Ninth & O Street Baptist Church v. EEOC
| Decision Date | 16 August 1985 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. C 85-0768-L(A). |
| Citation | 616 F. Supp. 1231 |
| Parties | NINTH & O STREET BAPTIST CHURCH, Plaintiff, v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Grabon, W.S., Brooks, Fred D., Felton, Sammie, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
George R. Rawlings, Henry V. Sanders, Louisville, Ky., for plaintiff.
Michael Spalding, Asst. U.S. Atty., Katherine Kores, Sr. Trial Atty., E.E.O.C., Memphis, Tenn., Fred Brooks, Area Director, Sammie Felton, E.E.O.C., Louisville, Ky., for defendants.
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Ninth & O Street Baptist Church of Louisville, Kentucky hereinafter "Church", previously obtained a temporary restraining order enjoining and restraining defendant Equal Employment Opportunity Commission hereinafter "EEOC" from taking, issuing or enforcing any subpoenas against the plaintiff or from proceeding in any manner with an investigative or enforcement activity. Following the issuance of the temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction hearing was held on August 13, 1985; and the matter is now ripe for a determination by this Court.
The EEOC subpoena, which is the subject matter of this controversy, is directed to the "Reverend Laverne Butler, Ninth & O Baptist Church, Early Childhood Development Center, In the Matter of Janice A. Teagardner." Before setting out the details of the subpoena, we note that Janice A. Teagardner is a white female who was discharged from her position as a teacher at the Early Childhood Development Center hereinafter "Center" on or about April 18, 1985. Some three days prior to the discharge, plaintiff announced its April 8, 1985, policy decision that all employees of the Center would be required to join the Church and that current staff who were members would be required to be active in the Church in order to retain their Center employment. Plaintiff also announced that the deadline for joining the Church would be September 1, 1985, with all non-member employees thereafter subject to discharge. See Exhibit 4 to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction.
Mrs. Teagardner, who is a Baptist but not a member of Ninth & O, was concerned about this announcement. It appears from statements made by plaintiff's counsel that Mrs. Teagardner's sister then went to the EEOC to determine what Mrs. Teagardner's rights would be under the newly announced Church policy.
On April 30, 1985, Mrs. Teagardner filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging a retaliatory discharge in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. In this complaint Mrs. Teagardner stated that she was discharged because her employer had learned that the EEOC had been contacted about its recent personnel policy. She also stated that other employees who had not contacted the EEOC were not discharged. Her charge, therefore, specifically arises under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3, commonly referred to as the retaliation clause.
The subpoena addressed to the plaintiff is dated July 10, 1985, and requires plaintiff to bring to the EEOC all documents describing the relationship of the Ninth and O Street Baptist Church to the Center's day care workers; all documents describing the relationship of the Church to the children who attend the Center and their parents; all documents pertaining to the services provided by the Center; all documents and contracts relating to the day care workers at the Center; all documents describing their responsibilities; all documents describing the Center's policies relating to discipline; a copy of Mrs. Teagardner's personnel file; and a request for access to the personnel files of current and terminated employees during the time period of July 1, 1984 to the present.
Plaintiff vigorously contends its First Amendment rights would be violated if the EEOC were allowed to conduct any investigation into matters pertaining to Mrs. Teagardner and to its policies. Plaintiff further states that because Mrs. Teagardner's discharge was based on "her repeated conduct in `sowing discord among the brethren' as condemned" in Proverbs Ch. 6, verses 16-19, this basic religious belief is protected by the First Amendment and not subject to interference by the EEOC. See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support. EEOC, on the other hand, contends that it has the authority to determine whether it has jurisdiction in this matter, that the controversy is not ripe for review, that the plaintiff will not suffer irreparable harm, and that the public interest would not be served by the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
Defendant cites several cases which help to resolve this controversy. In EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912, 101 S.Ct. 3143, 69 L.Ed.2d 994 (1981), EEOC appealed the district court's denial of a petition seeking enforcement of a subpoena issued in connection with its investigation of a charge of discrimination filed against Mississippi College. Mississippi College was owned and operated by the Mississippi Baptist Convention, which acquired the college in 1850. Ninety-five percent of the faculty members and eighty-eight percent of the students were Baptists. The college sought to assure that educational knowledge occurred in a Christian atmosphere and that the faculty and administrative officers were committed to the principle that the best preparation for life is a program of cultural and human studies permeated by the Christian ideal as evidenced in the tenets, practices and customs of the Convention and the Bible.
Although the college hired only males to teach biblical courses, it did employ Dr. Patricia Summers as a part-time assistant professor in the psychology department. While employed, Dr. Sommers expressed a desire for promotion to a vacant full-time slot. When she was not promoted, but a male was, she filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC.
As in this case, the college refused to comply voluntarily with the EEOC's request for information which it deemed necessary to investigate the charges. When the college refused, the EEOC brought action in the district court seeking enforcement of the subpoena; but the district court denied enforcement. EEOC v. Mississippi College, 451 F.Supp. 564 (S.D.Miss. 1978).
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit, in vacating the district court's order and remanding on the question of which portions of the EEOC subpoena should be enforced, 626 F.2d at 489, first stated that if a religious institution of the type described in Title VII's exemption clause, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1, presents convincing evidence that its challenged employment practice results from discrimination on the basis of religion, then the EEOC is deprived of jurisdiction to investigate further to determine whether the religious discrimination was a pretext for some other form of discrimination prohibited by Title VII. However, the Court went on to hold that even if an institution falls within the exemption of § 2000e-1, the EEOC retains the authority to investigate allegations of discrimination based upon sex or race. Id. at 485.
Moreover, in discussing the college's First Amendment rights, the Fifth Circuit held that the application of Title VII to the college violated neither the Establishment Clause nor the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 489. In determining whether a federal statute violates the Establishment Clause, the Fifth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's three prong test: first, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and third, it must not foster excessive government entanglement with religion. Id. at 486 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 2111, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971); Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 100...
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