Staley v. State
| Decision Date | 05 November 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 03A01-0804-CR-183.,03A01-0804-CR-183. |
| Parties | Brian A. STALEY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Donald J. Dickherber, Columbus, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Ellen H. Meilaender, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Appellant-Defendant, Brian A. Staley (Staley), appeals his conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2 and his adjudication as an habitual substance offender, I.C. § 35-50-2-10.
We affirm.
Staley raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as follows:
(1) Whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on endangerment; and
(2) Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Staley's conviction of operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person beyond a reasonable doubt.
The facts favorable to the judgment are as follows. Shortly before 3:00 a.m. on November 19, 2005, Bartholomew County Sheriff's Deputy David Steinkoenig (Deputy Steinkoenig) was driving southbound on Highway 11, just north of Garden City, Indiana. When he approached the Hacienda Lounge, a local bar, he noticed a GEO Tracker, later determined to be driven by Staley, driving at a "high rate of speed" towards the exit in the bar's parking lot. (Transcript p. 101). Although Staley had plenty of time to pull out of the parking lot ahead of Deputy Steinkoenig, he waited until after the Deputy had passed. Finding this odd, the Deputy turned into a parking lot down the street, waited for Staley to pass him, and then followed him.
Staley continued driving at a high rate of speed. Just as Deputy Steinkoenig was catching up, Staley pulled into a driveway and switched off his lights. Because Deputy Steinkoenig believed Staley was trying to elude him, the Deputy continued westbound for another 100 yards and pulled into a school parking lot down the street. The Deputy turned off his lights and observed Staley. Staley never exited his car. After five to ten minutes, Staley pulled back out onto the street and drove in the other direction without switching his lights on. Deputy Steinkoenig caught up with Staley and activated his lights just as Staley turned into another driveway.
As soon as Staley opened his door, Deputy Steinkoenig smelled a "very strong" odor of alcohol. (Tr. p. 131). The Deputy asked Staley for his driver's license and registration, and Staley "fumbled around" for his wallet, as if he "did not have control of his hands," before finding his license. (Tr. p. 131). When Deputy Steinkoenig asked him where he was coming from, Staley responded that he came from his father's house in Ogilville, and was silent when the Deputy informed him that he saw him leaving the Hacienda Lounge. Staley denied having pulled into a driveway previously and would not say whose driveway he was in at the time he was pulled over.
After checking and finding that Staley had a valid driver's license, Deputy Steinkoenig asked Staley to step out of the car. Staley had some difficulty getting out of the vehicle, and once outside, he leaned against the car. The Deputy asked Staley if he would perform a field sobriety test or take a portable breathalyzer test. Staley refused. Deputy Steinkoenig read Staley the implied consent law and asked him to submit to a chemical test at least three times, but Staley refused each time. Staley's eyes were bloodshot, his speech was slurred, and his balance was poor. Deputy Steinkoenig placed Staley under arrest.
Sheriff's Deputy Jason Williams (Deputy Williams) arrived on the scene as backup. He noticed that Staley was agitated and was leaning against the vehicle. Deputy Williams also smelled a "strong odor of alcohol[ic] beverage coming from his breath." (Tr. p. 93). The Deputies asked Staley to have a seat in the back of Deputy Steinkoenig's patrol car. However, Staley complained of shoulder pain and informed the Deputies that he could not get into the car. Ultimately, the Deputies placed Staley in the patrol car, face down on the back seat with his hands cuffed behind his back.
On December 5, 2005, the State filed an Information charging Staley with Count I, operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person, a Class A misdemeanor, I.C. § 9-30-5-2.1 On July 26, 2006, the State amended the Information, adding Count II, intimidation, a Class D felony, I.C. § 35-45-2-1(a)(2) and Count III, habitual substance offender, I.C. § 35-50-2-10. On March 10, 2008, a jury trial was held. At the close of the evidence, the jury found Staley guilty of operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person and found him to be an habitual substance offender. The jury found Staley not guilty of intimidation. On April 7, 2008, during a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Staley to one year executed, enhanced by three years for the habitual offender adjudication. The trial court suspended two years of the habitual offender sentence.
