K & W Auto., LLC v. Town of Barrington

• Decision Date: 31 January 2020
• Docket Number: No. 2018-250-Appeal.,PC 18-471,2018-250-Appeal.
• Citation: K & W Auto., LLC v. Town of Barrington, 224 A.3d 833 (R.I. 2020)
• Parties: K & W AUTOMOTIVE, LLC, et al. v. TOWN OF BARRINGTON.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

224 A.3d 833

K & W AUTOMOTIVE, LLC, et al.

v.TOWN OF BARRINGTON.

No. 2018-250-Appeal.

PC 18-471

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

January 31, 2020

Joelle C. Rocha, Esq., Anthony DeSisto, Esq., Michael D. Resnick, Esq., for Plaintiffs.

Andrew M. Teitz, Esq., Michael A. Ursillo, Esq., for Defendant.

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.

Justice Robinson, for the Court.

The defendant, the Town of Barrington (the Town), appeals from the Providence County Superior Court's entry of final judgment on August 16, 2018, pursuant to a bench decision granting the request for declaratory and injunctive relief on the part of the plaintiffs—namely, K & W Automotive, LLC and its owners, Wendy and Kenneth Wajda, and ECIG Shed, Inc. and its owner, Louis DelSesto (collectively plaintiffs). On appeal, the Town asserts that the hearing justice erred in ruling that it lacked authority under its Home Rule Charter to enact an ordinance banning the sale of flavored tobacco products and prohibiting the providing of any tobacco products to persons under the age of twenty-one. Additionally, the Town argues that the hearing justice erred in failing to address whether the ordinance at issue is preempted by state law. This case came before the Supreme Court for oral argument pursuant to an order directing the parties to show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After examining the written and oral submissions of the parties and after a thorough review of the record, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown and that the appeal may be resolved without further briefing or argument.

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

IFacts and Travel

The facts relative to this matter are not in dispute and are set forth herein as provided in the parties' agreed-to stipulation of facts. On June 5, 2017, the Barrington Town Council (town council) enacted Ordinance No. 2017-7 making it "unlawful to sell or to possess with the intention of selling tobacco products within the town without a tobacco dealer's license," with such license being required "in addition to any other license required by state and/or federal law" (Licensing Ordinance). The Licensing Ordinance also imposed various conditions upon license holders, including a prohibition on "sell[ing] any tobacco product to any individual under the age of twenty-one (21) years" as well as a prohibition on "sell[ing] any flavored tobacco product to a consumer."

On November 6, 2017, in reaction to litigation, the town council repealed the Licensing Ordinance and enacted a new ordinance, Ordinance No. 2017-17 (Tobacco Ordinance). The Tobacco Ordinance omitted the licensing requirement, but it retained two primary components of the Licensing Ordinance: (1) a prohibition on the sale of flavored tobacco products by any person other than an "electronic smoking device establishment" as defined in the ordinance¹ ; and (2) a prohibition against providing tobacco products in any way to any person under the age of twenty-one. The Tobacco Ordinance also stated that "[a] person who violates any provision of this chapter shall be subject to a fine of $100 for each separate offense." It further stated that a person who violates the minimum age provision would be subject to a $350 fine for the second offense and a $500 fine "for the third or any subsequent offense occurring within one year of the first offense."

On January 25, 2018, plaintiffs, two businesses located in the Town and licensed by the State of Rhode Island to sell tobacco and electronic nicotine delivery systems (electronic cigarettes) and their respective owners, filed a complaint in Superior Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief so as to prevent the Town from enforcing the Tobacco Ordinance. The plaintiffs' complaint also referenced as interested parties seven other businesses located in the Town that are licensed to sell tobacco and/or electronic cigarettes.²

On July 19, 2018, after considering the oral and written submissions of the parties, the hearing justice issued a bench decision, in which she concluded that the Tobacco Ordinance was null and void; accordingly, she granted plaintiffs' request for declaratory and injunctive relief.³ The hearing justice first determined that the Tobacco Ordinance primarily concerned public health and safety and that, therefore, "the [state's] police power [was not] implicated." Having cleared that hurdle, the hearing justice moved on to apply the three-variable test set forth in Town of East Greenwich v. O'Neil , 617 A.2d 104 (R.I. 1992). The hearing justice found that, pursuant to the O'Neil test, the Town did indeed lack authority under its Home Rule Charter to enact the Tobacco Ordinance because the subject matter involves a matter of statewide concern. Based on this ruling, the hearing justice concluded that she did not need to determine if the Tobacco Ordinance is preempted by state law. Lastly, the hearing justice went on to address the issue of whether or not the Rhode Island General Assembly had delegated authority to the Town to legislate on this issue, and she found that the General Assembly had not provided the Town with such authority, either expressly or by necessary implication. An order and a final judgment entered in favor of plaintiffs on August 16, 2018, and the Town timely appealed.

