International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Racho Trucking Co., 89-5449

Citation897 F.2d 1248
Decision Date09 March 1990
Docket NumberNo. 89-5449,89-5449
Parties133 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2836, 114 Lab.Cas. P 12,023 INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA v. RACHO TRUCKING COMPANY. Appeal of GEORGE RACHO TRUCKING COMPANY.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)

Andrew J. Primerano (argued), Bart E. Ecker, Laputka, Bayless, Ecker & Cohn, P.C., Hazleton, Pa., for appellant.

Jonathan Walters (argued), Kirschner, Walters & Willig, Philadelphia, Pa., and Robert H. Stropp, Jr., Michael Dinnerstein, United Mine Workers of America, Washington, D.C., for appellee.

Before HUTCHINSON and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges, and DuBOIS, District Judge. *

OPINION OF THE COURT

HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge.

I.

Appellant George Racho Trucking Company (Racho Trucking) appeals an order of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The order denied its motion for summary judgment and granted the International Union of United Mine Workers of America's (UMWA's or Union's) cross-motion for summary judgment in the UMWA's three consolidated actions to enforce, as binding labor arbitration awards, three decisions of the Anthracite Board of Conciliation (the Conciliation Board or the Board). The Board had upheld the UMWA's position in three grievances filed against Racho Trucking.

Racho Trucking is an employer signatory to the 1985 version of the collective bargaining agreement that governs relations between anthracite-producing companies and UMWA-represented workers in the anthracite industry. The Conciliation Board is an entity the companies and the Union first created in 1903 to help settle grievances arising under the collective bargaining agreement reached in that year. The 1903 collective bargaining agreement was the first collective bargaining agreement between the anthracite-producing companies of northeastern Pennsylvania and the UMWA.

From 1903 until 1975, the language of successive collective bargaining agreements between the anthracite producers and the UMWA plainly gave the Conciliation Board the power that a compulsory labor arbitrator has to settle disputes over the interpretation and application of a collective bargaining agreement. In 1975, the language changed. The changes were carried over into the 1985 agreement that controls this case.

Racho Trucking contends that the language changes converted the Conciliation Board from an arbiter to a mediator. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court disagreed with Racho Trucking, construed the new language as effecting no essential change in the Conciliation Board's power and granted the UMWA's request for enforcement of the Conciliation Board's three decisions against Racho Trucking.

In the face of the 1985 agreement's language, we conclude the district court could not properly rule, as a matter of law, that the 1985 agreement continued the pre-1975 power of the Conciliation Board to act as the final arbiter of grievances. Instead, we think that the 1985 agreement's changed language with respect to the Conciliation Board's power requires factual interpretation of what the parties intended the textual changes to mean. Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the UMWA.

In support of its motion for summary judgment, Racho Trucking introduced material evidence to bolster its contention that only an umpire, and not the Conciliation Board, can act as the final arbiter of grievances under the 1985 collective bargaining contract. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, governing practice on motions for summary judgment, does not permit a non-moving party to rest on its allegations in the face of a moving party's evidence that would, if unrefuted, entitle the moving party to judgment. Instead, the non-moving party must produce countervailing evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Racho Trucking's production of the texts of earlier agreements in support of its interpretation of the collective bargaining contract's grievance provisions would entitle it to summary judgment if otherwise unrefuted. The UMWA failed to produce countervailing evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact supporting its interpretation of the collective bargaining contract's grievance and arbitration provisions. Therefore, Racho Trucking was entitled to summary judgment.

Accordingly, we will reverse the district court's order granting summary judgment to the Union and remand these consolidated cases with instructions to enter an order granting summary judgment in favor of Racho Trucking so that these disputes can proceed to hearing before an umpire.

II.

The 1985 agreement contains a four step grievance procedure. It states:

Disputes arising under this Agreement shall be resolved as follows:

(1) The Miner will make his complaint to his immediate foreman. The foreman will have the authority to settle the matter and will notify the Miner of his decision within 24 hours.

(2) If no agreement is reached at Step 1, the complaint shall be taken up within five work days of the foreman's decision at a meeting attended by the Mine Committee, a representative of the UMWA District, and a representative of the Employer. At such meeting, the positions of the Miner, the Mine Committee and the Employer will be set forth in a written statement. The Miner will state and sign the grievance; a representative of the Mine Committee will state and sign the Mine Committee's position; and the representative of the Employer will state and sign the Employer's position.

