894 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 2018), 17-20278, In re Goodrich Petroleum Corp.
|Citation:||894 F.3d 192, 65 Bankr.Ct.Dec. 225|
|Opinion Judge:||W. EUGENE DAVIS, Circuit Judge|
|Party Name:||In the MATTER OF: GOODRICH PETROLEUM CORPORATION; Goodrich Petroleum Company, L.L.C., Debtors v. Goodrich Petroleum Corporation; Goodrich Petroleum Company, L.L.C., Appellees. Fallon Family, L.P., Appellant|
|Attorney:||Roger Joseph Naus, John Stephen Hodge, Seth Michael Moyers, Wiener, Weiss & Madison, A.P.C., Shreveport, LA, for Appellant. Frank Converse Brame, Brame Law Firm, P.C., Dallas, TX, Bradley Roland Foxman, Vinson & Elkins, L.L.P., Dallas, TX, John Tucker Kalmbach, Esq., Cook, Yancey, King & Galloway...|
|Judge Panel:||Before DAVIS, JONES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.|
|Case Date:||June 27, 2018|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit|
REVISED June 29, 2018
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Kenneth M. Hoyt, U.S. District Judge
Roger Joseph Naus, John Stephen Hodge, Seth Michael Moyers, Wiener, Weiss & Madison, A.P.C., Shreveport, LA, for Appellant.
Frank Converse Brame, Brame Law Firm, P.C., Dallas, TX, Bradley Roland Foxman, Vinson & Elkins, L.L.P., Dallas, TX, John Tucker Kalmbach, Esq., Cook, Yancey, King & Galloway, A.P.L.C., Shreveport, LA, for Appellees.
Before DAVIS, JONES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
W. EUGENE DAVIS, Circuit Judge
In 2014, appellant Fallon Family, L.P. (the "Fallon Family"), as part of a settlement agreement with appellees Goodrich Petroleum Corporation and Goodrich Petroleum Company, L.L.C. (collectively, "Goodrich"), executed a ratification of a previously disputed mineral lease in favor of Goodrich. In March 2016, Goodrich filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. Although the settlement agreement required
Goodrich to make substantial cash payments over time to the Fallon Family, the recorded ratification of the lease did not reflect this fact but only indicated that good and sufficient consideration had been paid for the ratification. The Fallon Family argued that because the bankrupt Goodrich failed to make payments under the promissory note made part of the settlement agreement, the Fallon Family had the right to dissolve the settlement agreement on grounds of non-payment, thus divesting Goodrich of its interest in the lease. We agree with the bankruptcy court that when Goodrich filed for bankruptcy, the debtor-in-possession became vested under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) with all the rights and powers of a bona fide purchaser of the real property rights of Goodrich, including the ratified lease. The lease as ratified may not be dissolved for nonpayment of the obligations in the settlement agreement because the public record reflects that consideration had been fully paid, and a third party was not placed on notice of the remaining payments. We therefore AFFIRM.
On September 8, 1954, the Fallon Familys predecessor-in-interest, Silas F. Talbert, executed a mineral rights lease (the "Lease") covering a 487-acre tract of land in Caddo and DeSoto Parishes, Louisiana (the "Property"). The Lease provided for a five-year primary term and a secondary term to continue "as long thereafter as oil, gas or other mineral is produced" on the Property. The Lease was properly recorded in the conveyance records of both parishes.
On February 28, 2012, the Fallon Family petitioned the 42nd Judicial District Court in DeSoto Parish to terminate the Lease and to assess damages and attorneys fees against Goodrich and other parties. Specifically, the Fallon Family alleged that Goodrich had ceased continuous operations on three units of the Property, in violation of the terms of the Lease. On October 2, 2014, the Fallon Family recorded two Notices of Pendency of Action (collectively, the "Lis Pendens") in the mortgage records of Caddo and DeSoto Parishes, which attached the Lease and evidenced the Fallon Familys suit to terminate the Lease.1 On October 6, 2014, the eve of trial, the Fallon Family agreed with Goodrich and the other defendants to resolve all controversies relating to the Lease.
