Greene v. H & R Block Eastern Enterprises, Inc.

• Decision Date: 26 July 2010
• Docket Number: Case No. 10-21663-CV
• Citation: 727 F.Supp.2d 1363
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida
• Parties: Rita GREENE, et al., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff(s), v. H & R BLOCK EASTERN ENTERPRISES, INC., H & R Block, Inc., H & R Block Group, Inc., H & R Block Tax Services, Inc., H & R Block Enterprises, Inc., Defendants.

727 F.Supp.2d 1363

Rita GREENE, et al., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff(s),

v.H & R BLOCK EASTERN ENTERPRISES, INC., H & R Block, Inc., H & R Block Group, Inc., H & R Block Tax Services, Inc., H & R Block Enterprises, Inc., Defendants.

Case No. 10-21663-CV.

United States District Court,

S.D. Florida.

July 26, 2010.

Jason Saul Remer, Remer & Georges-Pierre PLLC, North Miami, FL, for Plaintiff(s).

Dennis Michael McClelland, Erin L. Malone, Phelps Dunbar, Tampa, FL, Andrew M. Paley, Sheryl Skibbe, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Robert J. Carty, Jr., Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, Houston, TX, for Defendants.

FINAL ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

JAMES LAWRENCE KING, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Defendants' Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Based on the Rule Against Claim-Splitting (DE # 15) filed on June 17, 2010.¹ After careful consideration and for the reasons set forth below, the Court determines that the motion should be granted.

I. Background

For the sake of clarity, it is necessary to detail the background of both the instant case and an earlier-filed action, Illano v. H & R Blosck Eastern Enterprises d/b/a H & R Block, No. 09-22531-CIV-KING, 2009 WL 3119610 (S.D. Fla. Filed Aug. 27, 2009) (hereinafter " Illano "), predicated upon substantially similar facts and causes of action as those found in the instant case.²

A. Background of Illano

On August 27, 2009, Joaquin Illano and other similarly-situated individuals-representedby the same counsel who would later bring the instant action-alleged violations of the FLSA requirements for overtime compensation against H & R Block. In that case, the plaintiff was an associate employed by H & R Block. He alleged that he and other similarly situated individuals employed by H & R Block nationwide had worked an average of sixty hours per week without appropriate compensation for any hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. ( Illano Compl. ¶¶ 8-9). The Complaint further claimed that H & R Block's failure to compensate for "straight or overtime wages" violated the FLSA. ( Illano Compl. ¶¶ 9-10). On October 16, 2009 the Illano plaintiff filed an Omnibus Motion for Conditional Certification of Collective Action, 09-cv22531-KING (DE # 12), which sought conditional certification of a nationwide class of similarly-situated individuals employed by H & R Block who had also been refused appropriate overtime compensation. H & R Block responded to the Motion for Conditional Certification and argued that such certification was inappropriate for four reasons: 1) there was no evidence of plaintiffs similarly situated to the named Illano plaintiff, which is a requirement under the FLSA; 2) the nature of the Illano complaint demanded an individualized inquiry ill-suited for collective action; 3) there were insufficient allegations of H & R Block action against the alleged class of plaintiffs; and 4) plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that other purportedly similarly situated individuals desired to opt-in to the litigation, another requirement of the FLSA. This Court entered an Order, 09-cv-22531-KING (DE # 37), on January 12, 2010 denying the Illano Motion for Conditional Certification on the basis of plaintiff's failure to demonstrate a sufficient number of others similarly situated to the plaintiff. After the Illano plaintiff filed a second Motion for Conditional Certification, 09-cv-22531-KING (DE # 39), in which it sought conditional certification of a class of all persons in Miami-Dade County, Florida who were similarly situated to the plaintiff, this Court granted the plaintiffs motion. 09-cv-22531-KING, (DE # 46). By Order dated March 3, 2010, 09-CV-22531-KING, (DE # 52), this Court approved notice to conditional plaintiffs, which required similarly-situated employees of H & R Block to opt-in to the conditional class by June 4, 2010. ³

