Brotherhood of Ry. Carmen (Div. of TCU) v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.

• Citation: 894 F.2d 1463
• Decision Date: 28 February 1990
• Docket Number: No. 88-7012,88-7012
• Parties: 133 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2761, 114 Lab.Cas. P 12,010, 15 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1406 BROTHERHOOD OF RAILWAY CARMEN (DIVISION OF TCU), Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants v. ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 1463

894 F.2d 1463

133 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2761, 114 Lab.Cas. P 12,010,

15 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1406

BROTHERHOOD OF RAILWAY CARMEN (DIVISION OF TCU), Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants v. ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 88-7012.

United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

Feb. 28, 1990.

Richard S. Edelman, William G. Mahoney, Highsaw & Mahoney, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs-appellants.

George P. Parker, Jr., Matthews & Branscomb, J. Joe Harris, San Antonio, Tex., John J. Fleps, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before WISDOM, JOHNSON, and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.

WISDOM, Circuit Judge:

Defendant/appellee Santa Fe is an interstate carrier subject to the Railway Labor Act (RLA). ¹ The plaintiff/appellant unions are the exclusive bargaining representatives of Santa Fe's employees. The unions allege that a voluntary resignation program offered by Santa Fe to its employees constituted direct dealing in violation of the RLA. Santa Fe contends that the program was permitted by its collective-bargaining agreements with the unions. The district court found that this case presents a minor dispute subject to compulsory arbitration under the RLA. 703 F.Supp. 597. We AFFIRM.

I

On December 21, 1987, Santa Fe posted a notice to its Cleburne shop employees offering, to a limited number of employees on a first come, first serve basis, an opportunity to terminate their employment in return for $20,000. Santa Fe required applicants for that "voluntary resignation" or "buyout" program to waive all claims and rights under applicable collective bargaining agreements as well as any other claims against Santa Fe.

During the four months prior to the buyout offer, Santa Fe had furloughed a number of shop craft employees at its Cleburne facility. Employees were, therefore, concerned about their job security, and many rushed to accept the buyout. Over two hundred Cleburne employees accepted the buyout offer.

On January 12, 1988, six of Santa Fe's shop craft unions filed suit in federal district court, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the buyout program. In the one cause of action now pursued on appeal, the unions assert that, in offering the buyout program, Santa Fe violated RLA Secs. 2 First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth ² by dealing directly with Cleburne shop employees rather than negotiating through their designated representatives, the unions. Santa Fe argues that collective agreements with the unions permitted it to deal directly with individual workers to buy out their employment rights.

On October 26, 1988, the district court entered an order dismissing the unions' complaint for lack of jurisdiction. That judgment was rendered final by the district court's order of December 5, 1988 denying the plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend that judgment. The district court found that, since the collective agreements between Santa Fe and the unions arguably permitted Santa Fe's buyout program, the case involved a "minor dispute" subject to compulsory arbitration under the RLA.

On December 12, 1988, the unions filed a Notice of Appeal. The unions thereafter filed a Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal. That motion was denied by the district court on December 21, 1988. A similar motion was denied by this court on January 6, 1989.

This court now AFFIRMS the district court's judgment dismissing the unions' complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

II

A preliminary issue is raised regarding this court's jurisdiction over five of the appellants in this case. The Notice of Appeal filed by the unions designated "Brotherhood of Railway Carmen (Division of TCU), et al." as the appellants; none of the other five plaintiff unions were specifically named in the notice. This raises the question whether the "et al." designation in the Notice of Appeal was sufficient under Fed.R.App.P. 3 to perfect an appeal for the five plaintiff unions not specifically named in the notice.

Rule 3(c) requires that a "notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties taking the appeal". The Supreme Court, in Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, ----, 108 S.Ct. 2405, 2409, 101 L.Ed.2d 285, 292 (1988), made clear that an "et al." designation will not suffice to perfect an appeal for unnamed appellants. The Court explained that The purpose of the specificity requirement of Rule 3(c) is to provide notice both to the opposition and to the court of the identity of the appellant or appellants. The use of the phrase "et al.," which literally means "and others," utterly fails to provide such notice to either intended recipient. Permitting such vague designation would leave the appellee and the court unable to determine with certitude whether a losing party not named in the notice of appeal should be bound by an adverse judgment or held liable for costs or sanctions. The specificity requirement of Rule 3(c) is met only by some designation that gives fair notice of the specific individual or entity seeking to appeal.

