Johnson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore

• Decision Date: 12 May 2005
• Docket Number: No. 77, No. 60
• Parties: Ernest A. JOHNSON v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE CITY. Daniel T. Luster, Jr. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

874 A.2d 439

387 Md. 1

Ernest A. JOHNSON v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE CITY.

Daniel T. Luster, Jr. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City.

Nos. 60, 77, September Term 2004.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

May 12, 2005.

Paul D. Bekman (Gregory G. Hopper, Salsbury, Clements, Bekman, Marder & Adkins, LLC, on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.

William R. Phelan, Jr., Principal Counsel, Herbert Burgunder, Jr., Special Principal Counsel (Ralph S. Tyler, City Solicitor, on brief), for respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, and GREENE, JJ.

GREENE, J.

The Legislature is often faced with balancing opposing interests and making difficult choices. This case discusses some of the lines drawn by the Legislature distinguishing workers' compensation benefits for firefighters as different than for their dependents. We are asked to decide the availability of dual benefits for dependents of firefighters who die from particular occupational diseases. That issue has been addressed and decided by the Legislature.

Both Ernest Johnson (Mr. Johnson) and Daniel Luster (Mr. Luster) were Baltimore City Firefighters who died of cancers that were caused by their repeated contact with toxic substances in the line of duty. The cancer prevented both men from performing their duties as firefighters. Both Mr. Johnson and Mr. Luster are survived by their wives and both women receive benefits from their husbands service pension plans.

The issue before this Court is whether the widows may collect the service pension benefits in addition to the full workers' compensation death benefits, or whether the workers' compensation death benefits must be reduced by the amount of service pension benefits the widows are currently receiving.

We hold that the statute does not permit the dependents to collect full workers' compensation death benefits in addition to service pension benefits.

FACTS

The facts in both of these cases are undisputed. Consequently, our recitation of the facts is succinct. Mr. Johnson worked for thirty-two years as a Baltimore City firefighter. As a result of his repeated contact with toxic substances encountered in the line of duty, he contracted colon cancer and became unable to perform his duties as a firefighter. Mr. Johnson's average weekly wage as a firefighter was $989.75. On March 11, 1994, Mr. Johnson died from colon cancer.¹ Mrs. Johnson was wholly dependent on her husband at the time of his death. She currently receives $603.90 per week in benefits from Mr. Johnson's service pension plan.

Mr. Luster was also a Baltimore City firefighter who contracted cancer as a result of his repeated contacts with toxic substances encountered in the line of duty. Because of the cancer, Mr. Luster was unable to perform his duties as a firefighter and ultimately died from pancreatic cancer² on August 8, 2000. Mr. Luster's average weekly wage as a firefighter was $821.52. Mrs. Luster was wholly dependent on her husband at the time of his death. She currently receives $294.83 per week in benefits from Mr. Luster's service pension plan.

Both Mrs. Johnson and Mrs. Luster filed workers' compensation claims for death benefits, which were heard by the Workers' Compensation Commission, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, and the Court of Special Appeals. The Commission and the Circuit Court agreed in both cases that the widows were eligible for benefits and that they were permitted to receive a combination of workers' compensation and retirement benefits. In both cases, the Circuit Court granted motions for summary judgment filed by the claimants and denied motions for summary judgment filed by the City. As a result of these rulings, the City appealed in both cases to the Court of Special Appeals.

In a reported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals held that Mrs. Johnson was eligible for benefits, but that her workers' compensation death benefits must be reduced by the amount of service pension benefits that she received.³Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City v. Johnson, 156 Md.App. 569, 596, 847 A.2d 1190 (2004). Mrs. Johnson filed a Petition for Certiorari, which we granted. Johnson v. Baltimore, 382 Md. 687, 856 A.2d 723 (2004).

