UNITED FOOD & COMMERCIAL WKRS. UNION v. ALPHA BETA

• Decision Date: 15 November 1982
• Docket Number: No. C-82-3083 SAW.,C-82-3083 SAW.
• Citation: 550 F. Supp. 1251
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
• Parties: UNITED FOOD & COMMERCIAL WORKERS UNION, LOCALS 197, 373, 428, 588, 775, 839, 870, 1119, 1179 AND 1532, CHARTERED BY UNITED FOOD & COMMERCIAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO, Petitioners, v. ALPHA BETA COMPANY, Respondent.

550 F. Supp. 1251

UNITED FOOD & COMMERCIAL WORKERS UNION, LOCALS 197, 373, 428, 588, 775, 839, 870, 1119, 1179 AND 1532, CHARTERED BY UNITED FOOD & COMMERCIAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO, Petitioners, v. ALPHA BETA COMPANY, Respondent.

No. C-82-3083 SAW.

United States District Court, N.D. California.

November 15, 1982.

Thornton C. Bunch, Jr., Bunch & Andrews, San Francisco, Cal., for petitioners.

Patrick W. Jordan, Henry F. Telfeian, McLaughlin & Irvin, San Francisco, Cal., for respondent.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WEIGEL, District Judge.

Ten union locals have filed a Petition to Compel Arbitration and Complaint for Specific Performance ("Petition and Complaint") pursuant to § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 4 and 5, and 28 U.S.C. § 1337. The Petition and Complaint seeks to compel arbitration of a dispute between petitioners and the respondent employer under collective bargaining agreements that petitioners and respondent entered into in 1980. The agreements are effective until 1983. The dispute involves respondent's refusal to contribute to health and welfare and pension programs set up under those agreements on behalf of certain members of the petitioning locals. Subsequent to the execution of the collective bargaining agreements in 1980, these local members were transferred by respondent from their prior jobs to positions in respondent's food store in Pinole, California. Since 1981, respondent has made pension contributions on behalf of those employees transferred to the Pinole store to a fund set up pursuant to an agreement between respondent and the Independent Alpha Beta Workers Association ("IABWA"). The IABWA purports to represent the employees at the Pinole store. Respondent alleges the IABWA is the exclusive lawful representative of those employees.

Petitioners move for an Order Compelling Arbitration, for Summary Judgment, and for Attorneys' Fees. Respondent opposes this motion and moves, on various grounds, to dismiss the Petition and Complaint.

I. Petitioners' Motion.

A. Re Order Compelling Arbitration

Federal law favors private arbitration of labor disputes. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 414 U.S. 368, 377, 94 S.Ct. 629, 636, 38 L.Ed.2d 583 (1974); Brannon v. Warn Brothers, 508 F.2d 115, 119 (9th Cir.1974). The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4, upon which petitioners rely, provides that a court is to consider only two issues on a motion to compel arbitration. The court first must determine whether or not there is an agreement to arbitrate a particular dispute and, second, if it be found that there is such an agreement, whether or not it has been breached. See Conticommodity Services, Inc. v. Philipp & Lion, 613 F.2d 1222 (2d Cir.1980). The Supreme Court has stated that in cases, such as this, brought pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 185, "the judicial inquiry ... must be strictly confined to the question whether the reluctant party did agree to arbitrate the grievance...." United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1352, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960). In Steelworkers, the Court added that "an order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubt should be resolved in favor of coverage." Id. at 582-83, 80 S.Ct. at 1352-1353. Moreover, both the Supreme Court and this Circuit have held that the "most forceful evidence" is sufficient basis for a decision that a particular dispute should not go to arbitration. Id. at 585, 80 S.Ct. at 1354; Association of Industrial Scientists v. Shell Development Co., 348 F.2d 385, 388 n. 3 (9th Cir.1965).

Section 18 of the collective bargaining agreements between some of the petitioners and respondent establishes as subject to arbitration "a dispute, difference of opinion between the parties, and grievances of employees involving or arising out of the meaning, interpretation, application or alleged violation of this Agreement, including the arbitrability of all such matters." Section XIX of the collective bargaining agreements between the remaining petitioners and respondent provides that "all claims, disputes, and grievances arising between the parties during the term of this Agreement over the construction and application of this Agreement, or relating to working conditions arising out of this Agreement" are subject to arbitration. There are no exceptions to these provisions.

In addition, Section 1.13 of the agreements between some of the petitioners and respondent provides that transferred employees as to whom "contributions are made to the various trust funds shall continue to have contributions to the several trust funds made on their behalf in the same manner and in the same amount per hour as such contributions were made prior to their transfer." Section I. B of the agreements between the remaining petitioners and respondent contains an identical provision.

Petitioners and respondent disagree as to whether respondent must continue to make contributions on behalf of those employees transferred to the Pinole store under Sections 1.13 and I. B. This disagreement amounts to "a dispute ... or difference of opinion between the parties" under Section 18 of some of the agreements and is "a dispute ... arising between the parties ... over the construction and application of this Agreement" under Section XIX of the remaining agreements between petitioners and respondent. The agreements, then, call for arbitration of the dispute between petitioners and respondent. It is clear that respondent has refused to arbitrate. Consequently, the Court should grant the motion for an order compelling arbitration.

B. Re Summary Judgment

As just noted, a court must consider only two issues on a motion to compel arbitration: Whether there is an agreement to arbitrate the particular dispute and whether one party has refused to arbitrate. The relevant provisions of the agreement between petitioners and respondent, respondent's patent refusal to arbitrate, and the pertinent legal authorities show that there is no unresolved genuine issue of material fact and that petitioners are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

Moreover, contrary to respondent's contentions, petitioners' motion for summary judgment was timely made. Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(a) requires that twenty days elapse after the commencement of the action before a motion for summary judgment may be filed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 3 establishes that the filing of the complaint commences an action. The Petition and Complaint herein was filed on June 16, 1982. Forty-nine days later, on August 6, 1982, petitioners filed their motion for summary judgment in compliance with Rule 56(a).

C. Re Attorneys' Fees

American law generally requires each litigant to bear the costs of his own attorneys' fees. However, this Court possesses the discretion to award attorneys' fees where a party has "`acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.'" Aleyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 1622, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975).

Respondent has not exhibited the sort of behavior that might warrant an award of attorneys' fees against it. Its opposition to petitioners' Motion for an Order Compelling Arbitration and for Summary Judgment and its own Motion to Dismiss the Petition and Complaint have raised legitimate issues. Petitioners have provided little beyond conclusory allegations and mainly inapposite authorities to support their claims that respondent acted in bad faith and without justification.

II. Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Petitioners' Petition and Complaint.

A. Re Applicable Standard

Respondent brings its motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). Since the Court has been presented with and considered materials outside the pleadings, the motion is treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56(c). Thus, to gain summary judgment, respondent must show that no material issue of fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to its various claims on the motion.

B. Re Sufficiency of Process and This Court's Personal Jurisdiction

Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(b) requires that a summons state the "time within which these rules require the defendant to appear and defend." Rule 12(a) provides that a defendant shall have twenty days within which to answer a complaint. Respondent claims that Rules 4(b) and 12(a) indicate that the Summons petitioners served on respondents on August 31, 1982, was inadequate, because the Summons called for an answer within ten days. Respondent further asserts that this inadequate service of process invalidates this Court's personal jurisdiction over it.

Respondent's claims are meritless. Rule 4 should be liberally and flexibly construed. See 4 C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1083 (1969). The primary function of Rule...