Spencer v. General Elec. Co.
| Decision Date | 13 February 1990 |
| Docket Number | 88-1302,88-1389,Nos. 88-3892,89-2350 and 89-2356,89-2323,s. 88-3892 |
| Citation | 894 F.2d 651 |
| Parties | 51 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1725, 52 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 39,583, 58 USLW 2420, 58 USLW 2506, 15 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1091, 5 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. 241 Anne E. SPENCER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; The Equal Employment Advisory Council, Amici Curiae, and James Russell Neal, Defendant. Anne E. SPENCER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Amicus Curiae, and James Russell Neal, Defendant (Two Cases). Anne E. SPENCER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Amicus Curiae, and James Russell Neal, Defendant. Anne E. SPENCER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY; James Russell Neal, Defendants-Appellees, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Amicus Curiae (Two Cases). |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Jane Lang (Rebecca K. Troth, Paul C. Sprenger, Sprenger & Lang, on brief) for appellant.
Samuel A. Marcossan (Charles A. Shanor, Gen. Counsel, Gwendolyn Young Reams, Associate Gen. Counsel, Vincent J. Blackwood, Asst. Gen. Counsel, E.E.O.C., on brief) for amicus curiae.
Peter G. Nash (Jonathan R. Mook, Frances C. Moran, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak and Stewart, on brief) for appellee.
Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, Garen E. Dodge, McGuiness & Williams, on brief) for amicus curiae.
Before HALL and MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judges, and HARGROVE, United States District Judge for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.
Anne E. Spencer and the General Electric Company ("G.E.") each appeal from the judgments entered below in favor of Spencer on her hostile environment sexual harassment claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 2000e et seq., and in favor of G.E. on all other claims. Likewise, both parties appeal from the district court's award of attorney's fees to Spencer as a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k). Finding no error worthy of reversal, we affirm.
This case arises from Spencer's allegations of sexual harassment and abuse by her immediate supervisor at G.E., James Neal. We leave the details of these allegations to the thorough district court opinion on the merits of Spencer's claims. Spencer v. General Electric Co., 697 F.Supp. 204, 206-16 (E.D.Va.1988). For our purposes, an outline of the procedural history of the case will suffice.
Spencer filed suit against Neal and G.E. in November 1987. She alleged sexual harassment under Title VII, as well as the state tort claims of assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and negligent supervision. The basis of these claims was the allegation that over approximately a two-year period, Neal, during office hours, repeatedly solicited Spencer for sexual relations and repeatedly sexually assaulted her. This conduct was alleged to have culminated in Neal's rape of Spencer in October 1986. 1 Spencer sought in excess of one million dollars in compensatory and punitive damages as well as appropriate equitable relief.
Prior to trial, the district court dismissed the invasion of privacy claims and the negligent supervision claim on the grounds that Spencer had failed to state viable causes of action under Virginia law. The court also ruled that Virginia's two-year statute of limitations, Va.Code Ann. Sec. 8.01-243(A), barred all claims arising from any assaults which occurred more than two years before Spencer filed suit.
A simultaneous bench and jury trial on the Title VII and remaining tort claims commenced on May 24, 1988. At the close of Spencer's evidence, the court directed a verdict in favor of G.E. on all remaining tort claims. The court reasoned that the only way G.E. could be held liable for Neal's tortious conduct was through the doctrine of respondeat superior and that, since Neal's acts were clearly outside the scope of his employment, the claims had to be dismissed because Spencer had produced insufficient evidence of G.E.'s ratification of Neal's actions. Alternatively, the court ruled that even if G.E. had ratified Neal's actions, Spencer's claims were precluded by the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act, Va.Code Ann. Secs. 65.1 et seq. ("WCA").
After the directed verdict, Spencer decided to sever her Title VII claims from the tort claims and reached an agreement with Neal to dismiss her claims against him without prejudice, pending final resolution of G.E.'s tort liability. The court then granted Spencer's motion to this effect and, pursuant to Spencer's Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) motion, entered final judgment in favor of G.E. on the tort claims. 2
The jury was then dismissed and the trial continued on the Title VII claims, eventually lasting eight days. Spencer tried her case under both the hostile environment and quid pro quo theories of sexual harassment. In a lengthy opinion issued on October 4, 1988, the district court found in favor of Spencer on the hostile environment claim, but against her on the quid pro quo claim. Spencer, 697 F.Supp. at 216-19. Specifically, the court found that although Spencer had proven that sexual horseplay was prevalent in her workplace and that Neal had solicited her for sex, she had failed to prove that any sexual assaults had ever occurred or that her refusal to have sex with Neal had, in any way, prejudiced her employment. Id. at 207-17. Because G.E. had quickly transferred Spencer and because Spencer had not missed any uncompensated days from work, the court found that she could not prove any tangible loss due to the sexual harassment and, accordingly, awarded nominal damages of one dollar. Id. at 219. The court also found that since Neal had left G.E. and G.E. had implemented an extensive anti-sexual harassment policy, injunctive relief was not necessary. 3
Spencer promptly moved for reconsideration of the denial of injunctive relief. In a thorough memorandum order, the district court denied the motion, again basing its decision on the unlikelihood of future sexual harassment problems at G.E. in view of G.E.'s commitment to its newly-implemented anti-harassment policy. 4 Spencer v. General Electric Co., 703 F.Supp. 466 (E.D.Va.1989).
