Morser v. AT & T INFORMATION SYSTEMS

• Decision Date: 06 June 1989
• Docket Number: No. 86 Civ. 8594(RWS).,86 Civ. 8594(RWS).
• Citation: 715 F. Supp. 516
• Parties: Roy MORSER, Plaintiff, v. AT & T INFORMATION SYSTEMS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

715 F. Supp. 516

Roy MORSER, Plaintiff, v. AT & T INFORMATION SYSTEMS, Defendant.

No. 86 Civ. 8594(RWS).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

June 6, 1989.

Vladeck, Waldman, Elias & Engelhard, P.C., New York City, for plaintiff; Anne C. Vladeck, Laura S. Schnell, Jennifer L. Braun, of counsel.

Townley & Updike, New York City, for defendant; Daniel A. Rizzi, of counsel.

OPINION

SWEET, District Judge.

In an opinion dated January 13, 1989, 703 F.Supp. 1072 (the "Opinion"), this court granted summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P., dismissing the age discrimination complaint filed by plaintiff Roy Morser ("Morser") against defendant AT & T Information Systems ("ATT-IS"). Morser has moved pursuant to Rule 3(j) of the Civil Rules of the United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York and Rule 59(e), Fed.R. Civ.P., for an order granting reargument of the summary judgment motion and, upon reargument, denying summary judgment or for an order altering or amending the judgment. For the reasons set forth below, Morser's motion for reargument is granted, and upon reconsideration, summary judgment in favor of ATT-IS is granted.

Prior Proceedings

ATT-IS laid off Morser, then aged fifty-eight, during the company's massive 24,000 employee reduction-in-force in 1985 and 1986. Following his discharge, Morser filed age discrimination charges with the New York State Division of Human Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on April 28, 1986. On November 10, 1986, Morser filed the complaint in this action, alleging that ATT-IS violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., when it laid him off. ATT-IS moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The court granted the motion, setting forth its rationale in a thirty-two page opinion. Familiarity with that opinion is assumed.

Standards Under Rule 3(j) and Rule 59(e)

A court should grant a motion to reargue under Rule 3(j) only if the moving party presents matters or controlling decisions the court overlooked that might materially have influenced its earlier decision. See Gibson v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 700 F.Supp. 707, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Ruiz v. Commissioner of DOT, 687 F.Supp. 888, 890 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 858 F.2d 898 (2d Cir.1988). The rule's purpose is "to dissuade repetitive arguments on issues that have already been considered fully by the court." Caleb & Co. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 624 F.Supp. 747, 748 (S.D.N.Y.1985). A party should not treat a motion to reargue as a substitute for appealing from a final judgment. See Korwek v. Hunt, 649 F.Supp. 1547, 1548 (S.D. N.Y.1986), aff'd, 827 F.2d 874 (2d Cir.1987). The standards that apply to Rule 3(j) motions to reargue also apply to Rule 59(e) motions to alter or amend the judgment. See Lotze v. Hoke, 654 F.Supp. 605, 607 (E.D.N.Y.1987).

Morser's Motion for Reargument

Morser bases his motion to reargue upon two recent Second Circuit employment discrimination decisions, Montana v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Rochester, 869 F.2d 100 (2d Cir.1989), and Ramseur v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 865 F.2d 460 (2d Cir.1989), that Morser believes "`might reasonably have altered the result,'" Morser Reply Mem. at 3 (quoting Adams v. United States, 686 F.Supp. 417, 418 (S.D.N.Y.1988)), had this court considered them in granting summary judgment. In particular, Morser focuses on the statement that a court must draw all factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought, see Montana, 869 F.2d at 103; Ramseur, 865 F.2d at 465, and that summary judgment ordinarily is inappropriate where intent and state of mind are at issue. See Montana, 869 F.2d at 103; Ramseur, 865 F.2d at 465. On the basis of the subsequently decided Court of Appeals opinions, reargument is granted.

