Puerto Rico Ports Authority v. M/V MANHATTAN PRINCE

Decision Date22 February 1990
Docket NumberNo. 88-1533,88-1533
Parties, 29 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1103 PUERTO RICO PORTS AUTHORITY, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. M/V MANHATTAN PRINCE, et al., Defendants, Appellees. SUJEEN TRADING PTE., LTD., Claimant, Appellant, v. CROWLEY TOWING & TRANSPORTATION CO., Defendant, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Paul E. Calvesbert, with whom Jaime Morgan-Stubbe and Calvesbert & Brown, were on brief, for claimant, appellant.

William A. Graffam, with whom Jiminez, Graffam & Lausell, were on brief for, defendant, appellee Crowley Towing.

Hector Cuebas Tanon, with whom Vincente & Cuebas, were on brief, for plaintiff, appellee Puerto Rico Ports Authority.

Before CAMPBELL, Chief Judge, BOWNES and BREYER, Circuit Judges.

BOWNES, Circuit Judge.

Shortly after 8 p.m. (2012 hours) on August 15, 1985, the tanker Manhattan Prince, while in the process of docking, collided with a pier. The allision occurred in the Army Terminal Turning Basin, Puerto Nuevo Channel, San Juan Harbor, Puerto Rico. An in rem action against the vessel was brought by the Puerto Rico Ports Authority (PRPA) and the Puerto Rico Electric Authority for damages caused to facilities on the pier owned by both authorities. Shortly thereafter, Sujeen Trading PTE., LTD., (Sujeen), the owner of the tanker, brought an action for damage to the tanker's bow incurred in the allision and damages due to loss of hire against Crowley Towing and Transportation Company (Crowley) and against Captain Oscar Camacho, the compulsory pilot. Crowley was the owner of two tugboats, the Borinquen and El Morro, which had been hired by the tanker to help her dock. The claim against Crowley by the tanker was based on the alleged negligence of the tug Borinquen; the tug El Morro is not involved in the case. In both cases, the defendants filed cross claims and counterclaims against each other.

The cases were consolidated for trial and a bench trial was held in August, 1987. 1 The district court found the vessel and the pilot "jointly, severally and equally liable" for damages to the pier facilities, which amounted to $53,000. It found Crowley and the Electric Authority not liable to Sujeen for damages to the tanker. It found the pilot, Comacho, liable to Sujeen for half of the vessel's damages. These amounted to $194,723.40 for repairs to the bow of the tanker and $142,951.49 for loss of hire. The court further found that the PRPA was not liable for the negligence of the pilot. The court addressed the vicarious liability of the PRPA in an opinion published at 669 F.Supp. 34 (D.P.R.1987).

Sujeen has appealed the holding that the ship was at fault for the allision and the ruling that the PRPA was not vicariously liable for the negligence of the pilot. The pilot has not appealed, and there has been no appeal on the computation of damages. There are, therefore, two basic issues to be reviewed: whether the tanker was 50% at fault for the allision, and whether the PRPA is responsible for the negligence of the pilot. We start with the negligence issue.

I.
A. Standard of Review

We review the district court's finding of fact under the clearly erroneous standard, the same as that set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19, 20, 75 S.Ct. 6, 8, 99 L.Ed. 20 (1954). "A finding is clearly erroneous when 'although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed....' " Id. (citations omitted). See DiMillo v. Sheepscot Pilots, Inc., 870 F.2d 746, 749 (1st Cir.1989); EAC Timberlane v. Pisces Ltd., 745 F.2d 715, 722 (1st Cir.1984); Capt'n Mark v. Sea Fever Corp., 692 F.2d 163, 166 (1st Cir.1982).

In United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 95 S.Ct. 1708, 44 L.Ed.2d 251 (1975), the Court jettisoned the old rule of divided damages in admiralty collision cases that required an equal division of property damage whatever the relative degree of fault of the tortfeasors may have been. It held that:

when two or more parties have contributed by their fault to cause property damage in maritime collision or stranding, liability for such damage is to be allocated among the parties proportionately to the comparative degree of their fault, and that liability for such damages is to be allocated equally only when the parties are equally at fault or when it is not possible fairly to measure the comparative degree of their fault.

Id. at 411, 95 S.Ct. at 1715-16 (emphasis added). In this case, the court explicitly found: "Because it is impossible to fairly allocate proportional degrees of fault, the damages shall be equally divided between the 'Manhattan Prince' and Oscar Camacho. United States v. Reliable Transfer, 421 U.S. 397 [95 S.Ct. 1708, 44 L.Ed.2d 251] (1975)."

The clearly erroneous standard applies to the apportionment of liability. Getty Oil Co. v. USS Ponce De Leon, 555 F.2d 328, 335 (2d. Cir.1977); cf. Hanover Ins Co. v. Puerto Rico Lighterage Co., 553 F.2d 728, 731 (1st Cir.1977) (Jury verdicts on percentages of negligence not entitled to a trial de novo; district judge reviewed verdict and found it was neither clearly erroneous nor grossly excessive).

The clearly erroneous standard also applies to depositions 2 and other documentary evidence. United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394-95, 68 S.Ct. 525, 541-42, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948); San Francisco Real Estate Investors v. Real Estate, 701 F.2d 1000, 1002 (1st Cir.1983).

We end our exposition of the standard of review by noting that a district court's application of an improper standard to the facts is to be corrected as a matter of law. United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 194 n. 9, 83 S.Ct. 1773, 1784 n. 9, 10 L.Ed.2d 823 (1963).