Spencer submitted a petition for a partial award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k) on the basis of the judgment in her favor on the hostile environment claim. She claimed in excess of $380,000.00 in fees. Spencer v. General Electric Co., 706 F.Supp. 1234, 1236 (E.D.Va.1989). Not unexpectedly, G.E. contested the petition on several grounds--primary among them being that she was not a prevailing party and that all fees incurred after G.E.'s Fed.R.Civ.P. 68 offer of judgment were not recoverable because the judgment Spencer was eventually granted was less favorable than G.E.'s offer. 5 The district court agreed with Spencer that she had prevailed in the litigation because, among other things, she had forced G.E. to adopt the anti-harassment policy. Id. at 1237-38. However, the court agreed with G.E. that the relief Spencer received, including the anti-harassment policy, was not more favorable than G.E.'s offer, especially in monetary terms. Id. at 1241. Consequently, the court disallowed all post-offer fees, and awarded Spencer pre-offer attorney's fees of $52,179.00, local counsel fees of $2,252.20, and $2,278.20 in costs and expenses. Id. at 1248. Both parties have appealed this award. Nos. 89-2350, 89-2356.
To facilitate our discussion of the issues raised in this appeal, we will address them in three related areas of law--the Virginia tort claims, the merits of the Title VII claims, and the award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(k).
Spencer contends that the district court erred in holding that Virginia law does not recognize claims for invasion of privacy and negligent supervision. She also argues that the court was in error by dismissing, under the Commonwealth's statute of limitations, those portions of her claims which were based on Neal's acts which occurred more than two years prior to her filing suit. She contends that these acts squarely fit within the "continuing tort" exception to the statute. Spencer also maintains that the trial court erred in directing a verdict in favor of G.E. on her assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. She contends that G.E. is vicariously liable for Neal's torts because Neal, as G.E.'s manager and agent, was aided in accomplishing his tortious acts by the existence of the agency relationship. Thus, the mere existence of the agency relationship under these circumstances establishes liability, regardless of whether the prerequisites of respondeat superior are shown. Alternatively, while conceding that Neal's actions were outside the scope of his employment, Spencer argues that the evidence at trial presented a jury issue over G.E.'s ratification of those actions and, therefore, a directed verdict on the grounds of respondeat superior was in error. She also contests the court's alternative holding that the WCA precluded G.E.'s liability. Finally, she challenges the trial court's exclusion under Fed.R.Evid. 403 of evidence of Neal's consensual sexual relations with other of his subordinates. We take up these contentions in turn.
1. While Spencer's invasion of privacy claims were dismissed purely as a matter of law, i.e., on the grounds that such a claim does not exist in Virginia, we are precluded from reaching this issue, as well as the arguments surrounding her assault and battery claim, by the facts as found by the trial court. Recently, in Dwyer v. Smith, 867 F.2d 184, 192-93 (4th Cir.1989), we reaffirmed our rule that...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Robinson v. Dist. of Columbia, Civil Action No.: 15-444 (RC)
...injunctive relief addressing retaliation. Bundy v. Jackson , 641 F.2d 934, 946 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ; see also Spencer v. General Elec. Co. , 894 F.2d 651, 660 (4th Cir. 1990) (declining to award injunctive relief to Title VII plaintiff where the action involved "an isolated incident of on......
-
Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat. Corp.
...841 F.Supp. 825, 830 n. 5 (N.D.Ill.1994); see also Spencer v. General Electric Co., 706 F.Supp. 1234, 1237 (E.D.Va.1989), aff'd 894 F.2d 651 (4th Cir.1990). There is no quid pro quo harassment when no one at the place of business links economic benefits to the plaintiff's participation in s......
-
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.
...losses of overtime and promotions, particularly given absence of reasonable basis to quantify promotional opportunities), aff'd, 894 F.2d 651 (4th Cir.1990); see also Denton v. Boilermakers Local 29, 673 F.Supp. 37, 41 (D.Mass.1987) (burden of proving backpay entitlement satisfied by reason......
-
Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., s. 94-1600
...pro quo sexual harassment cases an employer is automatically liable for its supervisor's conduct, see, e.g., Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651, 658 n. 10 (4th Cir.1990) (citing U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(b)); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 n. 6 (4th Cir.1983); Cavalier simply asserts that ......
-
Theories of liability
...Such conduct may fade gradually into classical sexual discrimination at this juncture. For example: Spencer v. General Electric Co ., 894 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1990) (unwanted sexual solicitations and horseplay can be advances of a sexual nature). Priest v. Rotary , 634 F.Supp. 571 (N.D. C......
-
Insurance coverage issues arising from workplace tort claims.
...Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). (4.)29 C.F.R. [sections] 1604.11, (5.)See, e.g., Spencer v. General Electric Co., 894 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1990); Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers Inc., 830 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. (6.)Meritor Savings, 477 U.S. at 60, 67 (conditions of employme......
-
Chaos or Coherence: Individual Disparate Treatment Discrimination and the Adea - Michael J. Zimmer
...denied injunctive relief when the plaintiff proved only an isolated instance of discrimination. See, e.g., Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651, 660-61 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds, Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992). Others have issued injunctions in cases involving ......