Staley now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Staley contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it instructed the jury on the definition of "endangerment" for purposes of the operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person statute. It is well established by our court that instructing the jury is within the discretion of the trial court. Perez v. State, 872 N.E.2d 208, 210 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007).
However, Staley admits that he failed to object to the jury instruction. Generally, a contemporaneous objection is required to preserve an issue for appeal. See Anderson v. State, 653 N.E.2d 1048, 1051 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). Seeking to avoid procedural default, Staley urges us that his claim is not foreclosed because the trial court's tendering of the jury instruction constituted fundamental error. The fundamental error doctrine is extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process. Boesch v. State, 778 N.E.2d 1276, 1279 (Ind.2002), reh'g denied. When determining whether a defendant suffered a due process violation based on an incorrect jury instruction, we look not to the erroneous instruction in isolation, but in the context of all relevant information given to the jury, including closing argument, and other instructions. Id. There is no resulting due process violation where all such information, considered as a whole does not mislead the jury as to a correct understanding of the law. Id.
Here, Staley specifically contests the trial court's Instruction Six, which provided "[e]ndangering means that the Defendant's condition or operating manner could have endangered any person, including the public, the police, or the operator." (Appellant's App. p. 79) (emphasis added). Staley maintains that this instruction incorrectly states the law as it was based upon case law interpreting I.C. § 9-30-5-2 before it was amended in 2001.
Prior to 2001, Indiana Code section 9-30-5-2 provided that: "A person who operates a vehicle while intoxicated commits a Class A misdemeanor." Moreover, Indiana Code section 9-13-2-86 provided that:
Intoxicated means under the influence of:
(1) alcohol;
* * *
so that there is an impaired condition of thought and action and the loss of normal control of a person's faculties to an extent that endangers a person.
Interpreting these statutes, we held that the endangerment element of Indiana Code sections 9-30-5-2 and 9-13-2-86 indicated the level of impairment and the extent of lost faculties that must be shown to establish intoxication and to obtain a conviction. See, e.g., State v. Krohn, 521 N.E.2d 374, 377 (Ind.Ct.App.1988). In addition, we held that endangerment was established by evidence showing that the defendant's condition or operating manner could have endangered any person, including the public, the police, or the defendant. Blinn v. State, 677 N.E.2d 51, 54 (Ind.Ct. App.1997). Moreover, under the pre-2001 statutory scheme, we held that proof that the defendant's condition rendered operation of the vehicle unsafe is sufficient to establish the endangerment element of the offense. State v. Rans, 739 N.E.2d 164, 168 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied.
However, in 2001, the legislature amended the statutory scheme upon which these cases rely. As amended, Indiana Code section 9-30-5-2 provides as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), a person who operates a vehicle while intoxicated commits a Class C misdemeanor.
(b) An offense described in subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor if the person operates a vehicle in a manner that endangers a person.
Thus, pursuant to the 2001 amendment of Indiana Code section 9-30-5-2, only the enhanced offense of operating a vehicle while intoxicated requires proof that the defendant operated a vehicle in a manner that endangered a person.
Similarly, in defining the term `intoxicated,' the Indiana legislature deleted the "to an extent that endangers a person" language. Accordingly, Indiana Code section 9-13-2-86, as amended, provides that:
Intoxicated means under the influence of:
(1) alcohol
* * *
so that there is an impaired condition of thought and action and the loss of normal control of a person's faculties.
Staley now maintains that pursuant to the 2001 amendments, endangerment cannot be shown solely by the defendant's condition—that he was intoxicated—but only by the manner in which he operated the vehicle.
In Slate v. State, 798 N.E.2d 510 (Ind. Ct.App.2003), we considered and rejected the same argument Staley presents us today. In Slate, the contested jury instruction read, "[e]ndangerment means that [Slate's] condition or...
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