C&C Constr. v. Nales-Martinez
| Decision Date | 15 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 2002/0093,849/1994.,2009/0023,s. 2002/0093 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands |
| Parties | C & C CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE, INC., Appellant, Cross–Appellee, v. Juan NALES–MARTINEZ, Appellee, Cross–Appellant. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
On Appeal from the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands, Superior Court Judge: Maria M. Cabret.
Charles E. Engeman, Esq., St. Thomas, U.S.V.I., for Appellant, Cross–Appellee.
Eszart A. Wynter, Esq., St. Croix, U.S.V.I., for Appellee, Cross–Appellant.
Before RAYMOND L. FINCH, Judge of the U.S. District Court of the Virgin Islands; JUAN R. SANCHEZ, Judge of the U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation; and BRENDA J. HOLLAR, Judge of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands, sitting by designation.
Judge RAYMOND L. FINCH delivers the majority opinion, joined by Judge JUAN R. SANCHEZ, with Judge BRENDA J. HOLLAR, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
In reviewing this civil action for damages, we are called upon to address assignments of error regarding the Superior Court's decisions concerning summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and directed verdict, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50.
C & C Construction and Maintenance Inc. (“C & C” or “Appellant”) was a construction and maintenance company which provided manpower and services for the HOVENSA, LLC oil refinery on St. Croix, U.S.V.I. Appellee, Juan Nales–Martinez (“Martinez” or “Appellee” or “Cross–Appellant”) was formerly employed as a carpenter with C & C from 1991 until December 1993. In December of 1993, Martinez was laid off due to a reduction in workforce and given a lay-off slip indicating that he would be eligible for rehire should work become available. Martinez, however, was never rehired by C & C.
On October 24, 1995, after discovering that carpenters with less seniority had been rehired, Martinez initiated an action for fraud, misrepresentation, breach of contract and wrongful discharge in the Superior Court.1 On September 25, 2001, the trial court entered summary judgment against Martinez dismissing his fraud, misrepresentation and wrongful discharge claims.
From April 22–23, 2002, a trial was held on the surviving breach of contract claim.2 At trial, Martinez argued through counsel that an implied contract existed between himself and C & C, which was based in part on seniority; and which imposed a duty on C & C to rehire him should work become available. Martinez further argued that C & C breached that duty by failing to rehire him when work became available. C & C counter-argued, inter alia, that no written or implied contract existed, no seniority policy was adopted, nor did C & C otherwise have a duty to rehire Martinez.
After the close of Martinez' case-in-chief, C & C moved for judgment as a matter of law on the breach of contract and damages claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). The trial court heard arguments on the motion from both parties, but reserved its ruling. After the close of all evidence, C & C renewed its Rule 50(a) motion. Again, the court reserved its ruling, while the Rule 50(a) motion remained pending, the jury was instructed and the matter was submitted for deliberation. Subsequently, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Martinez in the amount of $273,000.00 in compensatory damages.
After the jury was discharged, the trial court granted in part and denied in part, C & C's pre-verdict Rule 50(a) motion. In partially granting CSC's 50(a) motion with regard to damages, the trial court reasoned that Martinez “failed ... to: present evidence which would allow a rational fact-finder to find any damages for the years 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999.” (J.A. 450–451.) In partially denying C & C's 50(a) motion, the trial court concluded that there was sufficient evidence from which a rational fact-finder could determine that there was a duty to rehire based on custom and practice from October of 2000 until June of 2001.( Id.) In so doing, the trial court calculated Martinez' hourly salary based on a forty-hour work week from October 2000 to June 2001, reduced by the amount Martinez earned in 2001. (J.A. 450–451.) The result was a remittitur of the jury award from $273,000.00 to $13,483.00 in damages. On July 10, 2002, the trial court issued its written ruling. However, neither C & C nor Martinez filed any post-verdict motions with the trial court, nor did either party move for a new trial.3
On July 16, 2002, C & C filed its timely notice of appeal challenging the trial court's partial denial of its Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law. On July 26, 2002, Martinez filed a timely cross-appeal challenging the trial court's September 21, 2001, summary judgment decision and its July 10, 2002, remittitur of the damages award.
