Acevedo v. Bookbinders & Machine Operators Local No. 25

• Decision Date: 16 June 1961
• Citation: 196 F. Supp. 308
• Parties: Felix ACEVEDO, Plaintiff, v. BOOKBINDERS AND MACHINE OPERATORS LOCAL NO. 25 EDITION BOOKBINDERS OF NEW YORK, INC., and James F. Moore, President, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

196 F. Supp. 308

Felix ACEVEDO, Plaintiff, v. BOOKBINDERS AND MACHINE OPERATORS LOCAL NO. 25 EDITION BOOKBINDERS OF NEW YORK, INC., and James F. Moore, President, Defendants.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

June 16, 1961.

Gene Crescenzi, New York City, for plaintiff.

John J. Corrigan, New York City, for defendants.

RYAN, Chief Judge.

This suit filed by a member of defendant local labor union under the provisions of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S. C.A. § 401 et seq., comes to us for trial upon stipulated facts. Plaintiff alleges that he is a member of Local 25 and that, by reason of the fact that he is called a member of the Class B group of the local, he is denied the right to vote for the President, Vice-President, Secretary-Treasurer, certain of the Executive Board members and other officers of the local union.

It appears that defendant maintains pursuant to provisions of its Constitution and by-laws two separate groupings of membership: Class A, consisting of Journeymen, Artisans, Craftsmen and Apprentices; and Class B, consisting of semi-skilled and unskilled workers. Plaintiff is one of the Class B group.

Each group of the local membership votes separately to elect specific officers and shop stewards; each group also meets separately and keeps minutes of its own group membership meetings.

On October 7, 1960, Class B group nominated candidates for the officers to be elected by that group: Second Vice President, Recording Secretary, five Executive Board Members and a Sergeant at Arms. The election of these officers took place on November 4, 1960 by the Class B members; plaintiff voted at that time. The Class A members did not participate in these nominations or elections.

The nomination of officers to be elected only by the Class A group (President, First Vice President, Treasurer-Secretary, etc.) was held on October 15, 1960, with the election scheduled for November 18, 1960.

It is further stipulated that both classes of members participated in contract negotiations with the employer association, but that each class meets separately to consider or ratify collective bargaining contracts with respect to matters affecting the respective class. An additional distinction between classes is found in the fact that Class A members pay higher initiation fees and membership dues than are required from Class B members.

On the eve of the election, November 17, 1960, plaintiff filed this suit and his complaint praying that the election be enjoined and by an application to the Court for an order to show cause sought to restrain the holding of the election. Neither the complaint nor an order to show cause was served on defendant at the time; defendant's counsel at Judge Bicks' oral direction was summoned to chambers for a hearing on this informal application to restrain the election.

It was stated by plaintiff's counsel at the hearing then held that plaintiff had told his counsel that he and other members of his category "have brought this to the attention of the union and they have not gotten the relief that they demanded." It was defendant's position that the "Class B" members had held an election on November 4, 1960, at which plaintiff had voted, and that their remedy, if any, lay not in an injunction of an imminent election but rather in complaint to the Secretary of Labor, who had the duty to investigate and in proper circumstances could even set aside an election. It was at this hearing that defendant and its attorney were first informed that this suit had been filed.

Because there were 1200 members expected to vote the next day and because it was impracticable to notify them in time that the election would not take place, it was suggested by the Court and agreed by counsel to let the election proceed as scheduled, to have the results impounded and have the incumbent officers continue to act until a decision on the matter. This was done; the election was held and the voting result sealed and filed with the Clerk of this Court, where it has remained. It was specifically stated by defendant's counsel and by the Court that, in the event of a trial, defendant would have a right to raise all available defenses including a challenge to the jurisdiction of this Court.

Plaintiff's counsel stated to the Court that he had read "both sides of the statute" (i. e. Title I—the Bill of Rights section, and Title IV, the Election section) and that the Class B members were claiming a substantive right in anticipation of its being denied them. "This is our last chance to claim this right before it is denied. After tomorrow, if the election is in, we can go to the Labor Board and say, `Look what they did to me.'"

