Moore v. Jasper County Dept.

• Citation: 894 N.E.2d 218
• Decision Date: 29 September 2008
• Docket Number: No. 37A03-0803-JV-103.,37A03-0803-JV-103.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court
• Parties: Charlotte MOORE, Appellant-Respondent, v. JASPER COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES, Appellee-Petitioner.

894 N.E.2d 218

Charlotte MOORE, Appellant-Respondent, v. JASPER COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES, Appellee-Petitioner.

No. 37A03-0803-JV-103.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

September 29, 2008.

Mark L. Callaway, Rensselaer, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Barry A. Chambers, Indiana Department of Child Services, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellee.

OPINION

NAJAM, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Charlotte Moore ("Mother") appeals the involuntary termination of her parental rights to her children, C.R.M. and C.B.M. Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's judgment.

We reverse.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mother is the biological mother of C.R.M. and his twin sister, C.B.M. (collectively "the twins"), born June 17, 2004.¹ On January 1, 2006, the Jasper County Department of Child Services ("JCDCS") was contacted by law enforcement officers who had been called to Mother's residence due to an altercation between Mother and two of her older children, D.M. and J.M. All three tested positive for alcohol. Mother was arrested for battery, and D.M. was arrested and placed in the Porter County Detention Center due to an outstanding warrant. Mother's remaining children were allowed to remain in the home under the supervision of their grandmother because no foster homes were available.²

This was not the JCDCS's first contact with Mother. Since 1996, the JCDCS had received approximately thirteen referrals for neglect, abuse, or lack of supervision involving Mother and her children; however, not all of the referrals were substantiated. During this time, JCDCS had provided various services in an attempt to help Mother improve her parenting skills, including intensive home-based counseling services. Counseling and parenting advice had also been provided to M.M., the twins' teenaged sister, who served as the twins' primary caregiver prior to their removal from the family home in January 2006.

On January 17, 2006, the twins and M.M. were removed from the family home, and a detention hearing was held the same day. Following the detention hearing, the trial court determined there was probable cause to believe M.M. and the twins were children in need of services ("CHINS").³ The children were made temporary wards of the State and were placed in therapeutic foster care. Following the children's initial removal, it was discovered that the twins were behind on their immunizations and were significantly developmentally delayed. Additionally, C.B.M. was diagnosed with Congenital Sucrose-Isomaltase Deficiency ("CSID"), a condition in which the body does not produce the enzyme needed to break down natural sugars. C.R.M. and C.B.M. were formally removed from Mother, pursuant to a dispositional decree, on March 6, 2006.⁴

The JCDCS filed separate petitions to involuntarily terminate Mother's parental rights to C.R.M. and C.B.M. on July 18, 2007. A fact-finding hearing on the termination petitions was eventually held on December 19, 2007. Uncontroverted evidence reveals that, at the time of the termination hearing, Mother was married, had enrolled at Ivy Tech Community College to pursue a Licensed Practical Nurse ("L.P.N.") degree after having already completed several prerequisite classes, had regained custody of two of her minor children had obtained her driver's license, had recently re-initiated individual counseling, and had obtained suitable housing.

At the termination hearing, JCDCS caseworker Monica Oliver ("Oliver") acknowledged that Mother had completed several court-ordered services. Oliver testified that Mother had: (1) submitted to a psychological assessment; (2) undergone a substance abuse assessment; (3) successfully completed parenting classes; (4) participated in consistent visitation with the twins; (5) obtained suitable housing; and (6) paid $1,010.20 in child support, but was $175.00 in arrears. Oliver remained concerned, however, with Mother's problem with "consistency," specifically referencing Mother's inconsistency in maintaining employment, participating in individual counseling, and maintaining contact with the JCDCS throughout the CHINS proceedings. Tr. at 24-28. In recommending termination of Mother's parental rights to the twins, Oliver acknowledged Mother's recent improvements, but stated she had "no evidence" as to Mother's "long-term ability to parent the children[,]" to "provide them with consistent care and guidance, and [to] provide for their needs[.]" Id. at 28. Jennifer Hatfield, foster care case manager with The Villages, also testified that she had concerns as to whether Mother would properly supervise and medicate the twins should they be returned to her care.

