Matter of Boston & Maine Corp.

• Decision Date: 31 August 1978
• Docket Number: No. 70-250-M.,70-250-M.
• Citation: 456 F. Supp. 412
• Parties: In the Matter of BOSTON AND MAINE CORPORATION, Debtor.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

456 F. Supp. 412

In the Matter of BOSTON AND MAINE CORPORATION, Debtor.

No. 70-250-M.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

August 31, 1978.

Charles W. Mulcahy, Jr., Mulcahy & Mulcahy, Boston, Mass., for trustees.

Paul B. Galvani, Ropes & Gray, Boston, Mass., for Maine Central Railroad Co.

John T. Collins, Neal Holland, Sherburne, Powers & Needham, Boston, Mass., for the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Co., the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., and the Western Maryland Railway Co. William P. Quinn, Fell, Spalding, Goff & Rubin, Philadelphia, Pa., for Trailer Train Co.

W. Charles Hogg, Jr., Clark, Ladner, Fortenbaugh & Young, Philadelphia, Pa., for the Committee of Interline Railroads.

Joseph H. B. Edwards, Paul J. Lambert, Diane M. Kottmyer, Bingham, Dana & Gould, Boston, Mass., for First Mortgage Indenture Trustees.

MEMORANDUM

FRANK J. MURRAY, Senior District Judge.

Petitions have been filed by 38 railroads,¹ and by Trailer Train Co., seeking immediate payment of interline charges, called "per diem" charges,² for pre-reorganization interline car usage. Specifically, petitioners seek to have Debtor's trustees pay the difference between the per diem charges paid the petitioners by Boston and Maine Corporation (B & M) from August 1, 1953 to March 12, 1970, the date of the filing of the petition in reorganization, and the per diem charges which would have been remitted had B & M paid according to the rates set out in the 1968 Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) decision. See Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. N. Y. Susquehanna & W. R. Co., 322 ICC 176 (1968). Petitioners argue that per diem charges are entitled to a special priority over other unsecured claims against the Debtor, and rely on Matter of Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 537 F.2d 906 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1092, 97 S.Ct. 1102, 51 L.Ed.2d 537 (1977), ("Rock Island"), in support of their claims. The basic position of Debtor's trustees is that petitioners' per diem claims are merely general unsecured debts and entitled only to the priority given other pre-reorganization unsecured claims; in support of that position they rely on In re Penn Central Transportation Company, 486 F.2d 519 (3rd Cir. 1973) ("Penn Central I") and Matter of Penn Central Transportation Company, 553 F.2d 12 (3rd Cir. 1977) ("Penn Central II").

The claims of the petitioners fall into three categories: (a) per diem charges for services performed before August 1, 1969, (b) per diem charges for services performed on and after August 1, 1969 and prior to March 12, 1970, and (c) per diem charges for services performed prior to March 12, 1970, but not reportable to Debtor until after March 12, 1970. The Debtor's trustees do not dispute the amounts of petitioners' claims at this stage of the reorganization proceedings; the sole issue is the priority of the claims.

I

It is not disputed by petitioners that unpaid pre-reorganization per diem charges constitute debts within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act (the Act). 11 U.S.C. §§ 1(14), 205(b). Section 77(a) of the Act 11 U.S.C. § 205(a) confers upon the reorganization court exclusive jurisdiction over the Debtor and its property, and grants all powers over that property traditionally exercised by bankruptcy courts. Under Section 77(c)(7) of the Act 11 U.S.C. § 205(c)(7) the reorganization court is empowered to determine priorities of the claims of creditors, except those claims which are given special status in reorganization proceedings and specifically described in Section 77. See 11 U.S.C. § 205(n) (claims of employees for personal injuries and claims of sureties on certain bonds); 11 U.S.C. § 205(c)(3) (claims under trustees' certificates); 11 U.S.C. § 205(b) (unsecured claims under the "six months rule"). It is also not disputed that neither the Bankruptcy Act nor the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., specifically provides that per diem charges for pre-reorganization rail car usage must be given priority status over other claims against a railroad in reorganization. However, petitioners argue that per diem debts should be distinguished from other claims against Debtor and that payment of the pre-reorganization per diem claims cannot be deferred at the discretion of the trustees.

