Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Devlin

• Decision Date: 21 August 2018
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 13-13126-PBS
• Citation: 323 F.Supp.3d 207
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
• Parties: METROPOLITAN PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. Susan DEVLIN, Mary Desrosier, Matthew Desrosier, and John Doe, Personal Representative of the Estate of Joseph Simeone, Defendants.

323 F.Supp.3d 207

METROPOLITAN PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff,

v.Susan DEVLIN, Mary Desrosier, Matthew Desrosier, and John Doe, Personal Representative of the Estate of Joseph Simeone, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 13-13126-PBS

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

Signed August 21, 2018

Glenda H. Ganem, McGovern & Ganem, P.C., Nicholas J. Pompeo, McGovern Houston & Ganem, PC, Peter R. Houston, McGovern, Snyder & Ganem PC, Boston, MA, for Plaintiff.

Matthew T. Lallier, The Law Office of Matthew T. Lallier Esq., Shrewsbury, MA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Saris, C.J.

INTRODUCTION

This long-running case arises from a car accident in Saugus, Massachusetts, in 2010. Susan Devlin was injured in the accident when a Ford Taurus, owned by Mary Desrosier but driven by her son Matthew Desrosier, collided with Devlin's car.¹ In state court, a jury found Matthew liable for negligent operation of a motor vehicle and Mary liable for negligent failure to secure her vehicle from the harmful effects of foreseeable criminal actions. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Company ("Metropolitan") filed a declaratory judgment action in this Court in 2013, seeking an order that it has no duty to defend or indemnify Mary or Matthew. In 2015, the Court held that Metropolitan had no duty to defend Matthew. See Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Devlin, 95 F.Supp.3d 278, 282 (D. Mass. 2015).

Based on the state court verdict, Metropolitan moves for summary judgment on the ground that the insurer has no duty to indemnify Mary for Devlin's injuries. Alternatively, Metropolitan argues that it is entitled to a declaratory judgment stating that its duties to indemnify and to pay any prejudgment interest are capped at the compulsory coverage limit in the policy. Devlin did not submit a cross-motion for summary judgment, but at the hearing on June 29, 2018, she agreed that there were no questions of fact for trial and that the Court could decide the remaining issues of indemnification as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) (allowing court to grant summary judgment for nonmovant "[a]fter giving notice and a reasonable time to respond").

Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 112) is ALLOWED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and partial summary judgment is ALLOWED for Devlin. Metropolitan must indemnify Mary up to the $20,000 compulsory coverage limit.

FACTS

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise stated.

I. Car Accident and State Court Trial

In 2010, Mary owned a 1998 Ford Taurus that was insured by Metropolitan. Docket No. 117-1 ¶ 2. On October 27, 2010, there was an accident at an intersection in Saugus, in which Mary's Taurus rear-ended Devlin's car. See Docket No. 117-1 ¶ 1.

Matthew was driving Mary's Taurus at the time of the accident, Docket No. 117-1 ¶ 16, but he did not have a valid driver's license, Docket No. 117-1 ¶ 18. Mary knew that he was not licensed. Docket No. 117-1 ¶ 18. On the date of the accident, Mary did not give Matthew permission to drive her car. Docket No. 117-1 ¶ 18. In fact, Mary had explicitly instructed Matthew never to drive her Taurus. Docket No. 117-1 ¶ 28. She did, however, leave the car keys unsecured and available to anyone in her house. Docket No. 117-1 ¶ 29.

The state court case, brought by Devlin against Matthew and Mary,² was tried to a jury in February 2017. Docket No. 117-1 ¶ 26. Matthew was found liable for negligent operation of the car. See Docket No. 117-1 ¶¶ 22, 37. Against Mary, Devlin brought two counts: one for negligent entrustment of the Taurus, and one for negligent failure to secure her vehicle from the harmful effects of foreseeable criminal actions. Docket No. 117-1 ¶ 23. Judge Krupp instructed the jury on the negligent security claim as follows:

To establish a claim for negligent security, Ms. Devlin must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the following four elements:

One, that Ms. Desrosier had ownership or control of a motor vehicle;

Two, that Ms. Desrosier knew or should have known that there was a reasonable possibility of criminal conduct involving the motor vehicle including the use of her motor vehicle by someone without authority to use it;

Three, that Ms. Desrosier negligently failed to take steps reasonably available to prevent the foreseeable criminal conducting [sic] involving the motor vehicle;

And four, the damages caused by Ms. Desrosier's failure to do so and the resulting foreseeable criminal conduct.

Docket No. 117-1 ¶ 32. Mary was found not liable for negligent entrustment, but liable for negligent failure to secure. Docket No. 117-1 ¶ 35. The jury awarded Devlin $210,601.80 for her injuries, including prejudgment interest. Docket No. 117-1 ¶ 37.

