Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. City of Jackson, Miss.

• Decision Date: 24 January 1935
• Docket Number: No. 540.,540.
• Parties: MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT CO. v. CITY OF JACKSON, MISS., et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

9 F. Supp. 564

MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT CO. v. CITY OF JACKSON, MISS., et al.

No. 540.

District Court, S. D. Mississippi, Jackson Division.

January 24, 1935.

Green, Green & Jackson and May, Sanders, McLaurin & Byrd, all of Jackson, Miss., for plaintiff.

W. E. Morse, City Atty., J. Morgan Stevens, and Harry M. Bryan, all of Jackson, Miss., for defendants.

HOLMES, District Judge.

The plaintiff, a public utility corporation organized under the laws of Florida, and doing business in this state, prays for an injunction to restrain the defendants, citizens of Mississippi, from the enforcement of a municipal ordinance which provides for substantial reductions in rates to be charged for electricity furnished by the plaintiff to the public within the city of Jackson, Miss. It alleges that the rates are unreasonably low, and that, if forced to abide by them, will be the means of confiscating the property of the plaintiff used and useful in the production of electricity and the distribution thereof to its patrons. The disputed amount involved, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds the sum or value of $3,000, and the controversy over it is wholly between citizens of different states. In addition, it arises out of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. There is a motion by the defendants to dismiss the bill, on the grounds that the ordinance assailed affects rates chargeable by a public utility, does not interfere with interstate commerce, and was adopted after a reasonable notice and hearing, "and where a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had at law or in equity," in the state courts.

It is apparent that but for the Act of May 14, 1934, 48 Stat. 775, 28 USCA § 41 (1, 1a), known as the Johnson Act, no question could fairly be raised as to the jurisdiction of this court in a controversy of this nature. That act is amendatory of the first paragraph of section 24 of the Judicial Code, and carves out of the prior grant of jurisdiction to the District Courts a specific class of cases falling within a designated category. Its constitutionality is attacked by the plaintiff as violative of article 3 of the Constitution of the United States. Having conferred on the Federal District Courts general jurisdiction of controversies such as this, it is contended that Congress is without power to withdraw the jurisdiction once conferred. In discussing the constitutional power of the legislative branch of the government to deal with the subject, the attorneys for the plaintiff recognize the distinction between the control which Congress has over the practice and procedure of the courts in matters not essential to their judicial competency and efficiency, and those powers which are essential to the existence and efficacy of the entire federal judicial system contemplated by the Constitution. They concede that such methods of practice or procedure as are not indispensable to the exercise of judicial power may be taken away from the inferior federal courts, but if the power sought to be withdrawn is needed to complete the full jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution, or by laws enacted in pursuance of its mandate, they insist that to take it away after it has once been conferred is "to destroy the court and the judicial power pro tanto." From the premise that Congress has no power to destroy the District Courts or to impair their competency to perform their constitutional functions, counsel conclude that the full jurisdiction of the courts which has been conferred under the Constitution must be left unimpaired, or, in making the change, that Congress must establish other courts of like judicial competency. Relying principally on Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 327, 4 L. Ed. 97, counsel draw a distinction between cases arising under the laws of the United States and controversies between citizens of different states. As to the former, they say that the Constitution makes it mandatory on Congress to vest the whole judicial power in the courts of the United States, while they admit, as to the latter, that Congress has a discretion to confer or withhold judicial power as it sees fit.

