MINNESOTA MIN. & MFG. v. Research Medical, Inc.
Decision Date | 13 July 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 84-C-0728S.,84-C-0728S. |
Citation | 691 F. Supp. 1305 |
Parties | MINNESOTA MINING AND MANUFACTURING CO., Plaintiff, v. RESEARCH MEDICAL, INC.; Peter Von Berg; and Peter Von Berg, a corporation, GmbH, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Utah |
Laurence H. Pretty, Gary A. Clark, Los Angeles, Cal., David A. Greenwood, Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, Salt Lake City, Utah, Walter N. Kirn, Robert W. Hoke, Craig S. Summers, St. Paul, Minn., for Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.
H. Ross Workman, David O. Seeley, Workman, Nydegger & Jensen, Louis M. Haynie, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Research Medical, Inc.
The action is before the court on the motion by plaintiff Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. (3M) for modification of the court's ruling on 3M's Motion for Certification of Final Judgment under Fed.R. Civ.P. 54(b).
3M brought this action for patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. §§ 271, 281 and 283-85; defendant Research Medical Company, Inc. (RMI) raised counterclaims of invalidity, unenforceability, noninfringement and antitrust. Pursuant to this court's order, RMI's antitrust counterclaims were severed for trial at a later date. In its October 22, 1987 memorandum decision, 679 F.Supp. 1037, the court concluded the subject 3M '129 patent is invalid and unenforceable on all claims. The court further concluded the RMI Von Berg catheter infringes the '129 patent claims 5, 6 and 7; and the RMI Polaris catheter infringes the '129 patent claims 5 and 6. On February 18, 1988, the court entered final judgment on all decided claims except RMI's counterclaim assertions regarding inequitable conduct and attorney's fees. The ruling was based on the court's determination the inequitable conduct issues decided in the infringement claim are so interrelated with the inequitable conduct issues in the remaining antitrust claims that "`the interests of sound judicial administration' would best be served by permitting 3M's conduct to be viewed as a whole." Memorandum Ruling at 5 (quoting Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7-8, 100 S.Ct. 1460, 1464-65, 64 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980)). The court found persuasive RMI's argument that if the validity and infringement claims were certified for appeal in their entirety, the inequitable conduct issues would be considered outside the context in which they would be presented for antitrust purposes, and an adverse appellate decision on inequitable conduct could prejudice RMI or unduly increase its burden on the antitrust counterclaims.
3M now moves the court to vacate its ruling, and enter final judgment on all claims finally decided.
Rule 54(b) provides in part:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, ... the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims ... only upon express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.
The quoted portion of the Rule applies only to an action in which multiple claims are presented, and one or more but fewer than all the claims have been finally decided. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 76 S.Ct. 895, 100 L.Ed. 1297 (1956). In the present case, there is no issue concerning whether the validity and infringement claims were finally decided; therefore the court turns to the question whether there should be any just reason for delay of entry of final judgment. In Curtiss-Wright, the Supreme Court clarified the scope and purpose of Rule 54(b):
Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 8, 100 S.Ct. at 1465. The Court considered two specific factors proper "judicial administrative interests": "whether the claims under review were separable from the others remaining to be adjudicated and whether the nature of the claims already determined was such that no appellate court would have to decide the same issues more than once even if there were subsequent appeals." Id. (footnote omitted). However, even when the appellate court would be required to review the same issues in subsequent appeals, certification might be appropriate if the district judge should determine "an appellate resolution of the certified claims would facilitate a settlement of the remainder of the claims." Id., 446 U.S. at 8 n. 2, 100 S.Ct. at 1465 n. 2.; see Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Eng'g & Foundry Co., 351 U.S. 445, 450 n. 5, 76 S.Ct. 904, 907 n. 5, 100 L.Ed. 1311 (1956).
In its present motion, 3M requests the court to include the inequitable conduct questions in the certification order on the ground that although Rule 54(b) allows the court to direct entry of final judgment on one claim for relief where multiple claims are presented, the inequitable conduct question is not a separate claim, but merely an issue that arose in the unenforceability defense related to RMI's "declaratory judgment claim for relief." 3M's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Modification at 4 (emphasis in original). 3M further argues that 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) is not relevant in this case. Under § 1292(b), the court may certify an order for interlocutory appeal of an issue if it should involve a controlling question of law on which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion; however, here § 1292(b) certification was not asserted by either party, and in any event, the statute is not authority for excising issues from certification of claims finally decided. The court agrees with 3M that § 1292 is not relevant in this case, and does not believe its certification order reflects confusion on that point.
The paramount question is whether the inequitable conduct allegations give rise to a claim separate from the validity and infringement claims or whether it is merely a theory or issue attached to RMI's defense of invalidity or unenforceability. See Gas-A-Car, Inc. v. Amer. Petrofina, Inc., 484 F.2d 1102, 1104 (10th Cir.1973). The courts "recognize that Rule 54(b) precedent is untidy, and `courts have been completely unable to settle on a single test for determining when claims "are separate."'" Tolson v. United States, 732 F.2d 998, 1001 (D.C. Cir.1984) (footnote omitted) (quoting Local P-171, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Thompson Farms Co., 642 F.2d 1065, 1070 (7th Cir.1981) (footnote omitted)); 10 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2657, at 60-61 (2d Ed.1983) (). Tolson states a "`rule of thumb' for identifying a genre of `claims that clearly cannot be "separate."'" Tolson, 732 F.2d at 1001 (citation omitted) (quoting Local P-171, 642 F.2d at 1070). "When alleged claims are so closely related that they would fall afoul of the rule against splitting claims if brought separately, they do not qualify as `separate claims' within the meaning of Rule 54(b)." Id. (citations omitted). That "rule of thumb" is set out in the District of Columbia Circuit's leading decision on the Rule 54(b) definition of a claim, Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 209 F.2d 802, 809-10 (D.C.Cir.1954), and is "indicated in sensible precedent elsewhere." Tolson, 732 F.2d at 1001; see, e.g., Local P-171, 642 F.2d at 1070; Page v. Preisser, 585 F.2d 336, 339 (8th Cir.1978).
Tolson expressly rejects the "different facts" test stated in the Tenth Circuit case, Gas-A-Car, 484 F.2d at 1105. In an antitrust action, Gas-A-Car held Rule 54(b) certification of the dismissal of Count II (violation of the Robison-Patman Act) was appropriate, because the unadjudicated claim, Count I (violation of the Sherman Act), was "not so inherently inseparable from or closely related to the claims in Count II that the district court ... abused its discretion in certifying the case...." Id. The Court further noted the facts to be proven on the two counts were not identical. Id.; see also, Purdy Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Champion Home Builders Co., 594 F.2d 1313, 1316 (9th Cir.1979) ( ). Gas-A-Car and Purdy agree a party "cannot successfully attack the court's finding of multiple claims merely by showing that some facts are common to all of its `theories of recovery.'" Purdy, 594 F.2d at 1316; see Gas-A-Car, 484 F.2d at 1104-1105.
While the Tolson test comports more closely with Curtiss-Wright than does the Gas-A-Car test, it appears Gas-A-Car remains the law of this jurisdiction regarding the definition of a claim. However, the court determines that under both Tolson and Gas-A-Car, RMI's assertion of inequitable conduct cannot be considered a separate claim for Rule 54(b) purposes. Although proof of inequitable conduct primarily relates to the counterclaim of unenforceability and gives rise to attorney's fees, the court concludes that RMI's assertion of inequitable conduct is "so closely related" to its invalidity and noninfringement counterclaims that...
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