Lakewood Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., LLC v. Dep't of Pub. Health

• Decision Date: 16 August 2018
• Docket Number: Appeal No. 3-17-0177
• Citation: 117 N.E.3d 1198,427 Ill.Dec. 261,2018 IL App (3d) 170177
• Parties: LAKEWOOD NURSING AND REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH; Lamar Hasbrouck, Director of Public Health; and Helen Sauvageau, Defendants (The Department of Public Health and Lamar Hasbrouck, Director of Public Health, Defendants-Appellees).
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2018 IL App (3d) 170177

117 N.E.3d 1198

427 Ill.Dec. 261

LAKEWOOD NURSING AND REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.The DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH; Lamar Hasbrouck, Director of Public Health; and Helen Sauvageau, Defendants

(The Department of Public Health and Lamar Hasbrouck, Director of Public Health, Defendants-Appellees).

Appeal No. 3-17-0177

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

Opinion filed August 16, 2018

Holly Turner, of Odessa, Texas, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (David L. Franklin, Solicitor General, and Laura Wunder, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees.

JUSTICE McDADEdelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1PlaintiffLakewood Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC(Lakewood), filed a notice of involuntary transfer and discharge against Helen Sauvageau for failure to pay for her residency.Sauvageau filed a request for hearing, which the parties agreed to stay when Sauvageau applied for Medicaid.Two days after Sauvageau's application was denied, Lakewood requested defendantIllinois Department of Public Health(IDPH) to set a hearing date.Sixty-eight days after Lakewood's request, a hearing was held.IDPH approved the discharge 30 days after the receipt of its final ruling.Lakewood filed a complaint in the circuit court, arguing that (1) IDPH's ruling is void because it violated statutory time requirements, and (2) IDPH erred when it required Lakewood to keep Sauvageau as a resident for an additional 30 days.IDPH filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted.Lakewood appealed, and this court reversed the trial court's decision.On remand, the trial court determined that IDPH did not violate statutory time requirements and that it had the discretion to impose the 30-day extension.Lakewood appealed.We reverse.

¶ 2 FACTS

¶ 3This case involves an involuntary discharge of a resident of Lakewood.In 2012, Helen Sauvageau became a Lakewood resident and initially paid for her residency through her pension and social security without the assistance of government financial aid.In August 2013, Sauvageau stopped paying Lakewood.

¶ 4 On October 28, 2013, Lakewood sent Sauvageau a notice of involuntary transfer or discharge and opportunity for hearing.The notice stated that it was seeking to discharge Sauvageau because she failed to pay for her stay at Lakewood.On November 1, 2013, Sauvageau filed an involuntary transfer or discharge request for hearing and, the next day, filed an application for Medicaid.On January 13, 2014, her Medicaid application was denied.On January 15, 2014, Lakewood's attorney informed IDPH of the denial and requested IDPH to set an intent to discharge hearing date.

¶ 5 On February 10, 2014, a prehearing was held.Lakewood filed a motion to dismiss its hearing request, arguing that the IDPH no longer had jurisdiction to hold a hearing because it would be doing so after the 10-day limitations period in section 3-411 of the Nursing Home Care Act( 210 ILCS 45/3-411(West 2014) ).In Sauvageau's response to the motion to dismiss, she claimed that, through an exchange of e-mails, the parties had agreed to stay the hearing pending her application for medical assistance, that failure to hold a hearing would violate her due process rights, and that the original discharge notice was defective.Sauvageau explained that she applied for medical assistance, that the application was denied, and that she was currently appealing the denial.IDPH denied the motion to dismiss, determining that the language within the section was directory rather than mandatory.It reasoned that there was no negative language denying a hearing if the time requirement was not met and that strict compliance of the time requirement would cause more adverse effects than a delay.

¶ 6 On March 24, 2014, an evidentiary hearing was held.At the hearing, Sauvageau's attorney stated that "we can stipulate to the fact that there are monies due and owing to Lakewood Nursing Home.I don't know that we can stipulate to the exact amount that they are claiming but we can definitely stipulate that we didn't pay because we ran out of money, and we applied for the Medicaid and we've been still in that process with the intent that Medicaid will eventually be approved.It is approved with the spend down and we are hoping to appeal and get some better terms out of that."The administrative law judge (ALJ) recommended, based on Sauvageau's stipulation that she owed money to Lakewood, that the notice of involuntary transfer or discharge should be approved "30 days subsequent to the receipt of the final ruling in this matter."The chief ALJ adopted the recommendation in its final administrative order.

