ANDERSON HIGHWAY SIGNS & SUPPLY v. Close, 98-334.
Citation | 6 P.3d 123 |
Decision Date | 04 May 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 98-334.,98-334. |
Parties | ANDERSON HIGHWAY SIGNS AND SUPPLY, INC., Appellant (Defendant), v. Marion CLOSE and Rollie Close, Appellees (Plaintiffs). |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming |
Representing Appellant: Daniel M. Fowler of Fowler, Schimberg & Flanagan, P.C., Denver, CO. Argument by Mr. Fowler.
Representing Appellees: David G. Lewis, Jackson, WY. Argument by Mr. Lewis.
Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.
The only question in this case is whether, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109 (amended 1986), a defendant found to be fifty percent at fault is responsible for all or only his proportionate share of damages in a case in which the plaintiffs were found to be free from negligence. The trial court concluded that, in the absence of negligence by the plaintiffs, the defendant was subject to the joint and several liability rule. We are satisfied that joint and several liability has been abrogated in Wyoming by statute in a simple negligence case, and the trial court erred when it refused to reduce the judgment against appellant, Anderson Highway Signs and Supply, Inc. (Anderson) and in favor of appellees, Marian Close and Rollie Close (the Closes). The judgment entered in the trial court is reversed, and the court is instructed to reduce the judgment against Anderson by fifty percent as the statute requires.
Appellant presents the following issue:
Did the trial court err as a matter of law under the 1986 version of the comparative fault statute, Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109, when it entered judgment against Anderson Highway Signs and Supply, Inc. ("Anderson"), for 100% of Plaintiffs' damages, even though the jury determined that Anderson was only 50% at fault and that a non-party actor, Timothy Velton, was also 50% at fault?
Appellees respond with this statement of the issue:
Is the defendant jointly and severally liable for the injuries it inflicted on the appellees, Marian and Rollie Close [?]
On September 2, 1993, the Closes were driving through Carbon County on Interstate 80. While the Closes were passing through a road construction site, an Anderson crew member accidentally dropped an orange traffic cone which rolled in front of the Closes' vehicle. Mr. Close swerved and braked suddenly to avoid hitting the cone, and the Closes' vehicle was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by Timothy Velton. Both Mr. and Mrs. Close were injured. They filed a complaint against Anderson and ultimately proceeded to trial.
At trial, the Closes argued that, under the 1986 version of the comparative fault statute, Anderson would be jointly and severally liable for their total damages even if there was a non-party (Velton) also at fault for the accident. Anderson responded that joint and several liability had been eliminated and that it should only pay damages in proportion to its percentage of fault. The district court ruled that, if the jury found Mr. Close free from any negligence, Anderson would be liable for the entire amount of the Closes' damages. The issue presently before this court was preserved for appeal when the district court instructed the jury to determine the relative fault of Mr. Close, Anderson, and Velton. Because no evidence pointed to negligence on the part of Mrs. Close, her name was not included in this instruction. The jury found Mr. Close 0% at fault and apportioned the fault equally between Anderson and Velton. The jury awarded the Closes $99,031.51 in damages. On September 10, 1998, the court entered judgment against Anderson for the full amount, plus interest and costs. Anderson appealed.
The crux of this case is whether the trial court properly interpreted the 1986 statute by requiring Anderson to pay 100% of the Closes' damages, even though the jury determined Anderson to be only 50% at fault. The question is one of statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation is a question of law; therefore, our standard of review is de novo. Cargill v. State, Dep't of Health, Div. of Health Care Financing, 967 P.2d 999, 1001 (Wyo.1998) (citing Parker Land and Cattle Co. v. Game and Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo.1993)). If the conclusion of law is in accordance with the law, we affirm it; if it is not, we correct it. Parker Land and Cattle Co., 845 P.2d at 1042.
We first determine which version of the comparative fault statute controls this action. The 1986 version of the statute applies to all causes of action arising after its effective date, June 11, 1986. 1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 24, §§ 3, 4; Halliburton Co. v. McAdams, Roux and Associates, Inc., 773 P.2d 153, 155 (Wyo.1989). The 1994 version of the statute applies to causes of action arising after its effective date, July 1, 1994. 1994 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 98, §§ 2, 4. Because the Closes' accident occurred on September 2, 1993, the 1986 version of statute applies, if the comparative negligence statute applies at all.
The 1986 version of the comparative negligence statute provides:
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109 (Michie June 1988 Rpl.) (hereinafter 1986 statute) (emphasis added). Clearly, if this version of the statute controls, subsection (d) would mandate that the district court was incorrect in making Anderson pay for 100% of the damages suffered by the Closes when Anderson was only 50% at fault. However, the question remains whether this statute applies.
The Closes maintain the 1986 version of the comparative negligence statute applies only to situations where the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. They also contend that, because neither Mr. nor Mrs. Close was found to be contributorily negligent, the common law doctrine of joint and several liability allows them to recover 100% of their damages from Anderson. They cite to Palmeno v. Cashen, 627 P.2d 163 (Wyo.1981) and Martinez v. City of Cheyenne, 791 P.2d 949 (Wyo. 1990) to support both propositions. Anderson contends those cases are distinguishable because both applied the 1977 comparative fault statute.
We first look at Palmeno, where this court wrote: 627 P.2d at 166. In that case, the 1977 statute2 clearly applied, as Anderson correctly points out. Id. at 165-66.
Unlike Palmeno, however, Martinez is not as clear regarding which comparative negligence statute applied. In Martinez, 791 P.2d at 962-63, this court followed its ruling in Palmeno, writing:
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