It is true that Mr. Justice Story, in Martin v. Hunter, supra, said that it is the duty of Congress to vest the whole judicial power, but this statement has not received the concurrence of either the legislative or judicial branch of the federal government. Even at the time it was made there did not exist in any federal tribunal, other than the Supreme Court, general jurisdiction to hear and determine cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States; such jurisdiction was not conferred until the Act of May 3, 1875 (18 Stat. 470). It should also be remembered that Mr. Justice Story then had uppermost in his mind the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the constitutionality of an act to re-examine and reverse or affirm state decisions. He was not dealing with a case involving the original jurisdiction of any federal court, but with a writ of error from a state court, the Court of Appeals of Virginia. The sole question for decision before him was the appellate power of the Federal Supreme Court to revise a judgment of the highest court of one of the states of the Union. It involved the constitutionality of the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (1 Stat. 85); and any enunciation of the constitutional duty of Congress to create inferior federal courts and distribute their jurisdiction was broader than the issues submitted in the particular controversy demanded. In other cases there is language commenting upon the use of the word "controversies," in section 2 of article 3 of the Constitution, as in contradistinction to the word "cases," and the omission of the word "all" in respect of controversies; but, as stated by Mr. Justice Sutherland in Williams v. United States, 289 U. S. 553, 568, 53 S. Ct. 751, 756, 77 L. Ed. 1372: "None of these cases involved the question now under consideration, and the expressions referred to were clearly obiter dicta, which, as said by Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399, 5 L. Ed. 257, `may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit, when the very point is presented for decision.'"

In no instance which has been brought to my attention has it been decided directly that Congress may withhold or withdraw the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts in all cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States; but that it may confer, enlarge, or contract the same in its discretion is indicated by analogous cases, by parity of legal reasoning, and by a contemporaneous practical construction of the Constitution for a period of 86 years.

What was said in Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226, 43 S. Ct. 79, 82, 67 L. Ed. 226, 24 A. L. R. 1077, with reference to the extent of the judicial power provided for in article 3 of the Constitution is very pertinent here, and is broad enough in language to include the specific question before me, although in decision it dealt only with such power in relation to controversies between citizens of different states. The court said: "The effect of these provisions is not to vest jurisdiction in the inferior courts over the designated cases and controversies but to delimit those in respect of which Congress may confer jurisdiction upon such courts as it creates. Only the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is derived directly from the Constitution. Every other court created by the general government derives its jurisdiction wholly from the authority of Congress. That body may give, withhold or restrict such jurisdiction at its discretion, provided it be not extended beyond the boundaries fixed by the Constitution. Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 Dall. 8, 10, 1 L. Ed. 718; United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 7 Cranch, 32, 3 L. Ed. 259; Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 441, 448, 12 L. Ed. 1147; Stevenson v. Fain, 195 U. S. 165, 25 S. Ct. 6, 49 L. Ed. 142. The Constitution simply gives to the inferior courts the capacity to take jurisdiction in the enumerated cases, but it requires an act of Congress to confer it. The Mayor of Nashville v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247, 252, 18 L. Ed. 851. And the jurisdiction having been conferred may, at the will of Congress, be taken away in whole or in part; and if withdrawn without a saving clause all pending cases though cognizable when commenced must fall. The Assessors v. Osborne, 9 Wall. 567, 575, 19 L. Ed. 748. A right which thus comes into existence only by virtue of an act of Congress, and which may be withdrawn by an act of Congress after its exercise has begun, cannot well be described as a constitutional right."

The fact that from 1789 to 1875 general jurisdiction was not conferred on inferior federal courts in suits arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States is a strong argument that the exercise of the power by Congress to vest such jurisdiction is not mandatory under the Constitution, but is "remitted without check or limitation to the wisdom of the legislature." Mayor of Nashville v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247, 252, 18 L. Ed. 851. In the case just cited, the court further said: "As regards all courts of the United States inferior to this tribunal, two things are necessary to create jurisdiction, whether original or appellate. The Constitution must have given to the court the capacity to take it, and an act of Congress must have supplied it. Their concurrence is necessary to vest it. It is the duty of Congress to act for that purpose up to the limits of the granted power. They may fall short of it, but cannot exceed it. To the extent that such action is not taken, the power lies dormant. It can be brought into activity in no other way."

A historical glance at the original structure and development of the federal judicial system in respect to the narrow constitutional...