T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Williams

• Decision Date: 17 February 1960
• Docket Number: No. 17959.,17959.
• Parties: T. SMITH & SON, INC., Appellant, v. Frank WILLIAMS, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

275 F.2d 397 (1960)

T. SMITH & SON, INC., Appellant, v. Frank WILLIAMS, Appellee.

No. 17959.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

February 17, 1960.

Edw. J. Boyle, Dudley A. Philips, Jr., Clem H. Sehrt, New Orleans, La., for appellant.

Max Zelden, Sam Monk Zelden, New Orleans, La., for appellee.

Before TUTTLE, BROWN and WISDOM, Circuit Judges.

WISDOM, Circuit Judge.

This action involves Section 2283 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283 restricting the power of federal courts to enjoin state court proceedings. The subject matter of the action, compensation to a waterfront worker, is a sore spot in federal-state relations. The question for decision is whether a federal court may enjoin compensation proceedings brought by a longshoreman against his employer in a state court under a state act when, as federal courts see it, the longshoreman's remedy is exclusively under the federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S. C.A. § 901 et seq. We hold that no injunction may issue.

I.

In 1917, in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 37 S.Ct. 524, 525, 61 L.Ed. 1086, the United States Supreme Court reversed an award under the New York State Workmen's Compensation Act, McKinney's Consol.Laws, c. 67, § 1 et seq., to the widow of a longshoreman killed while loading and unloading cargo in New York Harbor. The court held that the plaintiff's remedy was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government; application of state compensation laws to a longshoreman would "prejudice * * * the proper harmony or uniformity" of the general maritime law. The Jensen doctrine, depriving thousands of waterfront workers of the protection of state compensation laws, proved to be somewhat less than impregnable to a variety of attacks. In a series of cases the Supreme Court held that where employment, although maritime in character, pertains to local matters having only an incidental relation to navigation and commerce, it may be regulated by local rules which do not work a material prejudice to general maritime law.¹ Next came two attempts by Congress to overcome Jensen directly by legislation preserving to claimants "the rights and remedies under the Workmen's Compensation law of any state". These attempts failed.² Congress then enacted the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, providing compensation coverage under federal law for workers who could not be covered under state compensation laws. 44 Stat. 1424 (1927); 33 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq.

In Davis v. Department of Labor, 1942, 317 U.S. 249, 63 S.Ct. 225, 87 L. Ed. 246, the Supreme Court curtailed further the effectiveness of Jensen. The Court adopted the "twilight zone" rule: borderline employees are entitled to have their rights settled case by case in a trial, to determine whether the injury occurred in maritime activities or in activities sufficiently local to allow the valid application of state laws; some amphibious waterfront workers are entitled to the protection of state compensation acts.

The blur at the limits of the twilight zone and the application of the Davis doctrine in certain cases³ has raised a doubt as to whether there is life in old Jensen yet.⁴ But whenever a mirror is brought to see if Jensen is still breathing, Jensen revives, seemingly as vital and vigorous as ever;⁵ well, almost as vital and vigorous. In two recent cases this Court, relying on Jensen, held that the compensation claims of a welder, injured while making repairs on a floating dry dock (Flowers v. Travelers Ins. Co., 5 Cir., 1958, 258 F.2d 220, certiorari denied 1959, 359 U.S. 920, 79 S.Ct. 591, 3 L.Ed.2d 582) and a longshoreman injured while loading a ship (Noah v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 5 Cir., 1959, 267 F.2d 218, on rehearing reversing 5 Cir., 265 F.2d 547) are exclusively under the federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act.

The lack of definition inherent in twilight zones and the difficulty in reconciling Davis, Moore, and Baskin⁶ with Jensen, Flowers, and Noah have produced a serious conflict between Louisiana state courts and federal courts. In a carefully considered opinion, Judge Tate, for the Court of Appeal of Louisiana for the First Circuit, reviewed the jurisprudence and, on the authority of Davis, Moore, and Baskin, held that a longshoreman injured while working in the hold of an ocean-going steamer on navigable waters was entitled to recover under the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act.⁷ Richard v. Lake Charles Stevedores Inc., La.App., 1 Cir., 1957, 95 So.2d 830, 834; certiorari denied 355 U.S. 952, 78 S.Ct. 535, 2 L.Ed.2d 529; 19 La.L.Rev. 737 (1959). In both Jensen and Noah the injured worker was a longshoreman.⁸ But Louisiana courts follow Richard — Jensen, Flowers, and Noah to the contrary notwithstanding. Throughout the state, Louisiana district courts uniformly accept jurisdiction of compensation suits by longshoremen under the Louisiana Act and uniformly dismiss the employer's exceptions to the jurisdiction and of no right or cause of action.⁹ In Louisiana, therefore, and perhaps in other states,¹⁰ whether a waterfront worker (even a longshoreman) has a choice of remedies depends on whether he sues in a state court or in a federal court.

