Crowley v. Delaware & HR Corporation
| Decision Date | 06 October 1945 |
| Parties | CROWLEY v. DELAWARE & H. R. CORPORATION. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
Mulholland, Robie & McEwen, of Toledo, Ohio, and John J. Conway, of Albany, N. Y., for plaintiff.
Joseph Rosch, of Albany, N. Y. (Alfred Kelly and Earl Barkhuff, both of Albany, N. Y., of counsel), for defendant.
This action is based upon the statutory provisions found in title 45 U.S.C.A. § 153(p), which is part of the legislation generally referred to as the Railway Labor Act, and has for its purpose the enforcement of an award made by the National Railroad Adjustment Board, hereinafter referred to as the Board.
The award is the culmination of a dispute arising between plaintiff and defendant out of the interpretation or application of the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement entered into on June 25, 1940, between defendant and the American Train Dispatchers' Association, which represented the craft or class of defendant's employees known as Train Dispatchers.
The controversy was handled in the usual manner and submitted to the Board for decision as contemplated by the statute above referred to. The award followed the action of the Board and the required order directed to the defendant by the Board to make the award effective was issued in due course. The order was not obeyed and this litigation, as authorized by the statute, followed.
The facts are not seriously disputed, and they appear in the record based upon the stipulation of the parties, the comparatively brief testimony of witnesses and certain exhibits which were offered and received.
Plaintiff has been an employee of the defendant since 1914. Beginning in 1916 he occupied the position known as "Train Dispatcher" or "Trick Train Dispatcher," and in 1928, he was promoted to the position of Night Chief Dispatcher at the Carbondale, Pennsylvania office of the defendant railroad. His hours of duty were from 8:30 P. M. to 8:30 A. M. On July 1, 1938, he took over the duties of a trick train dispatcher. His hours of duty were from 11:00 P. M. to 7:00 A. M. and he continued in that position until March 16, 1940, during which period he received the pay of night chief. On March 16, 1940, the position of Night Chief was abolished and in accordance with an arrangement respecting seniority rights of employees, the plaintiff then bid in or took over a first trick dispatcher's tour of duty from 7:00 A. M. to 3:00 P. M., which position he has occupied up to the present time. Since March 16, 1940, he has performed none of the duties originally performed by the Night Chief.
The terms of the bargaining agreement need not be discussed in detail herein. There is no dispute but that its scope is broad enough to cover and apply to Night Chief and Trick Train Dispatchers. These terms are not defined; neither are the duties of the positions outlined. The agreement provides that payroll classification of an employee shall be determined in accordance with the duties performed.
The proceedings heretofore had herein were based upon a demand that the position of Night Chief Dispatcher be re-established, and that plaintiff be paid the amount of his monetary loss computed as the difference in the pay schedule between the position of Night Chief and Trick Train Dispatcher since October 1, 1940. The award, the enforcement of which is sought in this action, grants the requested relief in part — to wit, it directs that the position of Night Chief Dispatcher be re-established or restored at the Carbondale, Pa., office, but denies plaintiff's claim for reimbursement of monetary loss.
This case differs from the case of Hanks v. Delaware & Hudson Railroad Corporation, D.C., 63 F.Supp. 161, in two important particulars; Namely, (a) the plaintiff has not performed any of the duties of Night Chief since the bargaining agreement became effective, and (b) the schedule attached to the bargaining agreement contained no reference to the position of Night Chief Dispatcher at the Carbondale office. This is accounted for by reason of the fact that no such position did in fact exist at the time of the execution or effective date of the bargaining agreement.
Plaintiff bases his right to the relief sought upon the provisions of Article 1(a) and (b), of the bargaining agreement, which is quoted below.
As stated above, the terms or titles used in Section (a) above quoted are not defined but evidence was received to show the commonly accepted meaning of the term "Night Chief Dispatcher" in the railroad industry. This evidence substantially coincided with plaint...
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Shipley v. Pittsburgh & LER Co.
...119 F.2d 509; Railroad Yardmasters of North America v. Indiana Harbor Belt Co., D.C.Ind., 70 F. Supp. 914; Crowley v. Delaware & H. R. Corporation, D.C.N.Y., 63 F.Supp. 164. It cannot reasonably be held that Award 8258 and its findings are sufficiently definite and certain as to make a prim......