Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp. v. Richardson

• Decision Date: 20 June 1995
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 1993-261,1993-239.
• Citation: 894 F. Supp. 211
• Parties: HESS OIL VIRGIN ISLANDS CORP., Virgin Islands Industrial Maintenance Corp. and Leslie Wallace, Appellants, v. Erica RICHARDSON, individually and on behalf of the minors, Ilsa Tanghow, Gregory Robinson and Keith Conteh, Appellees, UNITED DOMINION CONSTRUCTORS, INC., William Osner and Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., Appellants, v. Hugh David COFFEY, Appellee,
• Court: U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands

894 F. Supp. 211

HESS OIL VIRGIN ISLANDS CORP., Virgin Islands Industrial Maintenance Corp. and Leslie Wallace, Appellants, v. Erica RICHARDSON, individually and on behalf of the minors, Ilsa Tanghow, Gregory Robinson and Keith Conteh, Appellees, UNITED DOMINION CONSTRUCTORS, INC., William Osner and Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., Appellants, v. Hugh David COFFEY, Appellee,

Civ. Nos. 1993-261, 1993-239.

District Court, Virgin Islands, Appellate Division, D. Saint Croix.

Argued February 16, 1995.

Decided June 20, 1995.

As Amended August 11, 1995.

George H. Logan, Christiansted, St. Croix, U.S.V.I. for Indus. Maintenance Corp.

Britain H. Bryant, Bryant, White and Associates, P.C., Christiansted, St. Croix, U.S.V.I., for Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp.

R. Eric Moore, Christiansted, St. Croix, for Leslie Wallace.

Lee J. Rohn, Christiansted, St. Croix, U.S.V.I., George W. Cannon, Jr., Frederiksted, St. Croix, for Erica Richardson, Individually and on behalf of the minors Ilsa Tanghow, Gregory Robinson, and Keith Conteh.

Andrew C. Simpson, Bryant, White and Associates, P.C., Christiansted, St. Croix, U.S.V.I. for United Dominion Constructors, Inc., United Dominion Constructors, Inc., Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp.

Lisa Harris-Moorhead, Moorhead & Bastress, P.C., Christiansted, St. Croix, U.S.V.I., for Hugh David Coffey.

Before MOORE, Chief Judge, District Court of the Virgin Islands; THOMPSON, Chief Judge United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, Sitting by Designation; and GILES, District Court Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Sitting by Designation.¹

OPINION

MOORE, Chief Judge.

These separate appeals involve provisions of the Virgin Islands labor relations statute, V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §§ 61-79 (1993), and in particular, sections 76-79 governing wrongful discharge ("Wrongful Discharge Act" or "WDA"). Both appellees, discharged employees, filed complaints with the Virgin Islands Department of Labor ("Department" or "DOL") charging wrongful discharge, subsequently filed WDA actions in the Territorial court, and thereafter requested permission from the Department to withdraw their complaints. In United Dominion Constructors, Inc. v. Coffey, Civ. No. 239-1993, United Dominion Constructors, Inc. ("UDCI") appeals from the Territorial Court's denial of its motion to dismiss the WDA action for the failure of its former employee, Hugh David Coffey ("Coffey"), to exhaust his administrative remedies. In Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp. v. Richardson, Virgin Islands Maintenance Corporation ("IMC") appeals the denial of its motion to dismiss the WDA suit of its former employee, Erica Richardson ("Richardson").

Two Territorial Court judges certified that the following question of law controlled each appeal:

Whether an employee who first elects to file an administrative claim for wrongful discharge pursuant to the Virgin Islands Wrongful Discharge Act, 24 V.I.C. § 76 et seq. (1986), but withdraws the claim before it is administratively resolved, is jurisdictionally barred from subsequently pursuing a judicial action.

Having carefully considered our jurisdiction² and the merits of these appeals, we hold that the Wrongful Discharge Act does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies or election between administrative and judicial remedies. Accordingly, an employee who has initiated an administrative claim for wrongful discharge is not barred from filing simultaneously or subsequently a WDA action in court.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY.

Because the factual and procedural contexts underlying each appeal differ, they are discussed separately.