The settlement was confirmed in a written agreement (the "Settlement Agreement") between the Fallon Family, Goodrich, and other defendants. The Settlement Agreement spelled out the terms of the parties October 15, 2014 compromise. In the Settlement Agreement, the Fallon Family agreed to ratify the Lease and to release its claims against Goodrich in consideration for Goodrichs paying $650,000 within ten business days of the Settlement Agreement and executing a promissory note (the "Promissory Note") in the amount of $1,000,000. The Promissory Note was to be paid in $100,000 biannual installments, with the first installment due on October 15, 2015. The $650,000 was wired to the Fallon Family and the Promissory Note duly delivered. The Amendment and Ratification of Oil, Gas and Mineral Lease (the "Lease Ratification") was recorded in the conveyance records of both Caddo and DeSoto parishes, with an effective date of October 15, 2014. The recorded Lease Ratification, in relevant part, reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, for the promises and covenants exchanged below, and other good and valuable consideration exchanged by the Parties on or near this date, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the Parties agree [to the listed promises and covenants].
The stipulated promises and covenants in the Lease Ratification are: (1) that except as to land released by prior agreement, the Lease is "hereby affirmed and ratified in its entirety, and remains in full force and effect; " (2) that the Lease "never ceased to be in full force and effect; " (3) that the Lease is severed by unit for maintenance; and (4) that an additional royalty clause is added to the Lease.
On October 15, 2015, Goodrich paid the first $100,000 installment on the Promissory Note; when the second installment came due on April 15, 2016, Goodrich failed to make the payment, leaving a $900,000 outstanding balance on the Promissory Note. On the same day, it filed voluntary chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings in the Southern District of Texas bankruptcy court.
During the course of bankruptcy proceedings, the Fallon Family filed an emergency motion seeking to compel assumption or rejection of the Settlement Agreement as an 11 U.S.C. § 365 executory contract. Had the Fallon Family succeeded in this argument, Goodrich would have been obligated either to perform fully the terms of the Settlement Agreement and thus pay the remainder of the debt or to reject the Settlement Agreement and thus relinquish any interest in the Lease Ratification. Alternatively, the Fallon Family sought to dissolve the Settlement Agreement in its entirety, putting both parties back in their pre-Settlement Agreement positions and thereby stripping Goodrich of its interest in the Lease. Goodrich, in opposition, argued that 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) allowed it to rely, as a bona fide purchaser, on representations in the recorded Lease Ratification that full consideration had been paid thereby preventing dissolution.
On July 26, 2016, following the receipt of Goodrichs objection and a motion hearing, the bankruptcy court denied the Fallon Familys motion, finding that, though the Promissory Note was integrated into the Settlement Agreement: (1) the Settlement Agreement was not an executory contract under 11 U.S.C. § 365 that Goodrich could be compelled to assume or reject; and (2) the Fallon Familys dissolution rights were not effective as to Goodrich pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544.2 On appeal, the district court affirmed.
The Fallon Family timely lodged this appeal.
We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). "We review the decision of a district court, sitting as an appellate court, by applying the same standards of review to the bankruptcy courts findings of fact and conclusions of law as applied by the district court." Thus, we review the bankruptcy courts findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.4
Central to this case is the interplay between 11 U.S.C. § 544(a), commonly referred to as the "strong arm" provision of the Bankruptcy Code, and the Louisiana Public Records Doctrine, Louisiana Civil Code article 3338. As a threshold matter, the Fallon Family argues that 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) only permits a debtor-in-possession (1) to avoid the transfer of property of the debtor; or (2) to avoid the obligations incurred by the debtor. In other words, the Fallon Family argues that these are the only strong-arm abilities Goodrich has to keep the bankruptcy estate intact.
These powers, the Fallon Family argues, are irrelevant in determining whether the Fallon Family can dissolve the Settlement Agreement because dissolution is a separate Louisiana statutory right. We agree with Goodrich that the Fallon Familys reading of 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) is much too narrow.
Because Goodrich, as debtor-in-possession, "occupies the shoes of a trustee in every way" under the Bankruptcy Code,5 Goodrichs abilities as debtor-in-possession are defined by 11 U.S.C. § 544(a).6 The relevant text of 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) reads as follows...
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