¶ 7 Lakewood filed a complaint in the Will County circuit court.The complaint alleged that the hearing and final order is void because they violate the statutory time requirements.It also claimed that the final order unconstitutionally required Lakewood to keep Sauvageau as a resident for an additional 30 days after the order was issued.IDPH filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Lakewood's claims were moot because Lakewood received the relief it sought as Sauvageau no longer lived in the facility.It also claimed that the trial court only has jurisdiction to review final administrative decisions and that Sauvageau does not challenge the decision but rather seeks "declaratory relief regarding the timing of the Department's actions."The trial court granted the motion to dismiss.

¶ 8 Lakewood appealed, and this court reversed and remanded the trial court's decision in Lakewood Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLC v. Department of Public Health , 2015 IL App (3d) 140899, 397 Ill.Dec. 876, 43 N.E.3d 203.This court determined that the issues were moot because relief was not available to Lakewood once Sauvageau left the facility.However, the court found that the public interest and the capable of repetition yet evading review exceptions applied.Id.¶¶ 19, 30, 36.This court stated that the time requirement issues that Lakewood presented were too premature for its review and would be better addressed on remand.Id.¶ 40.

¶ 9 On remand, the parties stipulated to the following facts:

"1.On July 6, 2012, Helen Sauvageau(hereinafter ‘Resident’) became a resident at Lakewood Nursing and Rehabilitation Center (hereinafter ‘Lakewood’) and was a private pay resident (meaning, Resident was not receiving governmental financial aid; Resident had a pension and Social Security) until August 2013, when Resident no longer paid for her nursing stay.

2.On October 20, 2013, the facility filed a ‘Notice of Intent to Discharge’ Resident due to her failure to pay.

3.Resident hired an attorney, who, on November 1, 2013, filed a Notice of Hearing with IDPH for the intended discharge.

4.On or about November 2, 2013, Resident filed an application for Medicaid, which stayed the intent to discharge hearing.

5.On January 13, 2014, Resident's Medicaid application was denied.Resident's request for Medicaid was denied for her stay at Lakewood because Resident gifted her house to her daughter.

6.On January 15, 2014, Lakewood's attorney informed IDPH of the denial and requested the intent to discharge hearing be set.

7.IDPH scheduled the intent to discharge for hearing to occur March 24, 2014(68 days after January 15, 2014).

8.On March 24, 2014, the intent to discharge hearing was held.At said hearing, Resident's attorney stipulated that Resident had not paid for her stay, and that monies were owed to Lakewood.

9.On May 6, 2014(43 days after the intent to discharge hearing was held), IDPH signed the Final Order in the intent to discharge case, and mailed said Order to the parties on May 7, 2014(44 days after the intent to discharge hearing was held).

10.In said Final Order, IDPH ordered the facility to allow Resident to stay in the facility an additional 30 days from the date of the Final Order.

11.Lakewood did not consent to the hearing being held more than 10 days after Medicaid denial being issued.

12.Lakewood did not consent to the Final Order being issued more than 14 days after the intent to discharge hearing was held.

13.Lakewood did not consent to the language in the Final Order allowing Resident to remain in the facility for 30 days.

14.Both parties agree that the Nursing Home Care Act, 210 ILCS 45(more specifically, Art. III Pt. 4‘Discharge and Transfer’;210 ILCS45/3-401 through 210 ILCS 45/3-423) governs this review.

15.Both parties agree to limit the issues to those set forth in the Appellate Court remand Order, specifically:

(a) Does the Nursing Home Care Act require IDPH to hold an intent to discharge hearing not later than 10 days after a hearing request is filed?

(b) Does the Nursing Home Care Act require IDPH to render a decision on the discharge within 14 days after a hearing request is filed?

(c) Does IDPH have the authority under the Nursing Home Care Act to issue an Order directing the nursing care facility to allow the Resident facing discharge to remain at the facility for a specific period of time after the issuance of a Final Order on the merits of the discharge hearing?"

¶ 10 Lakewood argued that section 3-411's time requirement that IDPH shall hold a hearing no later than 10 days after a hearing request is filed and render a decision within 14 days after the filing of the hearing request are mandatory because (1) the statutory provision affects public and private rights, (2) the provision contains negative language, and (3) the provision unambiguously construes specific time requirements.Furthermore, Lakewood claimed that section 3-413 of the Nursing Home Care Act( 210 ILCS 45/3-413(West 2014) ) did not give IDPH authority to approve the notice 30 days after the final ruling.

¶ 11The circuit court held that section 3-411's time requirements were directory for three reasons: (1) without negative language, provisions that construe procedural commands are...