A. The Coffey Case.

Mr. Coffey was employed as a subcontractor/administrator by UDCI from October 14, 1991 until he was discharged on May 14, 1992, on the ground that he had violated company policy. On June 12, 1992, Coffey, proceeding pro se, filed an administrative claim with the DOL for reinstatement and back pay. On August 12, 1992, he filed the instant lawsuit for wrongful termination, defamation, libel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Pursuant to its internal regulations, the Department held a preliminary hearing on October 16, 1992.³ No other action had been taken on his administrative claim by April of 1993 when Coffey wrote the DOL to request that his administrative claim be dismissed, pursuant to the DOL regulation that "any complaint may be withdrawn at any time with the consent of the Commissioner."⁴ The Department informed Coffey that his request must be made on an official DOL dismissal form, which it sent to him. Before Coffey could complete and return the official form, however, UDCI filed its motion to dismiss his court action because Coffey had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, relying on the Territorial Court decision in Daniel v. St. Thomas Dairies, Inc., 27 V.I. 120 (Terr.Ct.1992).

By memorandum opinion dated August 24, 1993, the Territorial Court (Eltman, J.) denied UDCI's motion to dismiss, finding that Coffey's motion to withdraw his administrative claim distinguished his case from Daniel. Even though the administrative claim was still pending, the trial judge ruled this distinction to be critical since he read Daniel as requiring the "exhaustion" of the administrative process. Noting that the statutory remedies available under the WDA are not inconsistent, the judge disagreed with Daniel's reliance on the doctrine of election of remedies, which presupposes two available and inconsistent remedies. The court also observed that the short 30-day period for filing an administrative claim makes the election of administrative remedies particularly harsh under the WDA. The court suggested a case-by-case application of the exhaustion doctrine, finding that the exhaustion requirement was not warranted in a case like Coffey's where the administrative remedies — reinstatement and back pay—"would be inadequate in comparison to what he seeks."

B. The Richardson Matter.

Ms. Richardson was discharged by her employer, IMC, a subcontractor of Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp. ("HOVIC"), where she had worked as a secretary at the HOVIC facility for two years before she was discharged in September of 1991. On October 1, 1991, Richardson filed an administrative complaint with the DOL and a year later filed her lawsuit in Territorial Court based on the same alleged wrongful termination. On March 23, 1993, the DOL approved her November 12, 1992, request to dismiss her administrative complaint. In the meantime, on March 3, 1993, IMC moved to dismiss the civil action, arguing that Richardson was required to exhaust her administrative remedies before seeking redress in the court, relying on Daniel.⁵ On June 25, 1993, the Territorial Court (Cabret, J.) denied IMC's motion to dismiss, finding jurisdiction over the action because the administrative claim was no longer pending, which distinguished Richardson's case from Daniel.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW.

Because the question raised in this consolidated appeal involves the application of legal precepts and turns on statutory construction, our review is plenary. Nibbs v. Roberts, V.I. BBS 91CI29A.DX2, 1995 WL 78295 (D.V.I. App. Feb. 8, 1995); In re Barrett, V.I. BBS 91CI159A.DX2 (D.V.I. App. Jan. 31, 1995).

III. JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION.

Although this issue has been litigated in the two divisions of the Territorial Court and the trial division of this Court, with varying and somewhat conflicting results, it is a case of first impression in this Appellate Division. Since a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recently considered the scope of the Wrongful Discharge Act, although in a different factual context, and come to a similar conclusion,⁶ a word is in order on the role of this Appellate Division within the territorial/federal framework of the Revised Organic Act of 1954,⁷ which the Congress of the United States has enacted as the "constitution" of these Virgin Islands. In other words, are we a territorial appellate tribunal akin to a state appellate court, whose interpretations of substantive local law are to be treated with deference unless manifestly in error? Or are we another layer of federal review between the local trial court and the United States court of appeals, that is, an intermediate federal court whose rulings of substantive local law are reviewed de novo?

In 1984, Congress amended the Revised Organic Act to extend the principles of federalism to the Territory's judicial system by enabling the Virgin Islands Legislature to create its own appellate court, establishing in the meantime an appellate panel within the District Court (the Appellate Division) to exercise appellate power over matters of local law.⁸ The Legislature of the Virgin Islands has established the boundaries of our appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the Territorial Court in 4 V.I.C. § 33.

We have found only one decision of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals addressing the significance of the 1984 amendments on the role of the Appellate Division:

The overall congressional intention discernible in the 1984 amendments is encouragement of the development of a local Virgin Islands appellate structure with greater autonomy with respect to issues of Virgin Islands law.... The Appellate Division ... represents a step in that direction, rather than toward the creation of a territorial federal appellate court with a place and role analogous to the place and role of the courts of appeals in the Article III court structure.

Matter of Alison, 837 F.2d 619, 622 (3d Cir. 1988). In the absence of a locally established Virgin Islands "supreme court," we understand Alison to hold that the Appellate Division should have a more autonomous role in interpreting local law.⁹

Having thus established that we presently function as the local appellate court for the Territory, we find the standard for reviewing our decisions on substantive local...