The Grant of Summary Judgment

Morser contends that this court failed to apply the principles set forth in Montana and Ramseur when it granted summary judgment against him, arguing that the Opinion "reflects a premature factual determination by the Court," Morser Mem. at 1, and that "the Court found facts and drew inferences which should have been left to a jury." Id. at 4. Morser identifies the following parts of the Opinion that he believes overlooked or misapplied applicable summary judgment standards:

— "ATT-IS hoped to retain employees with essential skills and strong performance." Opinion at 8.

— "In the context of a massive reduction-in-force slashing AT & T-IS's work-force by 25 percent, words such as `potential' and `future potential' reflect nothing more than a concern with the immediate future — particularly the company's ability to distribute the full range of functions among the remaining employees." Opinion at 29.

— Morser's superior's statement at her deposition "There was an observation that there was age and that we ought to look at that." "in context reveals a concern with seniority, not age. Moreover, the managers' decision to consider `age' reflected a sensitivity to the impact the determination of universes would have on older workers — the managers ultimately concluded that the designation of universes would not unfairly affect these employees." Opinion at 29.

— ATT-IS distributed Morser's functions to Ware after managers, exercising their business judgment, "compared the skills of Morser and Ware and concluded that Ware could take over some of Morser's functions, but that Morser could not perform all of Ware's duties." Opinion at 30. Similarly, the company's decision to distribute some of Morser's functions to Magnini "reflected a concern with functions, not discriminatory intent." Opinion at 31.

Contrary to Morser's contention, the Opinion did not overlook the summary judgment principles set forth in Montana and Ramseur. The Opinion described the appropriate standards as follows:

Summary judgment is authorized if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Summary judgment is appropriate only in circumstances where "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The moving party bears the burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists. See id. at 247-48 106 S.Ct. at 2509-10; Corselli v. Coughlin, 842 F.2d 23 (2d Cir.1988). All doubts are resolved against the moving party, and all favorable inferences are drawn in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608-09, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 249 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ 108 S.Ct. 269 98 L.Ed.2d 226 (1988); 10A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2727 (1983). The Supreme Court recently has made clear that "at the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

"One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually insupportable claims...." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The Second Circuit has noted that "the salutary purposes of summary judgment — avoiding protracted, expensive and harassing trials —apply no less to discrimination cases than to commercial or other areas of litigation." Mieri Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829 106 S.Ct. 91, 88 L.Ed.2d 74 (1985).

Opinion at 22-23.

This statement of the applicable summary judgment standards does not expressly state that summary judgment ordinarily is not appropriate where motive and intent are at issue. However, as Morser notes: "The determination of an individual's state of mind or of a party's motivation is a factual inference," Morser Mem. at 2 (emphasis added), and therefore a matter to be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party.

Morser's concern, therefore, is not that this court overlooked the applicable summary judgment standards, but that it improperly applied them. Indeed, Morser says: "Plaintiff does not contend that summary judgment can never be granted in discrimination cases; his contention is that it should not have been granted here." Morser Reply Mem. at 9 (emphasis added). However, that is a matter for Morser to raise on appeal, not in a motion to reargue or to alter or amend a judgment.

In addition, the facts in Ramseur differ substantially from those here. That case involved an isolated dismissal in which Chase Manhattan Bank fired its only Black audit manager. The bank denied that the dismissal was racially motivated, arguing that Ramseur's performance was unsatisfactory and that it had dismissed similarly situated White auditors. The Second Circuit overturned the district court's grant of summary judgment, noting that the court had failed to articulate the applicable standards for summary judgment and that "when inferences are drawn in Ramseur's favor, there are genuine issues of material fact to be tried, making summary judgment inappropriate." Ramseur, 865 F.2d at 465.

In particular, the Court noted Ramseur's "explicit and detailed" evidence refuting the bank's claim that her performance was unsatisfactory. Job reviews for the eight years prior to her firing revealed that Ramseur received "highly laudatory personnel evaluations," except for reviews prepared after the bank had decided to dismiss her. Id. at 466. The bank emphasized that Ramseur had participated in an audit for which the Comptroller of the Currency gave the bank its first ever...