Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. St. John

• Decision Date: 06 January 2004
• Docket Number: (AC 23279).
• Citation: 80 Conn. App. 767,837 A.2d 841
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY v. ROBERT ST. JOHN ET AL.

80 Conn. App. 767

837 A.2d 841

CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY v. ROBERT ST. JOHN ET AL.

(AC 23279).

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 14, 2003.

Officially released January 6, 2004.

Lavery, C. J., and DiPentima and Peters, Js.

James J. Farrell, for the appellants (named defendant et al.).

Thomas J. Sansone, with whom, on the brief, was David S. Hardy, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

LAVERY, C. J.

The defendants Robert St. John and Donald St. John¹ appeal from the judgment of the trial court denying their motion to open the judgment after they had been defaulted for failure to plead. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court (1) lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter because the plaintiff, Connecticut Light and Power Company, never served them with a writ of summons and complaint as required by General Statutes § 52-45a, and (2) improperly denied their motion to open the default judgment because the court clerk improperly entered a default judgment against them. We reverse in part and affirm in part the judgment of the trial court.

The relevant facts and procedural history are not in dispute. On March 6, 2000, the plaintiff filed an application for a prejudgment remedy regarding real property at 504 Main Avenue in Norwalk. The plaintiff claimed that it had provided utility service for the defendants' benefit and that they had failed to pay for that service. The plaintiff also obtained a temporary restraining order from the court, which enjoined Donald St. John from transferring his interest in the subject property. On March 13, 2000, at the hearing on the application for a prejudgment remedy, the parties entered into an agreement in which they agreed that the restraining order would be dissolved and that the defendants would hold $10,500 of the proceeds from the sale of the property in escrow pending the resolution of the plaintiff's claims against the defendants.

On April 12, 2000, the parties signed a stipulation regarding the aforementioned agreement. On that same day, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that the court did not have personal jurisdiction over them because they were not served properly with a complaint. On March 7, 2001, the court denied the motion, ruling that the defendants had waived their challenge to the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction when they entered into the stipulation.² On May 18, 2001, the plaintiff filed a motion for default for failure to plead, which the court clerk granted. On July 11, 2001, the defendants filed a motion to open the default, which the court denied without prejudice. On September 25, 2001, the defendants filed another motion to open the default, and both defendants also filed answers and counterclaims alleging a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. The court granted the motion.

On November 6, 2001, the plaintiff filed a request to revise.³ The defendants did not respond to the request to revise. On December 6, 2001, the plaintiff filed another motion for default for failure to plead, claiming that it had filed a request to revise the defendants' counterclaim and that they had failed to comply with the request. The court clerk granted the motion, defaulting both defendants. On December 28, 2001, the plaintiff claimed the matter for a hearing in damages, which was held on January 23, 2002. The defendants did not appear at the hearing. Following the hearing, the court rendered judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $10,500 and ordered that the funds held in escrow be used to satisfy the judgment. On May 15, 2002, the defendants filed a motion to open the default judgment, which the court denied.⁴ This appeal followed.

I

The defendants first claim that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter because the plaintiff never served the defendants with a writ of summons and complaint as required by § 52-45a.⁵ We disagree.⁶

As a preliminary matter, we address the appropriate standard of review. Because a determination regarding a court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is plenary. Giulietti v. Giulietti, 65 Conn. App. 813, 846, 784 A.2d 905, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 946, 947, 788 A.2d 95, 96, 97 (2001). "Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of a court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it. . . . A court does not truly lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has competence to entertain the action before it. . . . Once it is determined that a tribunal has authority or competence to decide the class of cases to which the action belongs, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is resolved in favor of entertaining the action. . . . [I]n determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Connor v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 260 Conn. 435, 442-43, 797 A.2d 1081 (2002).