Similarly, in an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals held that Mrs. Luster was eligible for workers' compensation death benefits, but that they must be reduced by the amount of service pension benefits that she received.⁴ We also granted certiorari in that case. Luster v. Baltimore, 383 Md. 214, 857 A.2d 1131 (2004). Because the issue before the Court in these cases is identical, we shall decide the cases together and report our decision in one opinion.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Md. Rule 2-501(e), summary judgment may be granted if "the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Walk v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 382 Md. 1, 14, 852 A.2d 98, 105 (2004)

. Whether the Circuit Court properly granted summary judgment is a question of law. Id. Therefore, we must decide if the trial court's decision was legally correct. Id.

In this case, we are called upon to interpret a statute. The question before us is purely a legal one. See Salamon v. Progressive Classic Insurance Company, 379 Md. 301, 307, 841 A.2d 858, 862 (2004)

(noting that the only issue presented in that case was a question of law involving statutory interpretation); Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604, 861 A.2d 78, 80-81 (2004) (stating that "[b]ecause our interpretation of ... provisions of the Maryland Code... are appropriately classified as questions of law, we review the issues de novo to determine if the trial court was legally correct in its rulings on these matters.").

DISCUSSION

Section 9-502 of the Labor and Employment Article requires employers and insurers to compensate covered employees and their dependents for disability or death that results from an occupational disease.⁵ This section also limits the liability of employers and insurers by requiring the occupational disease to meet certain requirements in order to be compensable. The section provides in pertinent part:

(a) "Disablement" defined. — In this section, "disablement" means the event of a covered employee becoming partially or totally incapacitated:

(1) because of an occupational disease; and (2) from performing the work of the covered employee in the last occupation in which the covered employee was injuriously exposed to the hazards of the occupational disease.

* * *

(c) Liability of employer and insurer. — Subject to subsection (d) of this section and except as otherwise provided, an employer and insurer to whom this subsection applies shall provide compensation in accordance with this title to:

(1) a covered employee of the employer for disability of the covered employee resulting from an occupational disease; or

(2) the dependents of the covered employee for death of the covered employee resulting from an occupational disease.

(d) Limitation on liability. — An employer and insurer are liable to provide compensation under subsection (c) of this section only if:

(1) the occupational disease that caused the death or disability:

(I) is due to the nature of an employment in which hazards of the occupational disease exist and the covered employee was employed before the date of disablement; or

(ii) has manifestations that are consistent with those known to result from exposure to a biological, chemical, or physical agent that is attributable to the type of employment in which the covered employee was employed before the date of disablement; and

(2) on the weight of the evidence, it reasonably may be concluded that the occupational disease was incurred as a result of the employment of the covered employee....

Md.Code (1991, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 9-502 of the Labor and Employment Article.

Section 9-503 of the Labor and Employment Article carves out an exception to the general occupational disease provisions noted in § 9-502 by giving special treatment to employees in particular professions who are suffering from particular diseases. Section 9-503 affords those employees the benefit of a presumption that their condition is a compensable occupational disease.⁶ It also permits those employees to collect workers' compensation benefits in addition to retirement benefits, up to the amount of the employee's weekly salary.⁷ Section 9-503 © states in pertinent part:

A paid firefighter ... is presumed to be suffering from an occupational disease that was suffered in the line of duty and is compensable under this title if the individual:

(1) has leukemia or pancreatic, prostate, rectal, or throat cancer that is caused by contact with a toxic substance that the individual has encountered in the line of duty (2) has completed at least 5 years of service as a firefighter ... in the department where the individual currently is employed or serves;

(3) is unable to perform the normal duties of a firefighter ... in the department where the individual currently is employed or serves because of the cancer or leukemia disability....

Md.Code (1991, 1999 Repl.Vol., 2004 Supp.) § 9-503(c) of the Labor and Employment Article. Section 9-503(e) provides in pertinent part:

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, any paid firefighter... who is eligible for benefits under subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d) of this section shall receive the benefits in addition to any benefits that the individual is entitle to receive under the retirement system in which the individual was a participant at the time of the claim.

(2) The benefits received under this title shall be adjusted so that the weekly total of those benefits and retirement benefits does not exceed the weekly salary that was paid to the ... firefighter....

Md.Code (1991, 1999 Repl...