H. Kessler & Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Com'n
Decision Date | 29 January 1973 |
Docket Number | No. 72-1082.,72-1082. |
Citation | 472 F.2d 1147 |
Parties | H. KESSLER & COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross Appellant, v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION et al., Defendants-Appellants-Cross Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Joseph Ray Terry, Jr., Regional Attorney, Atlanta Regional Office, EEOC, Atlanta, Ga., John DeJ. Pemberton, Acting Gen. Counsel, David Zugschwerdt, Acting Chief, Trial Section, Julia Cooper, Chief, Appellate Section, Lutz Alexander Prager, EEOC, Washington, D. C., for defendants-appellants.
Cleburne E. Gregory, Jr., Alexander Cocalis, Allen I. Hirsch, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge, and TUTTLE, WISDOM, GEWIN, BELL, THORNBERRY, COLEMAN, GOLDBERG, AINSWORTH, GODBOLD, DYER, SIMPSON, MORGAN, CLARK, INGRAHAM, and RONEY, Circuit Judges.
The court, having been convened en banc and having considered additional briefs, reverses in part the decision of the original panel in this matter, Kessler and Company v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 468 F.2d 25 (C.A.5, 1972).
The precise question presented for en banc review is whether the non-disclosure provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, section 709(e), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-8(e), make it unlawful for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, prior to the institution of formal legal proceedings, to disclose to the aggrieved party or his attorney information obtained by the Commission during the course of its administrative investigation of a claim of employment discrimination. The original panel held that the Act prohibited such disclosure, one judge dissenting. We reverse that aspect of the decision but affirm as to the other issues decided by the panel.
Our inquiry is directed to that portion of the Civil Rights Act which outlines the procedures to be followed by the Commission after a claim of discrimination has been filed by a private party. In this limited respect the Act contains three separate prohibitions against public disclosure. Two of these are contained in Section 706(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(a), which describes the principal functions of the Commission. It provides:
(Emphasis added.)
The third prohibition against disclosure is contained in Section 709(e) which provides:
(Emphasis added.)
It is this last provision with which we are directly concerned. The Commission takes the position that neither the charging party nor his attorney is, within the intendment of this statute, a member of the "public" to whom disclosure of "any information obtained by the Commission pursuant to its authority" is prohibited. This position is reflected in the Commission's current regulations which, insofar as relevant, provide as follows:
(Emphasis supplied.) 29 C.F.R. § 1601.20.
The Commission's policy was further explained in a memorandum, dated September 15, 1970, to all Commission field directors and field attorneys by the then General Counsel. The memorandum states:
(Emphasis supplied.)
Our task here, of course, is to ascertain whether the regulation and the Commission's stated policy with respect to disclosure are consonant with the statutory requirements. We think that the position taken by the Commission constitutes an accurate assessment of the relevant law.
It is noted at the outset that we are dealing here with a very limited form of disclosure, that is, disclosure only to the parties themselves or their attorneys of information obtained by the Commission during the course of its investigation of a complaint. The question is whether such limited disclosure makes "public" this information, in violation of Section 709(e), supra.
In light of the purpose of the Civil Rights Act, and recognizing the fact that the complaining person is, almost by definition, a person in impecunious circumstances, and bearing in mind the fact that "the importance of the private litigant in the context of Title VII cannot be over-emphasized," Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 460, n. 1 (C.A.5, 1970), and bearing in mind further the very limited time that is given to the charging party to file suit after the Commission notifies him that it has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance (30 days), it is obvious that the charging party literally needs all the help he can get in order to procure counsel, convince him that a right of action truly exists with evidence to support it, and prepare and file suit within the statutory period. It is within this context that we must consider whether the charging party himself, or his attorney is, within the meaning of the statute, a member of the "public".
The scant legislative history that is available with respect to this particular portion of the Act appears to support the position expressed by the Commission in its regulation. See Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283 (C.A.5, 1969). Senator Humphrey introduced the compromise amendment which eventually became law. In his statement he undertook to give a gloss to the amendment which would permit such disclosure as is necessary to the carrying out of the Commission's duties under the statute. He said:
That the non-disclosure provisions of the Act were never intended to apply to the immediate parties is given further substance by the legislative history of the 1972 amendments to Title VII. Though the provisions with which we are here...
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...on the matter to give the parties an opportunity to address themselves to that issue. But see H. Kessler & Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 472 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1973). The Freedom of Information Act, however, cannot be said to create a cause of action to prevent disclosure......
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