The defendants do not contest the court's competence to entertain the type of action before it; rather they contend that the plaintiff's failure to serve them with a writ of summons and complaint deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff concedes that it did not serve the defendants properly, but argues that such defective or insufficient service of process implicates only the court's personal jurisdiction over the defendants and not its subject matter jurisdiction over the action. We agree with the plaintiff.

"Our precedents make it abundantly clear that, except in the special circumstances of administrative appeals, defects in process do not deprive a court of subject matter jurisdiction. . . . [J]urisdiction over the person, jurisdiction over the subject-matter, and jurisdiction to render the particular judgment are three separate elements of the jurisdiction of a court. . . . Facts showing the service of process in time, form, and manner sufficient to satisfy the requirements of mandatory statutes in that regard are essential to jurisdiction over the person." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bridgeport v. Debek, 210 Conn. 175, 179-80, 554 A.2d 728 (1989).

Because the plaintiff's failure to serve the defendants with a writ of summons and complaint as required by § 52-45a implicates only the court's personal jurisdiction, we conclude that the court had subject matter jurisdiction over the action.⁷

II

The defendants also claim that the court improperly denied their motion to open the default judgment because the court clerk incorrectly entered a default judgment against them. Specifically, they argue that the proper court action was to enter a nonsuit on the counterclaims rather than a default judgment on the complaint and the counterclaims. We agree with the defendants.

Initially, we note that the record contains no memorandum of decision with respect to the court's denial of the defendants' motion to open, and the defendants have not provided a transcript of the hearing. Additionally, the defendants never filed a motion for articulation pursuant to Practice Book § 66-5. In such cases, we frequently have declined to review claims on appeal because the appellant has failed to provide the court with an adequate record for review. See Resurreccion v. Normandy Heights, LLC, 76 Conn. App. 642, 649, 820 A.2d 1116, cert. denied, 264 Conn. 917, 826 A.2d 1159 (2003). Our Supreme Court in Niehaus v. Cowles Business Media, Inc., 263 Conn. 178, 182-86, 819 A.2d 765 (2003), however, held that there is an adequate basis for appellate review when the facts underlying a claim on appeal are not in dispute and the claim involves a pure question of law. That is the case here.⁸ Accordingly, we review the defendants' claim.

The power of a court to set aside a default judgment is controlled by General Statutes § 52-212 (a), which provides in relevant part: "Any judgment rendered or decree passed upon a default or nonsuit . . . may be set aside . . . upon the complaint or written motion of any party or person prejudiced thereby, showing reasonable cause, or that a good cause of action or defense in whole or in part existed at the time of the rendition of the judgment or the passage of the decree, and that the plaintiff or defendant was prevented by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause from prosecuting the action or making the defense." See also Practice Book § 17-43. "Although the opening of a judgment properly rendered is a discretionary act of the court. . . a judgment improperly rendered, as a matter of law, must be set aside." (Citation omitted.) CAS Construction Co. v. Dainty Rubbish Service, Inc., 60 Conn. App. 294, 299, 759 A.2d 555 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 928, 767 A.2d 101 (2001).

In the present case, it is undisputed that the plaintiff's request to revise was directed only to the defendants' counterclaims and not their answers. It further is undisputed that the basis of the plaintiff's "motion for default" for failure to plead was that the defendants failed to object to or to comply with its request to revise.⁹ General Statutes § 52-119 provides that "[p]arties failing to plead according to the rules and orders of the court may be nonsuited or defaulted, as the case may be." (Emphasis added.) See also Practice Book § 10-18. The proper court action in this case was to nonsuit the defendants on their counterclaims rather than to default them on the plaintiff's complaint and on their counterclaims. See Enquire Printing & Publishing Co. v. O'Reilly, 193 Conn. 370, 377, 377 n.12, 477 A.2d 648 (1984); Connecticut National Bank v. Marland, 45 Conn. App. 352, 358, 696 A.2d 374, cert. denied, 243 Conn. 907, 701 A.2d 328 (1997).

"In an action at law, the rule is that the entry of a default operates as a confession by the defaulted defendant of the truth of the material...