An injured waterfront worker has a problem in deciding which law gives him the most benefits. But the man in the middle, caught between the state and federal acts, is the employer, unconcerned about a dent in the prized uniformity of the general maritime law but properly concerned because he may be subject to two attacks, under different laws, for what would seem to be one claim.¹¹ In this action the plight of the employer is urged as a compelling equitable consideration for issuance of the injunction.

II.

These are the pertinent facts. Frank Williams, a longshoreman working for T. Smith and Son, Inc., a stevedoring firm, was injured March 1, 1956, while loading barrels of asphalt on a vessel docked at the Mississippi River wharves of the port of New Orleans. As required by federal law, his employer notified the Deputy Commissioner of Labor at New Orleans, charged with administering the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, and began paying compensation benefits. Sometime in May 1958 the employer discontinued payments on the ground that the doctors had discharged Williams as able to return to work. In addition to payments for medical attention, Williams received compensation benefits of $3,896. Williams filed no claim for additional benefits under the federal act with the Deputy Commissioner of Labor at New Orleans. On November 26, 1958, however, Williams filed suit in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, Louisiana, seeking compensation benefits under the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation law, LSA-R.S. 23:1021 et seq., and asking for a judgment in the sum of $12,000, plus interest, penalties, and costs. On February 27, 1959, the Deputy Commissioner of Labor made a "determination"^11a that "jurisdiction in this case properly rests with the Deputy Commissioner * * * in the administration of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act". At that point the employer brought this action to enjoin Williams from going forward with his proceedings in the state courts. The employer alleged that the federal court has exclusive jurisdiction; that the employee had been paid all the compensation to which he was entitled; that an injunction was "necessary in aid of the federal court's jurisdiction or to protect or effectuate its judgments" under Section 2283.

III.

Section 2283, the anti-injunction statute, reads as follows:

"A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments."

Section 2283 is the 1948 revised version of Section 265 of the Judicial Code of 1911, former 28 U.S.C.A. § 379.¹² Both go back to Section 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1793 providing that: "* * * Nor shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay proceedings in any court of a state."

It has been suggested that the prohibition of federal injunctions against state proceedings was included in the Act of 1793 as a result of the opposition, intensified at that time by Chisholm v. State of Georgia, 1793, 2 Dall. 419, 1 L.Ed. 440, to extending the scope of federal jurisdiction at the expense of the states.¹³ Mr. Justice Frankfurter¹⁴ and others¹⁵ have questioned the significance of special contemporary factors, except the prevailing prejudices against equity jurisdiction. But: "the purpose and direction underlying the provision is manifest from its terms: proceedings in the state court should be free from interference by federal injunction. The provision expresses on its face the duty of `hands off' by the federal courts in the use of the injunction to stay litigation in a state court. * * * The Act of 1793 expresses the desire of Congress to avoid friction between the federal government and the states resulting from the intrusion of federal authority into the orderly functioning of a state's judicial process".¹⁶

In early cases involving federal injunctions to stay state court proceedings the courts managed to deny the injunctions without mentioning the Act of 1793, apparently assuming that federal courts had no control over state courts, except by established appellate jurisdiction.¹⁷ Later, the courts expressly applied the statutory limitation.¹⁸ Cutting across the hands-off principle, Congress enacted statutory exceptions¹⁹ and federal courts began to create judicial exceptions.²⁰ These exceptions reshaped the rule into a flexible but uncertain guide for avoiding friction between federal and state courts.

Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 1941, 314 U.S. 118, 62 S.Ct. 139, 86 L.Ed. 100, was a turning point. Toucey held that a federal court could not enjoin a state court...