Malouf v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n
Citation | 933 F.3d 1248 |
Decision Date | 13 August 2019 |
Docket Number | No. 16-9546,16-9546 |
Parties | Dennis J. MALOUF, Petitioner, v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Respondent. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit) |
Kenneth F. Berg, Ulmer & Berne LLP, Chicago, Illinois (Alan M. Wolper and Heidi E. VonderHeide with him on the briefs), for Petitioner.
Daniel Aguilar, Attorney, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. and Lisa Helvin, Senior Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C. (Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Mark R. Freeman, Attorney, and Joshua A. Salzman, Attorney, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; Michael A. Conley, Solicitor, and Dominick V. Freda, Assistant General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C., with them on the briefs), for Respondent.
Before BRISCOE, HARTZ, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
Mr. Dennis Malouf occupied key roles at two firms. One of the firms (UASNM, Inc.) offered investment advice; the other firm (a branch of Raymond James Financial Services) served as a broker-dealer. Raymond James viewed those dual roles as a conflict, so Mr. Malouf sold the Raymond James branch. But the structure of the sale perpetuated the conflict. Because Mr. Malouf did not disclose perpetuation of the conflict, administrative officials sought sanctions against him for violating the federal securities laws.
An administrative law judge found that Mr. Malouf had violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Securities Act of 1933, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Rule 10b–5, and Rule 206(4)–1. Given these findings, the judge imposed sanctions. The SEC affirmed these findings and imposed additional sanctions, including disgorgement of profits.
Mr. Malouf appeals the SEC’s decision, and we affirm.
In 2007, Raymond James became concerned about the conflict of interest between (1) Mr. Malouf’s role at its branch office and (2) his role at UASNM. These concerns led Raymond James to ask Mr. Malouf to choose between the two roles. Mr. Malouf opted to remain at UASNM and sold his Raymond James branch to Mr. Maurice Lamonde for roughly $1.1 million, to be paid in installments based on the Raymond James branch’s collection of securities-related fees.1
To facilitate the installment payments, Mr. Malouf routed bond trades on behalf of his UASNM clients through the Raymond James branch. This way, Mr. Lamonde would receive enough in commissions to allow him to pay what he owed Mr. Malouf.2
While Mr. Malouf was routing bond trades to the Raymond James branch, he regularly failed to seek competing bids for the trades. Mr. Malouf conceded that he should have sought competing bids: UASNM’s compliance procedures required firm personnel to solicit bids from three different broker-dealers before placing a trade, and Mr. Malouf admitted that he probably could have received better prices for his clients through competing bids.
Mr. Malouf bore responsibility for preparing UASNM’s forms to be filed with the SEC (referred to as "Forms ADV")3 and ensuring the accuracy of the UASNM website. But UASNM delegated compliance with these responsibilities to a chief compliance officer and hired an outside consultant to review UASNM’s compliance procedures and Forms ADV.
Mr. Malouf later acknowledged that his financial arrangement with Mr. Lamonde had created a conflict of interest that should have been disclosed. But Mr. Malouf did not disclose that arrangement to UASNM’s chief compliance officer or the outside consultant. Because these individuals did not know the details of the Malouf-Lamonde arrangement, UASNM not only failed to disclose Mr. Malouf’s conflict of interest but also boasted that (1) UASNM’s employees were not receiving any commissions or fees from the Raymond James branch and (2) UASNM was providing impartial advice untainted by any conflicts of interest.
While UASNM was boasting of its impartiality, Mr. Malouf was participating in deciding what UASNM would disclose. He acknowledged that he had reviewed some of the Forms ADV for what to disclose and had at least some familiarity with the contents of the website. But he took no steps to remedy UASNM’s misstatements or to disclose his own conflict of interest.
In June 2010, UASNM’s outside consultant learned that Mr. Malouf had been receiving ongoing payments from Mr. Lamonde. With this information, the consultant told Mr. Malouf and UASNM that the payments had created a conflict of interest that needed to be disclosed. UASNM disclosed the conflict roughly nine months later.
The SEC also found that Mr. Malouf had aided and abetted UASNM’s violations of §§ 206(4) and 207 of the Investment Advisers Act and Rule 206(4)-1(a)(5).
The SEC imposed four sanctions on Mr. Malouf:
On appeal, Mr. Malouf makes four arguments:
When considering these appellate arguments, we credit the SEC’s factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence. Geman v. SEC , 334 F.3d 1183, 1188 (10th Cir. 2003). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." C.E. Carlson, Inc. v. SEC , 859 F.2d 1429, 1433 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. NLRB , 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) ).
Mr. Malouf contends that the administrative law judge was not validly appointed under the Constitution’s Appointments Clause. But Mr. Malouf forfeited this contention by failing to present it in the SEC proceedings.4 Given the forfeiture, we decline to reach the merits of this challenge.
The Constitution’s Appointments Clause authorizes Congress to delegate the appointment of "inferior officers" to the President, courts, and department heads. U.S. Const. art. II § 2, cl. 2. Mr. Malouf contends that his administrative law judge was an "inferior officer" who had not been appointed by the President, a court, or a department head. See Lucia v. SEC , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 201 L.Ed.2d 464 (2018). For this contention, the threshold issue involves exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The underlying securities laws expressly require administrative exhaustion. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77i(a) (Securities Act), 78y(c) (Securities Exchange Act), 80b-13(a) (Investment Advisers Act).5 Given the statutory requirement, courts lack discretion to excuse the failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Ross v. Blake , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856–57, 195 L.Ed.2d 117 (2016). Failure to comply with a mandatory exhaustion requirement prevents judicial review of the issue. United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc. , 344 U.S. 33, 37, 73 S.Ct. 67, 97 L.Ed. 54 (1952).
Mr. Malouf concedes that his administrative filings did not address the Appointments Clause. We thus must decide whether Mr. Malouf satisfies an exception to the exhaustion requirement.
The Securities Act does not contain an express exception to the exhaustion requirement, so we cannot excuse a failure to satisfy the Securities Act’s exhaustion requirement. 15 U.S.C. § 77i(a) ; see Ross , 136 S. Ct. at 1856–57. But the other two securities statutes (the Securities Exchange Act and Investment Advisers Act) provide an exception, allowing the claimant to avoid the exhaustion requirement upon a showing of reasonable grounds. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78y(c)(1), 80b-13(a).
Mr. Malouf argues that he had two reasonable grounds to skip the exhaustion requirement:
We reject both arguments.
Mr. Malouf argues that exhausting this challenge would have been futile because the SEC would undoubtedly have denied relief. We reject this argument.
The failure to pursue administrative remedies may be excused when exhaustion would have been futile. Gilmore v. Weatherford , 694 F.3d 1160, 1169 (10th Cir. 2012). But the futility exception is available only when the administrative process would have been "clearly useless." Id. (quoting McGraw v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. , 137 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir. 1998) ).
Mr. Malouf has not shown that exhaustion of this challenge would have been clearly useless. Indeed, when he filed his brief in the SEC (on September 2, 2015), the SEC...
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