Thereafter and on December 9, 1960, defendant moved to strike the complaint for failure to name and serve defendant and for failure to sign the complaint, urging in support of his motion that plaintiff would still have a remedy under Section 401(e) of Title IV of the Act by complaint to the Secretary of Labor who is charged with the investigation of complaints of this nature. Plaintiff was given leave to serve an amended complaint, which was served on January 6, 1961.

By answer filed on January 16, 1961, defendant again pleaded as a defense that the relief, if any, to which plaintiff might be entitled was within the province of the Secretary of Labor under Sections 401 and 402 of the Act, and that plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by Section 101(a) (4).

The pertinent statutes here are the so-called "Bill of Rights" Title I, Section 101(a) (1) and (4), and Section 102, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 411(a) (1) and (4), and 412, and the Elections provisions of Title IV, Section 401(e), 29 U.S.C.A. § 481(e).

The "Bill of rights" provisions of which plaintiff claims he was deprived by action of the union provide:

"Equal rights.—Every member of a labor organization shall have equal rights and privileges within such organization to nominate candidates to vote in elections or referendums of the labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings, subject to reasonable rules and regulations in the organization's constitution and bylaws." Section 101(a) (1).

This supplements provisions governing "Terms of Office and election procedures—Officers of national or international * * * organizations; manner of election", which plaintiff also claims to have been violated, reading:

"In any election required by this section which is to be held by secret ballot, a reasonable opportunity shall be given for the nomination of candidates and every member in good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate and to hold office (subject to section 504 of this title and to reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed) and shall have the right to vote for or otherwise support the candidate or candidates of his choice, without being subject to penalty, discipline, or improper interference or reprisal of any kind by such organization or any member thereof. * * * Each member in good standing shall be entitled to one vote. * * *". Sec. 401(e).

The jurisdiction of this Court and plaintiff's right to maintain a suit is provided for by Section 102 of the Act:

"Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this title have been infringed by any violation of this title may bring a civil action in a district court of the United States for such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate. Any such action against a labor organization shall be brought in the district court of the United States for the district where the alleged violation occurred, or where the principal office of such labor organization is located."

It is, however, limited and conditioned by the provisions of Section 101(4) of the Act:

"No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to institute an action in any court, or in a proceeding before any administrative agency, irrespective of whether or not the labor organization or its officers are named as defendants or respondents in such action or proceeding, or the right of any member of a labor organization to appear as a witness in any judicial, administrative or legislative proceeding, or to petition any legislature or to communicate with any legislator: Provided, That any such member may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such organization, before instituting legal or administrative proceedings against such organizations or any officer thereof: * * *."

Before reaching the question of this Court's jurisdiction, looking for a moment at the merits of plaintiff's claim, we are persuaded from the legislative history of the "Bill of Rights" provision that while a union may set up procedural and even substantive conditions or restrictions on the members' right to vote, it may not do so indefinitely or arbitrarily so as to establish a permanent special class of membership not entitled to an equal vote; and that this right is further assured and made more concrete by the more specific provision of Section 401(e) which plainly says: "Each member in good standing shall be entitled to one vote" (good standing not to be affected even by default in the payment of dues). Ruling of Secretary of Labor, Section 452.10, 29 C.F.R. 1960 Supp.; Labor Reform Act, A. Cox, Mich. L.Rev. Vol. 58, pp. 819, 834; Sen.Rep. No. 187, Adm. & Cong.News, p. 2338.

This does not mean that it would be unreasonable for a labor organization such as the defendant local, whose membership has traditionally had craft and artisan distinctions, to conduct the business of representing employees of differing skills by dividing them into separate classes of membership—skilled and unskilled, etc. It does mean, however, that such distinctions may not indefinitely effect a discrimination in the right of a member to...