Petitioners contend that the pre-reorganization per diem charges incurred after August 1, 1969 were pursuant to an order of ICC, 332 ICC 176 (1968), supra, mandating the payment of per diem claims at specified per diem rates, and that therefore the duty of the trustees under section 77(c)(2)³ of the Act to comply with ICC orders requires immediate payment of the charges by the trustees. They contend further that public policy considerations with respect to the national supply of railroad cars likewise require the court to accord "super-priority" status to all pre-reorganization per diem claims, whenever incurred.

The arguments of petitioners find support in the decision and language of the opinion in Rock Island, supra, where the petition for reorganization was filed March 17, 1975. The reorganization court there ordered that the per diem accounts, all incurred after August 1, 1969, could be deferred at the discretion of the trustees. The interline railroads with the support of ICC sought modification of the order to require immediate payment of the per diem accounts. The reorganization court denied the petition, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the payment of both post- and pre-reorganization per diem accounts is "properly considered as part of the operation of the railroad in reorganization under section 77(c)(2) and is consequently governed by Commission orders", 537 F.2d at 910, and that the reorganization court "erred in its order permitting the trustee to defer payment of pre-reorganization per diem accounts." Id. at 913. In reaching that result the court concluded that "the reorganization court's power in determining the priority of that claim in relation to claims of other creditors has been circumscribed by the superseding authority of the Commission . . .". Id. at 910-11. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that its conclusion "departs to some extent" from the decision of the Third Circuit in Penn Central I at 912, but added that it did not believe the result reached by it "is in conflict with the decision of the Third Circuit." Id. at 913.

In Penn Central I the Third Circuit affirmed the ruling of the reorganization court that the interline railroads were not entitled to current payment of pre-reorganization per diem accounts. In reaching that result the court of appeals concluded that the interlines "at this juncture are in exactly the same position as other suppliers of Penn Central who were unpaid for goods and services delivered prior to the filing of the reorganization petition." 486 F.2d at 528. In Penn Central II the Third Circuit reaffirmed the result reached in Penn Central I on the question of pre-reorganization per diem charges, saying

Whatever may be the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of Penn Central I, the reality is that we have expressly addressed the question of per diem accounts, and we have expressly stated that the Interlines are in the same position with regard to these accounts as other unpaid suppliers. 486 F.2d at 528.

553 F.2d at 15.

The division of opinion between the Third and Seventh Circuits on the question of priority of per diem claims reflects fundamental differences between those courts in the views they take of the statutory powers of the reorganization court and ICC during the reorganization proceedings to affect priority of distribution of a debtor railroad's assets.

II

In Rock Island the Seventh Circuit was faced only with per diem claims incurred for services performed in January, February and March 1975. Under the applicable 40-day rule⁴ only the February and March claims became due after the petition was filed; the January claims became payable prior to that event.

In the case before this court the pre-reorganization claims arose in the years since 1953, and most of them are for services performed before August 1, 1969. These latter claims were never subject to the ICC prescribed rate. 332 ICC 176, 183 (1968), supra. Moreover, they were disputed in the District Court of the Southern District of New York, and that dispute has not been resolved. See note 1, supra. The rationale of Rock Island does not support petitioners' contentions that these claims were entitled to a preferred or super-priority status mandating their immediate payment. There is neither statutory authority nor clear and controlling policy considerations which deprive the court of discretion to defer payment of per diem claims for services performed before August 1, 1969.⁵

III

There is no statutory basis for distinguishing pre-reorganization per diem claims from other pre-reorganization claims (except those specifically described in section 77, and noted in Part I of this memorandum) in the administration of the estate of a debtor railroad. However, the Seventh Circuit determined that it is the duty of the trustee under section 77(c)(2) to pay pre-reorganization claims for services performed after August 1, 1969.⁶ Although under that section the trustee's authority to operate the debtor's business is "subject to the control of the judge and jurisdiction of the Commission . . .", the language of the section cannot be read to displace the control of the court over unpaid pre-reorganization claims, and acceptance of such a result would necessarily require rejection of settled bankruptcy principles and practice. The Rock Island court conceded that there is no statutory language to indicate "which policy and which authority is to predominate . . .". 537 F.2d at 910. Indeed, it is far from clear that the policies underlying section 77 would justify a construction of the statute which would effect any such erosion of the reorganization court's discretion.

The holding of...