Montanez v. D&D Auto, LLC
| Decision Date | 29 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 3:15-cv-397 (VAB) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | MARITZA MONTANEZ, Plaintiff, v. D&D AUTO, LLC doing business as FAIRFIELD HYUNDAI and SAFE-GUARD PRODUCTS INTERNATIONAL, LLC, Defendants. |
Maritza Montanez initiated this action in March 2015 against D&D Auto, LLC doing business as Fairfield Hyundai ("Fairfield Hyundai"), a car dealership, and Safe-Guard Products International, LLC ("Safe-Guard"). Compl., ECF No. 1. Ms. Montanez's claims arise out of her purchase of a used Mini Cooper from Fairfield Hyundai and a service contract on that vehicle from Safe-Guard. Id. ¶¶6-7, 10.
Ms. Montanez claims that the Defendants violated the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. §1601 et seq., the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act ("CUTPA"), Conn. Gen. Stat. §42-110a et seq., and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA"), 15 U.S.C. §2301 et seq. Id. ¶1. She also asserts claims of fraud, breach of contract, breach of warranty, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and common law misrepresentation. Id. She seeks compensatory, statutory, and punitive damages as well as costs and attorney's fees. Id. at Prayer for Relief.
Although Ms. Montanez's Complaint asserts all of her claims generally against both Defendants, in its Motion to Dismiss, Safe-Guard contends that Ms. Montanez targets Safe-Guard only with respect to her breach of contract and MMWA claims. Safe-Guard's Br. 1, ECF No. 14. Ms. Montanez does not object to this characterization of her claims, thus, the Court will consider only these two claims against Safe-Guard. The parties appear to agree that Ms. Montanez has asserted all claims listed in the Complaint against Fairfield Hyundai.
The parties have filed a number of motions. Each Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss, ECF Nos. 13, 17, and Ms. Montanez has filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings against Safe-Guard, ECF No. 15. After these three motions were fully briefed, Ms. Montanez moved to amend her Complaint, ECF No. 33, which Safe-Guard opposes. Safe-Guard has also filed a Motion for Sanctions, ECF No. 38, claiming that Ms. Montanez's counsel has no good basis for an assertion made in her initial Complaint and another assertion she seeks to add in her Proposed Amended Complaint.
The Court first will address the motions to dismiss and the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. It will then address the Motion to Amend and Motion for Sanctions. For the reasons that follow, Safe-Guard's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 13, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; Ms. Montanez's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF No. 15, is DENIED; Fairfield Hyundai's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 17, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; Safe-Guard's Motion for Sanctions, ECF No. 38, is DENIED; and Ms. Montanez's Motion to Amend the Complaint, ECF No. 33, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Ms. Montanez alleges that she bought a used Mini Cooper from Fairfield Hyundai on May 19, 2014 under a Retail Installment Contract. Compl. ¶6, ECF No. 1. She also contends that she purchased a service contract issued by Safe-Guard for $2,500, which Fairfield Hyundai represented covered the car's electronic components. Id. ¶¶7, 10. She claims that Fairfield Hyundai also told her that the Mini Cooper was covered by a factory warranty that expired "at 50,000 miles or August 15, 2015," whichever occurred first. Id. ¶13.
After Ms. Montanez purchased the car, she alleges that the engine light began illuminating "regularly." Id. ¶8. She claims that the engine light problem was related to a "TSB for the Mini Cooper related to the knock sensor." Id. ¶¶9, 19. She alleges that both Defendants refused to pay for or authorize repairs on her Mini Cooper, thereby forcing her to drive an unsafe vehicle. Id. ¶¶2, 14, 121-24. At least one dealer that investigated the problem allegedly determined that it was attributable to the car having an aftermarket radio. Id. ¶17.
Ms. Montanez contends that the factory warranty and the Safe-Guard service contract were in force at the time these incidents occurred. Id. ¶¶10, 13. She also alleges that the Safe-Guard contract consisted of "fine print" and that Fairfield Hyundai never provided her with the page of the contract describing coverage disclosure. Id. ¶¶11-12.
Ms. Montanez also alleges that Fairfield Hyundai made certain misrepresentations about the car it sold her and the payments she owed. She claims that Fairfield Hyundai misrepresented that the car was a "one-owner vehicle." Id. ¶15. She also claims that Fairfield Hyundai sold the car to her "knowing it had an aftermarket radio." Id. ¶16. Shecontends that Fairfield Hyundai included $750 GAP insurance and a $189 VIN Etch service without asking her permission, without disclosing the terms of conditions of such inclusions, and without actually etching her car. Id. ¶¶30-31.
She contends that Fairfield Hyundai failed to provide her with the "Buyer's Guide" or a DMV Form K-208. Id. ¶¶25, 33. She also alleges that Fairfield Hyundai misrepresented the percentage interest rate and the payments due on her installment contract. Id. ¶¶26-28.1 She contends that it disclosed and charged her a higher license and registration fee than was actually owed and that its dealer conveyance fee was "well over the standard price for such a fee." Id. ¶¶29, 32.
Both Fairfield Hyundai and Safe-Guard have moved to dismiss Ms. Montanez's case in its entirety. Mots. To Dismiss, ECF Nos. 13, 17. First, they both argue that the Court should dismiss the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), because it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Second, they both argue that Ms. Montanez has failed to state legally viable claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Ms. Montanez also seeks judgment on the pleadings in her favor under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) against Safe-Guard only. Mot. for J. on Pleadings, ECF No. 15.
The Court will address the arguments about subject matter jurisdiction first. It then will address the Rule 12(b)(6) arguments and the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
"[F]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction," and they must exercise that jurisdiction within the prescriptions of Congress or the Constitution. Durant, Nichols, Houston, Hodgson, & Cortese-Costa, P.C. v. Dupont, 565 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 2009). Rule 12(b)(1) requires a federal court to dismiss any case for which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction without addressing the merits. See Arbagh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over a case if (a) the parties are completely diverse and the amount in controversy requirements are met, or (b) the lawsuit requires the Court to decide a matter of federal law. See 28 U.S.C. §§1331-1332. In the latter case, a court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. §1367(a). Ms. Montanez bears the burden of establishing the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. See Aurecchione v. Schoolman Transp. Sys., Inc., 426 F.3d 635, 638 (2d Cir. 2005); Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 446 (1942).
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is facially plausible if "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Although "detailed factual allegations" are not required, a complaint must offer more than "labels and conclusions," or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" or "naked assertion[s]" devoid of "further factual enhancement." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007).
At this stage, the Court accepts as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draws inferences from these allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Newman & Schwartz v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 102 F.3d 660, 662 (2d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). Generally, in resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court also must consider only "the facts as asserted within the four corners of the complaint." McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007).2 In determining whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction, on the other hand, the Court may consider matters outside of the Complaint, if necessary. See Cortlandt Street Recovery Corp. v. Hellas Telecommunications, S.A.R.L., 790 F.3d 411, 417 (2d Cir. 2015); see also United States v. Space Hunters, Inc., 429 F.3d 416, 425-27 (2d Cir. 2005) ().
In deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), the Court applies the same standard applicable to motions to dismissbrought under Rule 12(b)(6). Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 160 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
Ms. Montanez claims this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over all of her claims because she raises questions of federal law under TILA and the MMWA. Compl. ¶3, ECF No. 1 (). She contends that the Court should exercise supplemental...
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