B. The Facts

Most of the facts are undisputed; it is the conclusions drawn from them by the district court that has drawn Sujeen's fire. The tanker, Manhattan Prince, was carrying 34,800 metric tons of fuel oil to San Juan. The vessel is 805 feet long, has a 124 foot beam, and at the time of the allision had a draft of approximately 32 feet, since she was fully loaded. The vessel was powered by a diesel engine with one righthand screw.

The Manhattan Prince was manned by Polish officers and crew. Neither the captain nor the two mates had been to San Juan Harbor prior to August 15, 1985, the date of the allision. None of the ship's officers spoke or understood Spanish. The compulsory pilot, Oscar Comacho, did not speak or understand Polish. He boarded the ship about 2 1/2 miles from the entrance to San Juan Harbor at 7:12 p.m. (1912 hours). The pilot had never before docked a ship of the size of the Manhattan Prince. He did not know when he first went on board where the ship was to dock. He obtained this information by radio from Port Control.

At the time the pilot boarded the ship, darkness had fallen. After a discussion with the captain about the maneuverability and other characteristics of the vessel and the layout of San Juan Harbor, the pilot stationed himself in the port wing of the bridge. The captain moved back and forth across the bridge as conditions dictated. The pilot guided the ship by giving course and speed orders to the captain in English who relayed them in Polish to the crew member responsible for carrying them out. At times the pilot gave orders directly to a crew member. The second mate of the Manhattan Prince was on the bow. His responsibility was to act as a lookout and count down the distances as the ship approached the dock.

The course the ship followed was through the mouth of San Juan Harbor, down the Bar Channel to Anegado Channel, then a turn to port and down Anegado Channel to Army Terminal Channel. The ship then turned to starboard and followed Army Terminal Channel to the Army Terminal Turning Basin where it docked.

The tugs owned by Crowley, the Borinquen and El Morro, tied onto the tanker in Anegado Channel before she turned into Army Terminal Channel. The Borinquen was secured to the starboard bow with two lines; the El Morro was made fast to the starboard quarter. The tugs were manned by Puerto Ricans so the only one who could talk to the tug captains was the pilot which he did via a VHF radio in Spanish and "Spanglish," a combination of Spanish and English. From his position on the port wing of the bridge, the pilot was unable to see the Borinquen. The second mate who was stationed on the bow could see the tug but could not talk to its crew because of the language barrier and because his VHF radio, which enabled him to talk with the tanker captain, was on a different frequency from the radios of the pilot and the tug captains. This meant that the pilot could not hear the communications between the bow and the captain of the tanker, the tug captains could not hear the communications between the tanker's captain and the bow, and the bow could not hear the communications between the tug captains and the pilot.

In addition to the communications problems, the ship was attempting to dock at night in a constricted area. It was commanded by a master who had never even seen San Juan Harbor prior to this, much less transited it by ship, and it was piloted by one who had never before guided a vessel of this size. This was a prescription for an accident.

The tanker and tugs proceeded down Army Terminal Channel to the turning basin. The basin is at the south end of the channel, which runs almost directly from north to south. At its widest point, the basin measures about 200 yards. The distance from the basin entrance to the pier at which the ship was to dock was approximately 400 yards.

Two piers jutted out into the water at the southern terminus of the basin. The Army Terminal pier, which was where the tanker was to dock, lay to the west of Catano pier. Both piers are about 150 yards long. The Catano pier is considerably narrower than the Terminal pier. The piers are about 100...

To continue reading

Request your trial
58 cases
  • Orria-Medina v. Metropolitan Bus Authority
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
    • September 6, 2007
    ...2, 8 (1st Cir.1992); De Leon Lopez v. Corporacion Insular de Seguros, 931 F.2d 116, 121 (1st Cir.1991); Puerto Rico Ports Auth. v. M/V Manhattan Prince, 897 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir.1990); Culebras Enterprises Corp. v. Rivera Rios, 813 F.2d 506, 516 (1st Cir. 1987); Ainsworth Aristocrat Internati......
  • Toledo-Colon v. Puerto Rico
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
    • September 21, 2011
    ...939 n. 3 (1st Cir.1993); De Leon Lopez v. Corp. Insular de Seguros, 931 F.2d 116, 121 (1st Cir.1991); Puerto Rico Ports Auth. v. M/V Manhattan Prince, 897 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir.1990)). Eleventh Amendment immunity protects the state and the arms or alter egos of the state. Ainsworth Aristocrat ......
  • Willhauck v. Halpin, No. 91-1328
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
    • October 11, 1991
    ...made without a full examination of all the factors [bearing on the issue of state control]."). See also Puerto Rico Ports Authority v. M/V MANHATTAN PRINCE, 897 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir.1990); Blake v. Kline, 612 F.2d 718, 723 (3rd Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921, 100 S.Ct. 3011, 65 L.Ed.2d......
  • Puerto Rico Ports v. Federal Maritime
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)
    • July 8, 2008
    ...whether proprietary or governmental functions. See Royal Caribbean Corp. v. PRPA, 973 F.2d 8, 9 (1st Cir.1992); PRPA v. M/V Manhattan Prince, 897 F.2d 1, 12 (1st Cir.1990). But the First Circuit has expressly departed from that narrow focus on governmental-versus-proprietary functions as th......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Citizen Suits Against States and Territories and the Eleventh Amendment
    • United States
    • The Clean Water Act and the Constitution. Legal Structure and the Public's Right to a Clean and Healthy Environment Part II
    • April 20, 2009
    ...2003) (“The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is treated as a State for Eleventh Amendment purposes. P.R. Ports Auth. v. M/V Manhattan Princess , 897 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1990).”); U.S.I. Props. Corp. v. M.D. Constr. Co., 230 F.3d 489, 495 n.3 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that “it is the settled law of......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT