Parler & Wobber v. Miles & Stockbridge
Decision Date | 25 July 2000 |
Docket Number | Misc. No. 20 |
Citation | 359 Md. 671,756 A.2d 526 |
Parties | PARLER & WOBBER, et al. v. MILES & STOCKBRIDGE, P.C., et al. |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Alvin I. Frederick (James E. Dickerman of Eccleston & Wolf, on brief), Baltimore, for appellants.
William J. Murphy (Robert T. Shaffer, III, John J. Connolly of Murphy & Shaffer, on brief), Baltimore, for appellees.
Argued before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL and HARRELL, JJ HARRELL, Judge.
Pursuant to Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl.Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (CJP), §§ 12-601, et seq.1, the Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, and Maryland Rule 8-3052, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland (Smalkin, J.) certified the following questions for our consideration:
We respond in the affirmative to both questions.
Our response to the certified questions begins with the following factual background supplied by the U.S. District Court:
This case started with a run-of-the-mill asbestosis lawsuit. Apparently, Jerome originally initiated suit in New York. According to Parler, she decided also to file in Maryland because she was worried that she would have statute of limitations problems in New York. Accordingly, she filed suit in Baltimore City Circuit Court in the fall of 1997, naming Salomon as defendant. According to Parler, service was affected on Salomon through its resident agent. No answer was originally filed and an initial Default Order and Notice of Default was issued in December, 1997.
Miles filed a third-party complaint against Parler. Miles alleges three specific acts of negligence in Parler's representation of Salomon: 1) it failed to argue either to the Circuit Court or on appeal (via the writ of mandamus) the appropriate liberal standard for the vacation of an entry of a default order before it becomes a final default judgment[3] 2) that Parler could have filed third-party complaints, but failed to do so, before October 5, 1998; and 3) that Parler negligently advised Royal to settle the Jerome litigation far in excess of any reasonable settlement value. As a result of this negligent representation, Miles claims that it is entitled to contribution and/or indemnification from Parler for any liability it has towards Royal. (Miles also raises these issues as a defense to Royal's claim.) 4
Under the Certified Questions of Law Act, this Court's statutorily prescribed role is to determine only questions of Maryland law, not questions of fact. See Reed v. Campagnolo, 332 Md. 226, 228, 630 A.2d 1145, 1146 (1993); Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Joy, 283 Md. 205, 219, n. 7, 389 A.2d 874, 882 (1978); Mercantile-Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Purifoy, 280 Md. 46, 55, 371 A.2d 650, 655 (1977). For purposes of our analysis, we accept the facts as submitted by the certifying court. See Reed, 332 Md. at 228, 630 A.2d at 1146; Food Fair Stores, Inc., 283 Md. at 219, n. 7, 389 A.2d at 882. Furthermore, we confine our legal analysis and final determinations of Maryland law to the questions certified. See Reed, 332 Md. at 228-29, 630 A.2d at 1146; Toll v. Moreno, 284 Md. 425, 437, 397 A.2d 1009, 1015 (1979).
We are presented with an issue of first impression in Maryland: when a client sues former counsel for professional malpractice, may that former counsel implead the client's successor counsel for contribution and indemnification where it alleges that successor counsel's professional negligence in the same matter contributed to the injury suffered by the client? We hold that such a claim may be maintained. In so holding, we must resolve two competing interests: the right for a joint tortfeasor to seek contribution or indemnification from an assertedly common liable party and the need to protect the attorney-client privilege.
Miles argues that it has a statutory right to implead Parler for contribution or indemnification under the Maryland Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act ("UCATA"), Maryland Code Annotated (1974, 1998 Repl.Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, §§ 3-1401, et seq.5, which contains no express recognition of or exception for the attorney-client privilege issue, and attendant ethical implications, presented here. It asserts that the very purpose of UCATA is served by its impleader action because the statute ...
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...[the] power to waive the attorney-client privilege." Newman, 384 Md. at 308, 863 A.2d at 335, citing Parler & Wobber v. Miles & Stockbridge, P.C., 359 Md. 671, 691, 756 A.2d 526, 537 (2000). Although we generally have discussed the attorney-client privilege with respect to the disclosure of......
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Kurstin v. Rosenthal, No. 2445, September Term, 2008 (Md. App. 3/1/2010)
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TABLE OF CASES
...Railroad Co., 248 N.Y. 339 (N.Y. 1928) 8-2 Paranto v. Ball, 52 Conn. 568 (1885) 10-2:3 Parler & Wobber v. Miles & Stockbridge. P.C., 359 Md. 671, 756 A.2d 526 (2000) 9-6:1 Parnoff v. Yuille, 139 Conn. App. 147, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 956 (2013), aff'd after remand, 163 Conn. App. 273 (2016......
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CHAPTER 9 - 9-6 THIRD-PARTY CLAIMS
...Levine, 544 A.2d 683 (D.C. App. 1988); Hughes v. Housley, 599 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1979). But see Parler & Wobber v. Miles & Stockbridge. P.C., 359 Md. 671, 756 A.2d 526 (2000); Goran v. Glieberman, 276 Ill. App. 3d 590, 659 N.E.2d 56 (1995); Brown v. LaChance, 165 Wis. 2d 52, 477 N.W.2d 296 (19......