II. Insurance Policy

A. Bodily Injury Coverage

Mary's Taurus was insured by Metropolitan under the standard Massachusetts Automobile Insurance Policy (Seventh Edition). Docket No. 117-1 ¶ 2. The insurance contract "consist[ed] of [the standard auto policy], the Coverage Selections Page, any endorsements agreed upon, and [Mary's] application for insurance." Docket No. 114-1 at 15. When the policy actually took effect is not clear in the record because there are multiple dates on the document. First, the policy says that it is "effective from" March 28, 2010, to March 28, 2011. Docket No. 114-1 at 8. The Coverage Selections Page is dated July 6, 2010, but it also includes the date of July 3, 2010, next to the words "Change 4." Docket No. 114-1 at 8. Regardless of the precise effective date, at the time of the accident, Mary's Taurus was covered by Metropolitan policy number 2398528494. Docket No. 114-1 at 8.

Under her policy, Mary had $20,000 of compulsory coverage and up to $100,000 of optional coverage for bodily injury to others. Docket No. 117-1 ¶ 3. The compulsory coverage section -- "Part 1. Bodily Injury to Others" -- reads in relevant part:

Under this Part, we will pay damages to people injured or killed by your auto in Massachusetts accidents. The damages we will pay are the amounts the injured person is entitled to collect for bodily injury through a court judgment or settlement. We will pay only if you or someone else using your auto with your consent is legally responsible for the accident.

...

The law provides a special protection for anyone entitled to damages under this Part. We must pay their claims even if false statements were made when applying for this policy or your auto registration.

Docket No. 114-1 at 16. The optional coverage section -- "Part 5. Optional Bodily Injury to Others" -- reads in relevant part:

Under this Part, we will pay damages to people injured or killed in accidents if you or a household member is legally responsible for the accident. We will also pay damages if someone else using your auto with your consent is legally responsible for the accident. The damages we will pay are the amounts the injured person is entitled to collect for bodily injury through a court judgment or settlement.

This Part is similar to Compulsory Bodily Injury To Others (Part 1). Like the Compulsory Part, this Part pays for accidents involving your auto in Massachusetts. Also like the Compulsory Part, this Part does not pay for the benefit of anyone using an auto without the consent of the owner.

Docket No. 114-1 at 25.

B. Operator Exclusion Provisions

Long before the accident, Mary and Matthew had signed an "Operator Exclusion Form" dated February 4, 2005. Docket No. 114-1 at 50. The form states that Matthew is an excluded operator for a 1998 Honda under policy number 0313492094 -- a different number than the one assigned to the 2010 policy, number 2398528494. Docket No. 114-1 at 50. The 2005 Operator Exclusion Form also states: "It is agreed that the person named below will not operate the vehicle(s) described below, or any replacement thereof, under any circumstance whatsoever." Docket No. 114-1 at 50.

Randy Daniels, a Senior Claims Examiner for Metropolitan, swears in his affidavit that in July 2010, Mary requested that Metropolitan substitute the Taurus for the 1998 Honda under her 2010 insurance policy. Docket No. 114-1, Daniels Aff. ¶ 11. Mary, on the other hand, testified that she sold her 1998 Honda and canceled that insurance policy months before initiating a new Metropolitan policy to cover the Taurus. Docket No. 117-1 ¶ 7. Regardless of what actually occurred, the parties agree that the 2010 insurance contract was a new policy, not a continuation of a previous policy.

On the Coverage Selections Page for the 2010 policy, in the section titled "Identification Numbers of Endorsements Forming a Part of This Policy," the only codes listed are "V911," "MA660," and "MPY-0016-S." Docket No. 114-1 at 8. The list does not include "M-106-S," which is the identification number for the 2005 Operator Exclusion Form. Docket No. 114-1 at 50. The Coverage Selections document also lists Mary (Operator 1), Matthew (Operator 2), and Jennifer Mason (Operator 3), as operators of the Taurus. Docket No. 114-1 at 9. Matthew has a "Y" next to his name in the "Approved Driver Training" column. Docket No. 114-1 at 9. On the next page, "DRIVER 2" and "DRIVER 3" are listed as "EXCLUDED FROM VEHICLE(S) 1." Docket No. 114-1 at 10.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standards

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To succeed, the moving party must demonstrate that there is an "absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Sands v. Ridefilm Corp., 212 F.3d 657, 661 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Quinones v. Buick, 436 F.3d 284, 289 (1st Cir. 2006). A genuine issue exists where the evidence is "sufficiently open-ended to permit a...