In the case before us, however, although five of the plaintiff unions were designated only as "et al." in the Notice of Appeal, that defect was cured by the fact that all six plaintiff unions were listed by name as appellants in a Memorandum in Support of Appellants' Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal. That supporting memorandum was filed within thirty days of the district court's judgment dismissing the case. In sum, within the thirty day period in which notice of appeal may be filed, all six unions seeking to appeal were clearly identified to both the appellees and the court. Thus, the required notice was provided within the thirty day period prescribed and the notice purposes of Rule 3(c) were served.

As the Supreme Court observed in Torres, "[I]f a litigant files papers in a fashion that is technically at variance with the letter of a procedural rule, a court may nonetheless find that the litigant has complied with the rule if the litigant's action is the functional equivalent of what the rule requires." Id., 487 U.S. at ----, 108 S.Ct. at 2408, 101 L.Ed.2d at 291. Since the Notice of Appeal along with the Memorandum provided adequate notice within the prescribed period, we hold that the unions' actions constituted the functional equivalent of what Rule 3(c) requires. This court has jurisdiction over the appeal of all six unions. ³

III

The unions charge that the buyout program offered to employees by Santa Fe without consultation with the unions constituted direct dealing regarding mandatory bargaining subjects (i.e., rates of pay, rules or working conditions) in violation of the RLA. ⁴ Santa Fe argues that its buyout program did not constitute direct dealing regarding mandatory subjects. Santa Fe argues, in the alternative, that even if the buyout program would otherwise have constituted an RLA violation the program was permitted by collective agreement between Santa Fe and the unions. ⁵

Addressing Santa Fe's first argument, we find that an RLA dispute is presented here. Even if the buyout program did not itself constitute direct dealing regarding mandatory subjects (a question we need not decide here), it may have functioned to "undermine collective bargaining rights". According to the 1964 Shopcrafts Agreement between Santa Fe and the unions, employees would be entitled to certain rights and benefits in the event that they were adversely affected by transfers of work. The unions allege that such work transfers were occurring and were adversely affecting employees at the time of the buyout offer. If the unions' allegations are true, then, by offering the buyout program and dealing directly with individual employees regarding acceptance of the buyout offer, Santa Fe effectively circumvented whatever obligations it might have had under the Shopcrafts Agreement by "buying out" employees one at a time. ⁶

In J.I. Case v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 64 S.Ct. 576, 88 L.Ed. 762 (1944), the Supreme Court stated that,

Individual contracts, no matter what the circumstances that justify their execution or what their terms, may not be availed of to ... limit or condition the terms of the collective agreement....

We know of nothing to prevent the employee's, because he is an employee, making any contract provided it is not inconsistent with a collective agreement.... But in so doing the employer may not incidentally exact or obtain any diminution of his own obligation ... in the matters covered by collective agreement.

321 U.S. at 337, 339, 64 S.Ct. at 580, 581. ⁷

Those principles stated in J.I. Case are equally applicable in cases brought under the RLA. As the Supreme Court stated in Order of R. Telegraphers v. Railway Exp. Agency, "[t]he decision in J.I. Case Co. v. National Labor Relation Bd. ... considers more generally the relation of individual contracts to collective bargaining, and much that is said in that opinion is applicable [in cases brought under the RLA]." 321 U.S. 342, 347, 64 S.Ct. 582, 585, 88 L.Ed. 788 (1944).

The buyout program, about which Santa Fe dealt directly with employees, may have functioned to undermine the collectively-bargained Shopcrafts Agreement and to reduce Santa Fe's obligations under that agreement. As such, the buyout program may have violated the RLA regardless of whether it constituted direct dealing regarding mandatory subjects (a question we do not pass on here). The unions, therefore, have stated a dispute cognizable under the RLA.

IV

The RLA provides two distinct procedures to promote the resolution of labor disputes. If there is a "major dispute", then, before resorting to self-help, the parties are required to submit to conference and, if necessary, mediation. 45 U.S.C. Secs. 152, 154-56. Where the dispute is classified as "minor", if not settled informally, it is subject exclusively to resolution through arbitration. 45 U.S.C. sec. 153. See, e.g....