Holt v. At&T, Inc.
| Decision Date | 17 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:13-cv-00635 KJM DAD,2:13-cv-00635 KJM DAD |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | SHERRIE HOLT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. AT&T, INC., Defendant. |
The parties appeared on August 22, 2014 for argument on defendant's motion for summary judgment. Xavier Villegas appeared for plaintiffs Sherrie Holt, Elvira Anderson, Marlene Mattsson, Kathy Connors, and Alana Keel (collectively "plaintiffs"); Adam Bouayad appeared for defendant AT&T, Inc. (AT&T or defendant). After considering the parties' arguments, the court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment.
On April 1, 2013, plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging generally they worked selling advertisements for AT&T at a facility in Gold River; the members of their work group were generally over forty years of age; AT&T announced it was closing the Gold River office and centralizing operations in Pleasanton; although AT&T directed plaintiffs to report to Pleasanton, they had already hired younger workers for that facility; AT&T told plaintiffs if they chose not to relocate, their choice would be a voluntary termination. The complaint contains three claims: (1)a violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, et seq.; (2) a violation of California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Cal. Gov't Code §§ 12940, et seq.; and (3) a violation of California's WARN Act, Cal. Labor Code §§ 1400, et seq. ECF No. 2.
Defendant filed its motion for summary judgment on July 25, 2014, arguing that the ADEA and FEHA claims are barred because of plaintiffs' failure timely to exhaust administrative remedies and plaintiffs received all the protections of the WARN Act. It also argues AT&T was not plaintiffs' employer because it is merely a holding company. The court does not address the latter argument, as it finds plaintiffs have not shown they timely exhausted their state and federal age discrimination claims or that they were denied the protections of the WARN Act.
A court will grant summary judgment "if . . . there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The "threshold inquiry" is whether "there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).1
The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the district court "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, which "must establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact . . . ." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585 (1986). In carrying their burdens, both parties must "cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the record . . .; or show [] that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (). Moreover, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48 (emphasis in original).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court draws all inferences and views all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587-88; Whitman v. Mineta, 541 F.3d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 2008). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)).
A court may consider evidence as long as it is "admissible at trial." Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003). "Admissibility at trial" depends not on the evidence's form, but on its content. Block v. City of L.A., 253 F.3d 410, 418-19 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324). The party seeking admission of evidence "bears the burden of proof of admissibility." Pfingston v. Ronan Eng'g Co., 284 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 2002). If the opposing party objects to the proposed evidence, the party seeking admission must direct the district court to "authenticating documents, deposition testimony bearing on attribution, hearsay exceptions and exemptions, or other evidentiary principles under which the evidence in question could be deemed admissible . . . ." In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 385-86 (9th Cir. 2010).
In March 2010, plaintiffs were employed as telephone sales representatives in Pacific Bell Directory's Gold River Office. Decl. of Stephen Donovan, Ex. 45 (Donovan Decl.) ¶ 3. They were all members of IBEW Union Local 1269. Decl. of Jon Irelan, Ex. 53 (Irelan Decl.) ¶¶ 5-6.
The Directory decided to consolidate the sales representatives into two offices, one in Costa Mesa and one in Pleasanton. Donovan Decl. ¶ 3. On March 2, 2010, plaintiffsreceived a notice that their positions were being relocated to Pleasanton effective May 24, 2010. Donovan Decl. ¶¶ 6-7 & Sub. Ex. A (Notice of Relocation); Dep. of Sherrie Holt, Ex. 46 at 2:20-3:11; Dep. of Elvira Anderson, Ex. 47 at 2:19-4:9; Dep. of Marlene Mattsson, Ex. 48 at 2:3-9; Dep. of Kathy Connors, Ex. 49 at 3:20-4:11; Dep. of Alana Keel, Ex. 50 at 4:10-25. This notice said in pertinent part that Donovan Decl., Sub. Ex. A.
On March 23, 2010, the company sent plaintiffs a written notice, offering them an "early termination option" and stating that employees who did not wish to move to the Pleasanton office could leave the business on April 16, 2010 and receive a payment equivalent to the number of work days between April 16 and May 21, 2010. Donovan Decl. ¶ 8 & Sub. Ex. B. Holt, Anderson, Mattsson, and Connors elected to accept the early departure option rather than relocate to Pleasanton and received all their wages through May 21, 2010. Holt Dep. at 4:4-10, 5:6-6:4 & Ex. 23; Anderson Dep. at 7:1-15, 9:11-10:1 & Ex. 10; Mattsson Dep. at 4:1-12, 6:6-15, 7:4-25 & Ex. 15; Connors Dep. at 7:14-23, 12:18-19, 13:1-7 & Ex. 3. Keel elected not to relocate, but continued to work at Gold River until May 21, 2010. Keel Dep. at 8:8-9:2, 19:25-20:2.
Although none of the plaintiffs filed an age discrimination complaint directly with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), they each filed a claim with California's Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) in the spring of 2013. Decl. of Adam Bouayad, Ex. 51 & Sub. Exs. A-H; Holt Dep. at 12:23-13:21 & Ex. 26; Anderson Dep. at 13:21-14:20 & Ex. 13; Mattsson Dep. at 9:5-10:1 & Ex. 18; Connors Dep. at 19:7-13 & Ex. 7; Keel Dep. at 28:4-30:6 & Ex. 36.
Defendant argues plaintiffs' state and federal age discrimination claims are barred because they did not file an administrative claim with the EEOC and did not timely file their claim with the DFEH, which means there was no timely exhaustion.
Plaintiffs argue their filing with DFEH serves to exhaust both ADEA and FEHA claims and they are entitled to equitable tolling because they were pursuing other remedies.
In reply defendant says that even if equitable tolling applies plaintiffs have presented no evidence supporting their claimed pursuit of other remedies.
Before pursuing an ADEA claim, a plaintiff must wait for at least sixty days after filing an age discrimination complaint with either the EEOC or DFEH. Funk v. Sperry Corp., 842 F.2d 1129, 1134 (9th Cir. 1988); Dempsey v. Pac. Bell Co., 789 F.2d 1451, 1452 (9th Cir. 1986). Because of the work-sharing agreement between the EEOC and DFEH, a claim filed with DFEH is deemed filed with the EEOC as of that date. McConnell v. Gen. Tel. Co. of Ca., 814 F.2d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1987); 29 C.F.R. §1626.10(c). The worksharing agreement means California is a "deferral state[,]. . . one to which the EEOC has agreed to defer cases for preliminary investigation." Id. In a deferral state, a plaintiff must file the age discrimination claim with DFEH within 300 days of the alleged unlawful practice. Haynes v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, No. C-07-00691 MHP, 2008 WL 60404, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2008); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1)(A)-(B).
Similarly, a worker pursuing an age discrimination charge under FEHA must also exhaust administrative remedies by filing a claim with DFEH within one year of the alleged unlawful practice and then obtain a right to sue letter. Romano v. Rockwell Int'l, 14 Cal. 4th 479, 491 (1996); Tapia v. Artistree, Inc., No. CV-14-01381 DDP (ASx), 2014 WL 1402306, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2014); Cal. Civ. Code § 12960(d). Plaintiffs' complaints, filed with DFEH in 2013, are not timely.
Plaintiffs argue the time limits were tolled by their pursuit of wage claims against their employer. ECF No. 28 at 7. In McDonald v. Antelope Community College District, theCalifornia Supreme Court said that an employee's pursuit of the college's internal grievance procedure could...
To continue reading
Request your trial