State v. Valdez-Molina

Citation897 P.2d 993,127 Idaho 102
Decision Date15 June 1995
Docket NumberVALDEZ-MOLINA,No. 20595,20595
PartiesSTATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Arturo, and Marciano Molina-Ayon, Defendants-Appellants. Boise, December 1994 Term
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Idaho

Ismael Chavez, Caldwell, for appellants.

Larry EchoHawk, Atty. Gen., Douglas A. Werth, Deputy Atty. Gen. (argued), Boise, for respondent.

JOHNSON, Justice.

This is a cocaine possession and trafficking case. The issues presented concern standing to raise entrapment as a matter of law in violation of due process, submitting Miranda rights issues to a jury, and sentencing under an unconstitutional mandatory minimum sentencing statute. We reach three conclusions: (1) the defendants did not have standing to raise the entrapment issue; (2) any error in the submission of the Miranda rights issue to the jury was harmless error; and (3) the sentences must be vacated and the defendants resentenced pursuant to State v. Sarabia, 125 Idaho 815, 875 P.2d 227 (1994).

I.

THE BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS.

The federal immigration and naturalization service (INS) recruited an illegal alien, Ramone Sanchez-Valdez (Valdez), to serve as an informant in exchange for money and legal documents allowing him to remain in the United States. Valdez was working at a migrant labor camp, where he developed a relationship with Pedro Angulo-Lau (Lau), who subsequently introduced him to Hipolito Carreon-Rosales (Carreon).

A plan was formed by which a friend of Carreon's was to bring cocaine from California to sell to Valdez's boss. Carreon called a friend in California, Marciano Molina-Ayon (Ayon), and convinced Ayon to bring drugs to Idaho.

Valdez and Carreon met the buyers, actually INS agents, at a restaurant. The men went out to the parking lot where Ayon and his eighteen-year-old nephew, Arturo Valdez-Molina (Molina), were standing near an automobile. Molina showed the agents cocaine hidden in a secret compartment of the automobile. Officers immediately arrested Molina, Ayon, and Carreon, and seized five kilograms of cocaine, worth approximately $400,000 on the street. Lau was arrested later.

The four men were tried together, each charged with trafficking in cocaine, conspiring to traffic in cocaine, and possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. Molina and Ayon were found guilty on all three counts.

The applicable statute provided that a conviction of trafficking in four hundred or more grams of cocaine carried a mandatory minimum term of ten years and a fine of $25,000. I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(2)(C) (1994). Pursuant to this provision, the trial judge sentenced Molina to a fixed term of ten to fifteen years for trafficking and concurrent terms of five to ten years for the other charges and fined him $25,000. He sentenced Ayon to a fixed term of ten to fifteen years for trafficking and concurrent terms of ten to fifteen years for the other charges and fined him $25,000.

II.

MOLINA AND AYON DO NOT HAVE STANDING TO RAISE THE ENTRAPMENT ISSUE.

Molina and Ayon assert that they were entrapped in violation of due process of law because of what they term the law enforcement officials' "outrageous behavior." This is the "objective theory" of entrapment, which focuses not on the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime, but instead scrutinizes the government's investigatory conduct. We conclude that Molina and Ayon do not have standing to raise this issue.

The state argues that Molina and Ayon did not assert a due process violation below or request jury instructions based on the objective theory of entrapment, and that therefore the issue is not preserved for appeal. We note first that an objective theory of entrapment predicated on due process presents questions of law for the court, and is ordinarily not an issue for the jury. Therefore, it is irrelevant that Molina and Ayon did not request jury instructions on this issue. Molina and Ayon did file a motion for a judgment of acquittal on the grounds of "entrapment as a matter of law" in which they claim they "essentially" asserted a due process claim. The phrase, "as a matter of law" implies an objective test of entrapment based on due process. Therefore, Molina and Ayon preserved this issue for appeal by raising it in a motion to acquit.

Before it becomes necessary for us to discuss whether the facts in this case support a conclusion that INS's conduct constituted entrapment in the objective sense, we must address the question of standing to raise this issue. Molina and Ayon do not base their due process claim on any government conduct directed specifically at them; they challenge their conviction based on the INS's actions regarding Valdez, Lau, and Carreon.

Normally a defendant does not have standing to raise a due process violation suffered by a third party. In the entrapment context, however, direct targets of the government's activity should have standing to contest their convictions on the grounds that the government's conduct toward third parties was so outrageous that it violated their due process rights because they are direct targets of the government's conduct.

The critical question, therefore, is whether Molina and Ayon were direct targets of the INS investigation. To qualify as a direct target requires, at a minimum, that the government be aware of the person's existence before arresting the person.

There is no evidence the INS knew anything about Molina and Ayon personally before their arrest. Furthermore, all the discussions and arrangements were between Valdez and Lau and Carreon and between the INS agents and Carreon. Molina and Ayon, who brought the cocaine to Idaho at Carreon's behest, had no contact with the INS agents or Valdez prior to the meeting at the restaurant. Given these facts, Molina and Ayon cannot be characterized as direct targets, although the INS undoubtedly wanted to trap suppliers such as the defendants. Therefore, the defendants do not have standing to assert their objective entrapment claim based on due process.

III.

ANY ERROR OF THE TRIAL COURT IN SUBMITTING MIRANDA ISSUES TO THE JURY WAS HARMLESS.

Molina and Ayon assert that the trial court, not the jury, should have decided whether any waivers of their Miranda rights were knowing and voluntarily made. We conclude that any error the trial court may have committed was harmless.

Counsel for Molina, Ayon, and Lau filed a pretrial motion to suppress their post-arrest statements. The motion was supported by counsel's affidavit, which stated:

[T]he Defendants have informed affiant that at least two of them have given statements to the officers who arrested them, that to the best of their recollection they do not recall being advised of their right to remain silent and to have an attorney present....

The trial court held a hearing on the motion, at which the trial court decided not to suppress the statements, stating:

It's a question of fact for the jury. If [the arresting officer] testifies under oath that--that he gave it [the Miranda warning] to them, and they say they don't understand it, that becomes an issue for the jury. Not for me to decide.... [I]f your clients are--want to rebut that, or whatever they want to say that's up to them; but it's no basis to dismiss these cases. It's no basis to suppress it either.

At trial the interviewing officer...

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