IIStandard of Review

"[A] decision to grant or deny declaratory or injunctive relief is addressed to the sound discretion of the [hearing] justice and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the record demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion or the [hearing] justice committed an error of law." La Gondola, Inc. v. City of Providence , 210 A.3d 1205, 1213 (R.I. 2019) (quoting Kayak Centre at Wickford Cove, LLC v. Town of Narragansett , 116 A.3d 250, 253 (R.I. 2015) ). When deciding a case based on stipulated facts, "[t]he trial court does not play a fact-finding role, but is limited to applying the law to the agreed-upon facts." Morse v. Minardi , 208 A.3d 1151, 1155 (R.I. 2019) (quoting Hudson v. GEICO Insurance Agency, Inc. , 161 A.3d 1150, 1153 (R.I. 2017) ). Our review with respect to questions of law and statutory interpretation is de novo. Delbonis Sand & Gravel Co. v. Town of Richmond , 909 A.2d 922, 925 (R.I. 2006).

IIIAnalysis

On appeal, the Town asserts that the hearing justice erred in finding that the Town did not have authority under its Home Rule Charter to enact the Tobacco Ordinance because, in the Town's view, that ordinance addresses a matter of purely local concern. The Town further argues that, because the Tobacco Ordinance addresses a matter of local concern, the hearing justice erred in failing to analyze whether the ordinance is preempted by state law. Such analysis, the Town argues, would have shown that the ordinance is consistent with state law and, thus, is not preempted. The Town also contends that, in conducting her analysis, the hearing justice did not give appropriate weight to State ex rel. Town of Westerly v. Bradley , 877 A.2d 601 (R.I. 2005).

The plaintiffs assert that the Tobacco Ordinance addresses a matter of statewide concern because it involves the regulation of business, over which they contend the state has exclusive power to legislate. The plaintiffs also assert that the Tobacco Ordinance involves a matter of statewide concern when analyzed under the three-part test set forth in O'Neil . Accordingly, plaintiffs argue that the hearing justice correctly found that no preemption analysis was necessary because the Town did not have authority to enact the ordinance in the first instance, either through its authority with respect to local concerns or through any enabling legislation enacted by the General Assembly. The plaintiffs also contend that, even if preemption is applicable, the minimum age provision is preempted because state law occupies the field. Lastly, plaintiffs aver that the Town's reliance on this Court's holding in Bradley is misplaced.

AAuthority Under the Town's Home Rule Charter

In analyzing the Town's contentions on appeal, we first address whether the Town, under its constitutionally authorized Home Rule Charter, had the authority to enact the Tobacco Ordinance. In 1951, the General Assembly enacted the Home Rule Amendment to the Rhode Island Constitution, granting to municipalities "the right to self government in all local matters." R.I. Const., art. 13, § 1. Specifically, article 13, section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution provides:

"Every city and town shall have the power at any time to adopt a charter, amend its charter, enact and amend local laws relating to its property, affairs and government not inconsistent with this Constitution and laws enacted by the general assembly in conformity with the powers reserved to the general assembly." R.I. Const., art. 13, § 2 ; see Amico's Inc. v. Mattos , 789 A.2d 899, 903 (R.I. 2002).

Pursuant to its authority under the Home Rule Amendment, the Town adopted the Barrington Town Charter (Home Rule Charter), which expressly vests the town council with the power "[t]o enact, amend or repeal ordinances for the preservation of the public peace, the health, safety, comfort and welfare of the inhabitants of the Town and for the protection of persons and property." Barrington Town Charter, § 2-1-6(a).

This Court has repeatedly held that the Home Rule Amendment allows municipalities to legislate on matters of purely local concern. Amico's Inc. , 789 A.2d at 903 ; O'Neil , 617 A.2d at 111 ; Westerly Residents for Thoughtful Development, Inc. v. Brancato , 565 A.2d 1262, 1264 (R.I. 1989) (holding that a town's decision to expand its sewer system was a matter of "purely local concern"). At the same time, however, we are mindful of the following pertinent principle: "Municipalities may not * * * legislate on matters of statewide concern. The power of the General Assembly remains exclusive in those areas." O...