Cincinnati, I.&W. Ry. Co. v. Moffet

• Decision Date: 22 December 1904
• Citation: 72 N.E. 774,213 Ill. 197
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: CINCINNATI, I. & W. RY. CO. v. PEOPLE ex rel. MOFFET, County Collector.

213 Ill. 197

72 N.E. 774

CINCINNATI, I. & W. RY. CO.

v.PEOPLE ex rel. MOFFET, County Collector.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 22, 1904.

Appeal from Macon County Court; O. W. Smith, Judge.

Application by the people, on the relation of Edward R. Moffett, county collector, for judgment against the property of the Cincinnati, Indianapolis & Western Railway Company for delinquent taxes. From the judgment rendered, defendant appeals. Affirmed.George W. Fisher, for appellant.

W. E. Redmon, State's Atty., for appellee.

SCOTT, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the county court of Macon county, rendered at the June term, 1904, for certain taxes of the year 1903, extended by the county clerk of said county against the real estate of appellant. The taxes involved include county tax for the county of Macon, town taxes for the towns of Decatur, Blue Mound, and Long Creek, road and bridge taxes for the towns of Blue Mound and Long Creek, and city tax for the city of Decatur.

The objection made to the county tax is that the resolution of the board of supervisors merely directed the clerk to extend the amount of 75 cents on each $100 of valuation for the current expenses of the county, when it should have specified the sums of money to be raised and the specific purpose for which each sum was required.

Paragraph 6 of section 25, c. 34, Hurd's Rev. St. 1903, empowers the county board annually to cause the levy and collection of taxes for county purposes, not exceeding 75 cents on the $100 valuation, Section 121, c. 120, Hurd's Rev. St. 1903, reads as follows: ‘The county board of the respective counties shall, annually, at the September session, determine the amounts of all taxes to be raised for county purposes, the aggregate amount of which shall not exceed the rate of seventyfive cents on the $100 valuation of property, except for payment of indebtedness existing at the adoption of the present state constitution, unless authorized by a vote of the people of the county. When for several purposes, the amount for each purpose shall be stated separately.’ Section 127 of the same chapter is in the following language: ‘The said clerks shall estimate and determine the rate per cent upon the proper valuation of property in the respective towns, townships, districts and incorporated cities, towns and villages in their counties, that will produce, within the proper divisions of such counties, not less than the net amount of the several sums that shall be required by the county board, or certified to them according to law.’

It is to be observed that section 121, supra, directs the board to determine, not the amount of taxes for county purposes, but ‘the amounts of all taxes to be raised for county purposes,’ and ‘when for several purposes, the amount for each purpose shall be stated separately.’ Section 127, supra, directs the clerk to determine the rate per cent. which will produce, not the amount or sum required by the county board, but that will produce ‘not less than the net amount of the several sums that shall be required by the county board.’ It is apparent from the two sections last cited that the Legislature intended that the county board should ascertain the total of county taxes to be levied each year under its authority by determining the amount that would be required for each purpose for which county taxes may be levied, the aggregate of such amounts to be the total county tax-for example, a certain sum for the pauper fund, a certain sum for the fund for the purchase of supplies for county offices; if the county is engaged, or is about to engage, in building, a certain sum for the building fund; if its property requires repair, a certain sum for the repair fund; and so with each of the purposes for which the county board is authorized to levy taxes and for which it may require money.

The levy here was for 75 cents on the $100, and specified no purpose except to state that it was for ‘current expenses.’ This designation is too general. The resolution was passed by the board before the total amount of the assessment of property in the county had been ascertained, and before the county board could know what amount of money would be produced by the 75 cent rate. The Legislature did not intend to put it in the power of the county board to levy a 75 cent tax without reference to the needs of the county, but did intend that the total amount of the tax should be determined by an ascertainment of the sum needed by the county for each purpose for which it may levy taxes.

We have invariably held that, under similar statutes, a levy for town taxes must specify the various purposes for which the tax was levied, and that a designation of the tax as ‘for town purposes' is not sufficiently definite (People v. Chicago & Alton Railroad Co., 194 Ill. 51, 61 N. E. 1064;Indiana, Decatur & Western Railway Co. v. People, 201 Ill. 351, 66 N. E. 293;Cincinnati, Indianapolis & Western Railway Co. v. People, 207 Ill. 566, 69 N. E. 938), and that an ordinance for the levy of city or village taxes must specify in detail the several purposes for which the tax is levied (People v. Peoria, Decatur & Evansville Railroad Co., 116 Ill. 410, 6 N. E. 459; Cincinnati, Indianapolis & Western Railway Co. v. People, supra). There is no distinction between this case, in so far as it affects the county tax, and cases arising under the statutes authorizing the levy of township and city or village taxes.

Appellee relies upon the case of Mix v. People, 72 Ill. 241. In that case the amount of the county tax extended was $25,000. That sum had been fixed by an order of the county board which merely adopted the report of a committee recommending that a tax in that amount be levied. The only question considered by this court was whether or not that order levied the taxes. The objection that the county board had not stated specifically the various purposes for which the tax was to be levied does not seem to have been either made or considered, and the case is therefore not authority so far as the objection now before us is concerned.

We are also referred to cases in which this court has held that a levy made by taxing officers of a certain number of cents on the $100, instead of fixing the total amount of the levy, while not in strict accordance with the statute, was sufficient, and that taxes extended thereunder were valid. Those under existing statutes are cases in which the tax could have been for but one purpose, as in Chicago & Alton Railroad Co. v. People, 155 Ill. 276, 40 N. E. 602, where, on each $100 of the assessment, $2 was levied for school purposes and $1.50 for building purposes. Those cases are distinguishable from the one at bar by the fact that the tax levied by a fixed percentage could be used for one purpose only, and not for a number of purposes, as in the case of county taxes levied for current expenses.

Gage v. Bailey, 102 Ill. 11, is not in point, as the town tax there levied at a certain rate per cent. was imposed under the provisions of article 10, c. 103, Gross' St. 1868, which differed materially from the statute now under consideration.

The objection to the Decatur town tax is that the certificate of the town clerk recites that at the annual town meeting held in that town it was voted to levy $3,000 as a tax for town purposes, when it should have specified the purposes for which that amount was required, and the amount required for each purpose. The same objection is made to the Blue Mound town tax. We have so frequently held that such a designation of a town tax is insufficient that a reference to the cases on that subject is no longer necessary.

The certificate of the levy of town tax made by the town clerk of the town of Long Creek states that at the annual town meeting there was voted to be levied as a tax for town purposes the sum of $432. Attached to the certificate, when filed with the county clerk, was a statement under the hand of the town clerk specifying the purposes for which that amount was to be raised, and giving the sum required for each purpose. The record of the annual town meeting, introduced in evidence by the people, also showed the several purposes for which the sum of $432 was required, together with the amount required for each purpose, and corresponded with the statement attached to the certificate of levy. The objection to this...