B. Background of Instant Case

On May 21, 2010, over eight months after filing Illano, the plaintiff's attorney for Illano filed the instant Complaint (DE # 1) as a putative class action, seeking relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. ("FLSA"). Specifically, the Complaint purports to be brought on behalf of all "tax preparers", "tax professionals", "tax associates", and other similarly situated individuals employed by H & R Block within the United States of America. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 6, 9). The Complaint alleges that, for three years prior to the filing of the Complaint, Defendants willfully refused to compensate Plaintiffs and other similarly situated individuals for mandatory training performed in the course of their employment. (Compl. ¶ 1, 6). Additionally, the Complaint alleges that Defendants requiredPlaintiffs and other similarly situated employees to work unpaid hours "off the clock" to prevent overtime payments, According to the Complaint, this policy resulted in H & R Block's failure to pay even the minimum-wage requirement due to Plaintiffs under the FLSA. (Compl. ¶¶ 3, 7). The Complaint concludes that Defendants' failure to compensate Plaintiffs and similarly-situated individuals for the mandatory training and for "off the clock" work violated the FLSA. (Compl. ¶ 7).

In response, Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss in which they claim that dismissal of Plaintiffs' action is appropriate on two grounds, both of which focus on the relationship between the instant suit and the earlier-filed Illano: 1) Plaintiffs' suit constitutes inappropriate claim-splitting and duplicative litigation; and 2) Plaintiffs' suit is an attempt to circumvent this Court's ruling regarding conditional certification in Illano.

II. Legal Standard

"For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the Court must view the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, consider the allegations of the complaint as true, and accept all reasonable inferences therefrom." Omar ex rel. Cannon v. Lindsey, 334 F.3d 1246, 1247 (11th Cir.2003). A complaint may be dismissed if the facts as pleaded fail to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1968-69, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (abrogating former "unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts" standard and replacing it with a standard requiring "only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face"); Marsh v. Butler County, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1037 (11th Cir.2001) (en banc) ("Pleadings must be something more than an ... exercise in the conceivable.") (quoting United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Ag. Proc., 412 U.S. 669, 688, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973)). Finally, "[i]n analyzing the sufficiency of the complaint, [the Court] limit[s][its] consideration to the well-pleaded factual allegations, document:; central to or referenced in the complaint, and matters judicially noticed." La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir.2004).

III. Discussion

As noted above, Defendants;, movants in this matter, make two arguments for dismissal of the instant action: 1) inappropriate claim-splitting and duplicative litigation; and 2) circumvention of Illano's conditional certification. It is necessary for this Court to adjudicate only the first proposed basis for dismissal, as it is dispositive.

A. Claim-Splitting & Duplicative Litigation

Defendants' first basis for dismissal is that the established refusal of courts to permit claim-splitting mandates dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims in the instant case. Defendants argue that the instant matter involves the same subject as Illano-an alleged failure by H & R Block to compensate a defined group of individuals for "off the clock" employment. Additionally, Defendants argue that both cases seek recovery against the same corporate defendants. Defendants further note that Rita Greene and at least six other name;I individuals in the instant action filed consents to join the Illano lawsuit as conditional plaintiffs inMarch 2010.⁴ Defendants also point out that this matter necessarily relies on the same nucleus of facts at issue in Illano: 1) alleged instruction by H & R Block management to limit time entry to less than forty hours; 2) an alleged preconceived plan limiting such time entry for each H & R Block office; and 3) an alleged compensation system that contravened the FLSA. Finally, Defendants claim that any discovery pursued in the instant case would necessarily involve: the precise issues involved in any discovery in Illano.

In response, Plaintiffs argue that the issues involved in the instant case differ from those in Illano. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that they seek recovery for certain violations of the FLSA that are not at issue in Illano, such as pay for mandatory training classes completed by Plaintiffs for H & R Block within the last three years. As a final matter, Plaintiffs argue that because many of them are not named plaintiffs in Illano, they may have valid claims that may be not heard in any context other than the instant case. In lieu of dismissal of the instant case, Plaintiffs would seek consolidation of this matter and Illano.

It is well settled that a plaintiff "may not file duplicative complaints in order to expand their legal rights." Curtis v. Citibank, 226 F.3d 133, 140 (2d Cir.2000). Such a policy ensures that a plaintiff may not "split up his demand and prosecute it by piecemeal, or present only a portion of the grounds upon which relief is sought, and leave the rest to be presented in a second suit, if the first fails." Stark v. Starr, 94 U.S. 477, 485, 24 L.Ed. 276 (1876). The effect of this restriction is twofold: to ensure fairness to litigants and to conserve judicial resources. See, e.g., Borrero v. United Healthcare of New York, Inc., 610 F.3d 1296, 1306-09 (11th Cir.2010) (discussing related doctrine of claim preclusion and its judicial purpose). According to the Second Circuit,...