,

[381 S.W.3d 504]

Chatha marked the “continuing action” box, alleging discrimination between September 1, 2005 and September 26, 2005.⁴ After receiving right-to-sue notices from the EEOC and the TWC, Chatha filed suit against the University in state court under the TCHRA. The University responded by filing a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting Chatha's TWC complaint was untimely filed pursuant to the 180–day limitations period under the TCHRA. SeeTex. Lab.Code § 21.202. The University specifically alleged that Chatha was aware of the alleged discriminatory salary in 2004, yet failed to file a complaint until 2006. Chatha responded that the federal Ledbetter Act applies to a discriminatory pay claim brought under the TCHRA because one of the TCHRA's purposes is to execute the policies of Title VII. See id.§ 21.001(1). The trial court denied the University's plea.

The University brought an interlocutory appeal, seeTex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 51.014(a)(8), and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that the Ledbetter Act applies to claims brought under the TCHRA, and Chatha's claim was therefore timely because she received a paycheck containing an alleged discriminatory amount within 180 days of the date she filed her complaint with the TWC. 317 S.W.3d 402, 404, 407. In reaching this decision, the court of appeals relied on (1) the general purposes provision of the TCHRA, and (2) two federal district court decisions that had applied the Ledbetter Act to the TCHRA. Id. at 407. We granted review to determine whether the Ledbetter Act applies to a pay discrimination claim brought under the TCHRA.⁵

II. Analysis A. Legal Framework

The TCHRA was “enacted to address the specific evil of discrimination and retaliation in the workplace,” as well as to coordinate and conform with federal anti-discrimination and retaliation laws under Title VII. See City of Waco v. Lopez, 259 S.W.3d 147, 153–55 (Tex.2008). Although from its inception the TCHRA was not an exact replica of Title VII, both the TCHRA and Title VII similarly define unlawful employment practice,⁶ and as part

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of each act's administrative process impose a strict 180–day statute of limitations for filing an employment discrimination complaint with the appropriate governmental agency, running from the date the alleged unlawful employment practice occurs. The TCHRA provides:

(a) A complaint under this subchapter must be filed not later than the 180th day after the date the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

The [TWC] shall dismiss an untimely complaint.

Tex. Lab.Code § 21.202.⁷ Prior to the federal Ledbetter Act's enactment in 2009, Title VII and the TCHRA contained virtually identical language concerning the 180–day limitations period.

Although we have always considered the TCHRA's plain language and our precedent in interpreting the TCHRA, see, e.g., Caballero v. Central Power & Light Co., 858 S.W.2d 359, 359–61 (Tex.1993), we have looked to federal law for guidance in situations where the TCHRA and Title VII contain analogous statutory language, see, e.g., Specialty Retailers v. DeMoranville, 933 S.W.2d 490, 492 (Tex.1996) (per curiam). Therefore, we previously looked to federal case law in interpreting the 180–day limitations provision in section 21.202 for defining when an unlawful employment practice occurs. See id. In Specialty Retailers, we held that the 180–day limitations period in the TCHRA commences “when the employee is informed of the allegedly discriminatory employment decision, not when that decision comes to fruition.” Id. at 493. There, an employee was informed that she would be fired if her leave of absence lasted longer than one year. Id. at 492. When the employee did not return to work after a year, her employment was terminated. Id. We concluded that the 180–day limitations period began when the employee was informed of the alleged discriminatory policy, not when her employment was actually terminated a year later. Id. at 493. We noted a distinction between an act of continuing discrimination and an effect of past discrimination, and determined that the termination of her employment after a year's leave of absence could only be considered an effect of past discrimination. Id.

We cited as authority United States Supreme Court precedent—specifically, the Ricks decision—in reaching our conclusion. See id. at 492–93 (citing Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980)). In Ricks, a professor was denied tenure, and in accordance with the university's policy regarding unsuccessful tenure applicants, Ricks was instead offered a “terminal” one year contract. 449 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. 498. Two months before his termination, Ricks filed an EEOC complaint alleging employment discrimination. Id. at 254, 101 S.Ct. 498. The Supreme Court held that Ricks's complaint was barred because it was filed

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more than 180 days after he was notified of the Board's decision to deny tenure. Id. at 257–58, 101 S.Ct. 498. It was the denial of tenure that constituted the allegedly discriminatory employment decision, not the actual termination one year later. Id. at 258, 101 S.Ct. 498. The Supreme Court noted that it is possible for the effects of a...