This Court exercises appellate jurisdiction over judgments and orders of the Superior Court in civil cases. V.I.Code Ann. tit. 4, § 33 (2001); Revised Organic Act of 1954 § 23A, 48 U.S.C. § 1613a.4 This Court exercises plenary review over the order denying summary judgment, and must “apply the same test that the lower court should have utilized.” Texaco Antilles Ltd. v. Creque, 273 F.Supp.2d 660, 662 (D.Vi.2003).5
The appellate court's review of a Rule 50(a) directed verdict is also plenary. Mosley v. Wilson, 102 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir.1996). A directed verdict or judgment as a matter of law is only appropriate where, viewing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1); Goodman v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 293 F.3d 655, 664–665 (3d Cir.2001); Caver v. City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 243 (3d Cir.2005). The legal foundation for the jury's verdict is reviewed de novo while the factual findings are reviewed to determine if there is a rational basis for the verdict in the evidence, drawing all favorable inferences to the prevailing party justifiably drawn from the evidence. Steelwagon Mfg. Co. v. Tarmac Roofing Systems, Inc., 63 F.3d 1267, 1271 (3d Cir.1995).
III. ANALYSISA. C & C's Appeal
C & C's arguments turn on the trial court's partial denial of its Fed.R.Civ.P. 5.0, motion for judgment as a matter of law. Specifically, C & C argues that the trial court erred by: reserving ruling and partially denying C & C's Fed.R.Civ.P. 50 motion; finding that an implied contract existed as a matter of law; and determining that there was sufficient evidence pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50 to award damages to Martinez. We, however, find that the trial court properly reserved its ruling, and that C & C's failure to file the necessary post-verdict motions precludes our substantive review of C & C's appeal.
“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 establishes two stages during which a party may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial: prior to submission of the case to the jury and after the verdict and entry of judgment.” See, e.g., Benta v. Bryan, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64598, at *7–8 (D.V.I.App.Div. July 22, 2009), rev'd on other grounds by, 2011 U.S.App. LEXIS 6664 (3d Cir. Mar. 31, 2011). Prior to the case going before the jury, a party may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence via Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). 6
In contrast, Rule 50(b), allows a party to renew its sufficiency of the evidence challenge after the jury verdict and entry of judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b) provides in pertinent part that:
(b) Renewing Motion for Judgment After Trial;
Alternative Motion for New Trial.
If, the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law made under subdivision (a), the court is considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to the court's later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion. The movant may renew its request for judgment as a matter of law by filing a motion no later than 10 days after entry of judgment-and may alternatively request a new trial or join a motion for a new trial under Rule 59. In ruling on a renewed motion, the court may:
(1) if a verdict was returned:
(A) allow the judgment to stand,
(B) order a new trial, or
(C) direct entry of judgment as a matter of law....
Id. (emphasis added).
To challenge the sufficiency of evidence, a 50(a) motion must be filed before submission of the case to the jury. Unitherm, 546 U.S. at 396. If the Rule 50(a) motion is not granted and the jury subsequently decides against the moving party, then pre-verdict 50(a) arguments may be renewed by filing a post-verdict 50(b) motion. Id.; see also Benta, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64598. A party may also challenge the trial court's 50(a) ruling by moving for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 50(b)(2002).
C & C argues that the trial court erred in submitting the matter to the jury, while a Rule 50(a) motion was pending. However, the Superior Court's decision to reserve its decision was properly within its discretion.
Rule 50(a) expressly provides, that the trial court may resolve the 50(a) issue against the party; and may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party based on sufficiency of the evidence. SeeFed. R. Civ. P 50(a)(2002) (emphasis added). The rule further provides that, “[ if ], the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law made under subdivision (a), the court is considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to the court's later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b)(2002) (emphasis added).7
Thus, “while a [trial] court is permitted to enter judgment as a matter of law when it Concludes that the evidence is legally insufficient, it is not required to do so.” Unitherm Food Sys. v. Swift–Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 401, 405, 126...
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