The twins' Guardian Ad Litem ("GAL"), Richard Comingore ("Comingore"), was strongly opposed to the termination of Mother's parental rights. In so testifying, Comingore stated:

I believe it would be detrimental to terminate the parental rights for these two children with the mother at this point in time. This has been a challenging case for me to deal with as a guardian ad litem. One, it was fairly short notice in which I was appointed; and certainly [Mother] ... has a colorful history, as I think testimony would illustrate today, perhaps. But I have also had the opportunity to visit the house where they're currently living.... And I believe the marriage has provided an opportunity of stability to [Mother] that she's never been afforded previously.

* * *

The house is a four-bedroom house.... Very clean. There was food there. There was heat there.... [N.M.] and [J.M.] were there, as well as [Husband's] two other children ... for visitation, because he is a divorced father. And that was a very opportune moment for me to observe the reaction of the kids together, because of the two families. I thought it was very appropriate, very positive.

Id. at 65-66. Comingore went on to testify that he felt Mother's case was "a unique case because [he] saw what appeared to be a changed person in ... [Mother.]" Id. at 66. When asked to describe what he meant, Comingore stated:

I saw a person who was very calm, was very concerned about her children, the [twins], as well as the third one that was also in foster care, the older child. I saw a person who was making valiant attempts to change her lifestyle through parenting classes, through attending Ivy Tech to become a L.P.N., licensed practical nurse. I saw a person living in a home which was clean and very appropriate.

Id. at 66-67.

In addition to his testimony concerning Mother, Comingore also testified as to his opinion of Husband. Comingore indicated that he was initially concerned about Husband's history⁵ and how his presence in the home would affect the family, so Comingore contacted the Deputy Prosecuting Attorney. According to Comingore, the Deputy Prosecuting Attorney "allayed those concerns." Id. at 68. Comingore and Husband both testified that Husband was employed and had an annual income of approximately fifty thousand dollars, as well as a 401K plan and health insurance through his employer. Comingore concluded that what he saw was, "a woman who had seven children and was trying to raise them to the best of her ability as a single mother, and was fighting an absolutely up-hill battle" until the marriage between Husband and Mother which provided her "a very positive environment for her and her family." Id. at 68-69.

Finally, Mother's sister, an L.P.N., and her own mother both testified that they were willing to help Mother care for the twins when they were not in school should Mother regain custody. Additionally, Mother's sister testified she would help Mother get C.B.M. to all of her medical appointments at Riley Hospital for Children because she, too, had a child with special medical needs that required traveling to the hospital for doctors' visits.

At the conclusion of the termination hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement. On January 23, 2008, the trial court issued separate orders terminating Mother's parental rights to C.R.M. and C.B.M. The trial court's orders were identical with the exception of the captioning and names. Mother filed separate appeals of the trial court's termination orders. This appeal ensued. On June 20, 2008, this Court ordered the separate appeals consolidated under a single cause number.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Mother alleges the trial court's orders terminating her parental rights to C.R.M. and C.B.M. are not supported by sufficient evidence. Specifically, Mother asserts the JCDCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence (1) that there is a reasonable probability the conditions leading to the twins' removal and continued placement outside the home would not be remedied or that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the twins' well-being and (2) that termination of Mother's parental rights is in C.R.M.'s and C.B.M.'s best interests.

Initially, we note our standard of review. This Court has long had a highly deferential standard of review in cases concerning the termination of parental rights. In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001). Thus, when reviewing the termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 264 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom that are most favorable to the judgment. Id.

Here, the trial court made specific findings in terminating Mother's parental rights. Where the trial court enters specific findings of fact, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings. Bester v. Lake County Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind.2005). Second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. In deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court's...