Keeler v. Mayor & City Council of Cumberland

• Decision Date: 10 June 1996
• Docket Number: No. S96-167.,S96-167.
• Citation: 928 F. Supp. 591
• Parties: Cardinal William H. KEELER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MAYOR & CITY COUNCIL OF CUMBERLAND, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

928 F. Supp. 591

Cardinal William H. KEELER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MAYOR & CITY COUNCIL OF CUMBERLAND, et al., Defendants.

No. S96-167.

United States District Court, D. Maryland, Northern Division.

June 10, 1996.

Peter E. Keith, Thomas N. Biddison, Jr., David W. Kinkopf, Baltimore, MD, for plaintiffs.

H. Jack Price, Jr., City Solicitor, Cumberland, MD, for defendants.

Lynne A. Battaglia, United States Attorney, Kay A. Allison, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, MD, for Intervenor — United States of America.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SMALKIN, District Judge.

This action is before the Court on the motion of the defendant Mayor and City Council of Cumberland to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The plaintiffs, Cardinal William H. Keeler, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore (representing the archdiocese as a corporation sole) and St. Peter and Paul's Roman Catholic Congregation, Inc., have opposed the motion. The United States has intervened under 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) for the purpose of defending the constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. No oral argument is necessary. Local Rule 105.6, D. Md.

Factual Background

St. Peter and Paul's Roman Catholic Church occupies an entire block of the city of Cumberland, Maryland. The block contains a church, a "massive" monastery with a large chapel, and a corridor known as the "White Elephant," which connects the monastery to the sacristy of the Church. (Cmplt. ¶ 10). The buildings were built between 1848 and 1889.

In 1974, the City of Cumberland enacted a Historic Zoning Ordinance and established a Historic Preservation Commission. Four years later, the City created the Washington Street Historic District, which includes all of the ecclesiastical buildings of St. Peter and Paul's church. Once the church had become part of the historic district, the church buildings could only be altered or demolished with the approval of the Cumberland Historic Preservation Commission.

The monastery and chapel have stood empty since 1986. The large buildings are in disrepair. According to the complaint, the "estimated cost for reconstruction simply to retain and adequately maintain the structure exceeds three hundred and eighty thousand dollars ... plus significant annual maintenance costs," and "the estimated cost for a complete renovation of the entire building exceeds two million dollars." (Cmplt. ¶¶ 13 and 14).

After several plans to preserve or convert the building failed, the parish decided that "the Monastery and Chapel should be razed in order to remove a draining financial liability and that a badly needed Church Annex and other facilities should be built on the property for the good of the parish." (Cmplt. ¶ 1). On August 14, 1995, the plaintiffs applied to the Cumberland Historic Preservation Commission for a Certificate of Appropriateness to demolish the monastery and chapel building. The Commission held a public hearing to consider the application on September 11, 1995. The Commission subsequently denied the demolition application. According to the plaintiffs, the effect of the Commission's decision is to force "SS Peter and Paul Church and its parishioners to maintain an enormous building which has no function for the parish, is a significant financial liability and whose presence prevents the parish from meeting the religious needs of its congregation." (Cmplt. at ¶ 2).

The Complaint

On January 18, 1996, the plaintiffs filed a ten-count complaint in this Court. Count I alleges that the City of Cumberland's application of its Historic Preservation Ordinance to the plaintiffs violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (RFRA), because it substantially burdens the free exercise of religion. Counts II and III allege that the City of Cumberland has violated both the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the corresponding provision of the Maryland Constitution, Article 36 of the Declaration of Rights. Count IV alleges a violation of the Establishment Clause. Count V alleges that the actions of the Historic District Commission "restrict freedom of expression and speech" and infringe upon parishioners' right to assemble. Counts VI and VII seek relief under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Articles 19 and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, contending that the City has effected an unconstitutional taking of the plaintiffs' property. Counts VIII and IX allege that the actions of the Historic Preservation Commission violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights because they were "arbitrary and capricious, were not supported by substantial evidence, and violated state and local law." Lastly, in Count X, the plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that the City of Cumberland may not apply its Historic Zoning Ordinance to the plaintiffs. In addition, the plaintiffs seek an order directing the City to permit the demolition of the monastery, the chapel and the "White Elephant," an award of attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and damages "in an amount to be determined" during the litigation.

The Motion to Dismiss

On February 26, 1996, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. According to the defendants, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and is "barred by the doctrine of waiver." (Mot. to Dismiss at 1). The defendants attached to their motion the transcript of the hearing before the Historic District Commission on September 11, 1995. The plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion on March 11, 1996. The plaintiffs' opposition was also supported by exhibits.

Although the defendants do not specifically so state, their motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is authorized by Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion must be denied "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (footnote omitted); accord Mylan Laboratories, Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir.1993), cert. denied 510 U.S. 1197, 114 S.Ct. 1307, 127 L.Ed.2d 658 (1994). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion, therefore, tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint, and, if the complaint is legally insufficient, "authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1832, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).

Rule 12 provides, in part, as follows:

"If, on a motion ... to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment ..."

In the present case, both parties presented exhibits to this Court in addition to the pleadings. If this Court were to consider those exhibits, then the defendants' motion to dismiss would be converted to a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Wilson-Cook Medical, Inc. v. Wilson, 942 F.2d 247, 251-252 (4th Cir.1991); Gay v. Wall, 761 F.2d 175, 177 (4th Cir.1985). Unlike a 12(b)(6) motion, a motion for summary judgment is an adjudication of the merits of the plaintiff's case, based upon undisputed facts.

Under the circumstances of the present case, this Court will exercise its discretion to exclude the matter extraneous to the pleadings and to treat the motion as a 12(b)(6) motion, as the parties apparently intended. In light of the numerous legal theories advanced by the plaintiffs and the relatively undeveloped state of the record, the parties should be given an opportunity to file properly-supported motions for summary judgment at a later stage of the litigation.

Analysis

The defendants argue that the complaint fails to state a cause of action under any legal theory advanced by the plaintiffs. This Court may dismiss the complaint only if it appears, as a matter of law, that no set of facts the plaintiffs might prove would entitle them to relief under any legal theory. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. at 101-02. Accordingly, "the court, in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, must take all wellpleaded material allegations of the complaint as admitted and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." De Sole v. U.S., 947 F.2d 1169, 1171 (4th Cir.1991).

The defendants first argue that the plaintiffs waived their right to sue the defendants by entering into a "Stipulation and Agreement" with the City. The complaint cannot be dismissed on the basis of the affirmative defense of waiver, however, when the issue is the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs' complaint. The defendants also contend that the Mayor and City Council of Cumberland should be dismissed as party defendants because "the City has had no involvement in this matter." (Dfts.' Mot. to Dismiss at 11). The plaintiffs, however, contend that the Historic District Ordinances passed by the City Council violate their rights guaranteed by the First and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The complaint alleges that the defendants "acted under state law, pursuant to their official policies and customs, and in their official capacities as entities of local government in the City of Cumberland." (Cmplt. ¶ 27.) To the extent that the plaintiffs may have stated a constitutional cause of action cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they have also adequately alleged the basis for § 1983 municipal liability. See Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037-38, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1298-99, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986).

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