(3) If no agreement is reached at Step 2, the written statement shall be referred to the Anthracite Board of Conciliation, consisting of two representatives to be designated by the UMWA District and two representatives to be designated by the Employers signatory to this Agreement. The Board shall take up the complaint within seven work days after the matter is referred to it.

(4) If no agreement is reached at Step 3, the matter shall be referred to the umpire. Either the Union or the Employer may request that the umpire hear testimony and receive evidence in person, and where such a request is made, the umpire shall promptly conduct a hearing for that purpose. Where neither the Union nor the Employer requests a personal hearing before the umpire, a hearing shall be held before the Anthracite Board of Conciliation, the record of which shall be transmitted to the umpire according to past practice. Where no personal hearing before the umpire is requested, the umpire may conduct a supplementary hearing or investigation if necessary, in his judgment, to reach a fair decision. The umpire's decision shall be final and shall govern only the dispute before him.

Anthracite Wage Agreement of 1985, Article 18, Sec. (b), App. at A-54-55 (emphasis added).

Article 18, section (g) of the 1985 collective bargaining agreement is also material. It is entitled "Finality of Decision or Settlement" and states:

Settlements reached at any step of the grievance procedure shall be final and binding on both parties and shall not be subject to further proceedings under this Article except by written mutual agreement. Settlements reached at Steps 2 and 3 shall be in writing and signed by appropriate representatives of the Union and the Employer.

Id., Article 18, Sec. (g), App. at A-55 (emphasis added).

As noted above, the Anthracite Wage Agreement of 1985 is one in a line of collective bargaining contracts dating back to 1903. The 1903 contract, entitled "Awards of Commission, 1903," had grievance provisions whose language differed from those in the 1985 text. The 1903 contract's grievance provisions were set forth in Section IV of that agreement. Section IV stated, in relevant part:

[A]ny difficulty or disagreement arising under this award, either as to its interpretation or application, or in any way growing out of the relations of the employers and employed, which cannot be settled or adjusted by consultation between the superintendent or manager of the mine or mines, and the miner or miners directly interested, or is of a scope too large to be so settled or adjusted, shall be referred to a permanent joint committee, to be called a Board of Conciliation, to consist of six persons....

The Board of Conciliation thus constituted, shall take up and consider any question referred to it as aforesaid, hearing both parties to the controversy, and such evidence as may be laid before it by either party; and any award made by a majority of such Board of Conciliation shall be final and binding on all parties. If, however, the said Board is unable to decide any question submitted, or point related thereto, that question or point shall be referred to an umpire, to be appointed, at the request of said Board, by one of the circuit judges of the third judicial circuit of the United States, whose decision shall be final and binding in the premises.

Awards of Commission, 1903, Sec. IV, App. at A-106-07 (emphasis added).

Racho Trucking's principal office is in the City of Hazleton, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. Luzerne is one of six northeastern Pennsylvania counties that contain and produce practically all the anthracite, or hard coal, in the world. Along with other companies in the anthracite industry, Racho Trucking has been going through a period of economic hardship and contraction. This has resulted in the lay-off of a number of its employees.

Proceeding under the 1985 agreement, three members of the UMWA who were laid off by Racho Trucking filed separate grievances against the company. Each employee said that Racho Trucking laid him off in favor of an employee with less seniority and then used the junior employee to fill a job the grievant was qualified for and entitled to fill under the collective bargaining agreement's seniority provisions. The grievance procedures provided for in steps 1 and 2 of the 1985 agreement failed to settle...

To continue reading

Request your trial
37 cases
  • Stradford v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • 9 November 2022
    ... ... 21-2655 & 22-2027 United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit. Argued: ... Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Racho Trucking Co ... ...
  • McGowan v. Njr Service Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • 13 September 2005
    ... ... No. 04-3620 ... United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit ... 2 (3d Cir.2005) (citing Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Racho Trucking ... See Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 153 (3d Cir.1987), rev'd in ... International ... Page 253 ... Business Machines Corp., 77 ... ...
  • Celeste Hamilton, H. v. Spriggle
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • 14 August 2013
    ... ... Civil Action No. 4:09–CV–1801. United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania. Aug ... Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Racho Trucking ... Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 ... ...
  • Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Jones
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • 13 September 2010
    ... ... No. 4:09-cv-422. United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania. Sept ... " to domestic "employees" not entitled to workers' compensation benefits or to liability assumed by ... See Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Racho Trucking ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT