Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., Civ. A. No. 93-6076.

Citation898 F. Supp. 298
Decision Date04 August 1995
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 93-6076.
PartiesJames W. WOODSON v. SCOTT PAPER COMPANY.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Pennsylvania)

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Alan B. Epstein, Jablon, Epstein and Wolf, Philadelphia, PA, for plaintiff.

Steven R. Wall, Marina C. Tsatalis, Julie A. Uebler, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Philadelphia, PA, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM

LUDWIG, District Judge.

Defendant Scott Paper Company's post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law, to alter the judgment or, in the alternative, for a new trial, will be granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff James W. Woodson's motion for prejudgment interest will be granted. The verdict will be reduced to $1,496,698.70.

This employment discrimination action, filed November 16, 1993, was brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq.; the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. §§ 951 et seq.; the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and Pennsylvania common law. On December 23, 1994, summary judgment for defendant was granted in part. Order, No. 93-6076, Dec. 23, 1995; memorandum, No. 93-6076, Jan. 9, 1995. The remaining claims proceeded to trial on February 7, 1995.

At trial, the following evidence, as viewed most favorably to plaintiff, was adduced. In 1970, plaintiff, an African American, was recruited for employment by defendant Scott Paper Company to work as a chemical materials specialist in Philadelphia. Feb. 8, 1995, N.T. 24; Feb. 13, 1995, N.T. 9-10; Plaintiff's exh. 1, at 5, 93. He was soon promoted and for almost 20 years, through 1990, received numerous promotions, positive performance evaluations, merit wage increases, bonuses and awards. N.T. passim.

In November 1989 and February 1990, plaintiff filed charges of discrimination against defendant with the EEOC and the PHRC alleging that Scott had not considered him for top-level management positions because of his race. Feb. 8, 1995, N.T. 47-53; Feb. 13, 1995, N.T. 49-59. In October, 1990, he was promoted to product system leader of Light Weight Wet Strengthâ Napkins at defendant's Chester plant.

In the following year, defendant undertook a company-wide reorganization of its management team. A "forced ranking" or evaluation was made of 27 managers, and the bottom five were terminated. Plaintiff finished 25th and was terminated on January 27, 1992 without prior notice. Defendant's only other African American manager was also ranked in the bottom five. The evaluations were performed without interviews, and two of the three evaluators had little familiarity with plaintiff's work. Plaintiff's annual evaluations were higher than or comparable to a number of the managers who were ranked above him.

On February 15, 1995 the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff on his retaliatory discharge claim and for defendant on the race discrimination claim. Inherent in the jury verdict was the finding that the rating system used to select him for termination was pretextual. The verdict of $1,557,845 included $150,000 in back pay, $397,845 in future earnings, $10,000 for emotional distress, and $1,000,000 in punitive damages.

Defendant's post-verdict motion challenges the exhaustion of administrative remedies under the PHRA, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the jury instructions; and alternatively, the amount of the verdict. Plaintiff moves for prejudgment interest on the backpay award.1

I.

Defendant contends that this court lacked jurisdiction over the PHRA claim because the prerequisite administrative charge was not filed with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission.2 43 Pa.S.A. § 962. Without jurisdiction over the Pennsylvania law claim, the verdict amount, other than backpay,3 would be subject to the $300,000 limitation of Title VII, as amended. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).4

On July 22, 1992, plaintiff filed an administrative complaint with the EEOC alleging the facts giving rise to this action. Feb. 14, 1995, N.T. 5-6. However, he did not file with the PHRC, and his response to a request for admission concedes that his EEOC complaint was not cross-filed with the PHRC. Feb. 14, 1995, N.T. 5-6.5 Also, on the EEOC charge form, he did not check the box requesting that the charge be filed with both agencies. Plaintiff's exh. 93. Nonetheless, by letter of July 29, 1992, the EEOC advised plaintiff, "You should be aware that the Commission will provide a copy of your charge to the PHRC in accordance with our procedures." Plaintiff's response to defendant's motion for summary judgment, Oct. 18, 1994, exh. I. The record also includes a copy of a form from the EEOC to the PHRC, dated July 29, 1995, which purports to transmit plaintiff's charge to that agency. Plaintiff's exh. 93.6

Had the EEOC perfected the filing of the charge with the PHRC, in accordance with its letter and transmittal form, there would have been a sufficient PHRA filing for jurisdictional purposes. Vincent v. Fuller Co., 532 Pa. 547, 551, 616 A.2d 969, 971 (1992), citing, Lukus v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 276 Pa.Super. 232, 419 A.2d 431 (1980). Plaintiff had no reason to believe a crossfiling had not occurred, and, in any event, defendant was not prejudiced by the lack of PHRC processing.

In these circumstances, the EEOC's notice to plaintiff should be considered an equitable filing. Case law has not regarded the filing requirement jurisdictional where the failure or breakdown has been in the administrative system. See Hicks v. ABT Assoc., Inc., 572 F.2d 960, 967 (3d Cir.1978) (jurisdiction existed under Title VII where EEOC improperly refused to accept administrative filing); Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 857 F.Supp. 399, 405 (E.D.Pa.1994) (exhaustion of administrative remedies under PHRA is procedural and subject to estoppel and waiver); Feingold v. Bell of Pennsylvania, 477 Pa. 1, 10, 383 A.2d 791, 795-96 (1978) ("The rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies is not intended to set up a procedural obstacle to recovery"). PHRA's exhaustion of remedies provision mandates liberal construction to accomplish the Act's purposes. 43 Pa.S.A. § 962(a).7 To deprive plaintiff of his state claim in this unusual situation would frustrate the remedial purpose of the statute. See Parsons v. City of Philadelphia Coordinating Office of Drug and Alcohol Abuse Programs, 833 F.Supp. 1108, 1113 (E.D.Pa. 1993) (PHRA jurisdictional requirement could be met if plaintiff had received some notice from the EEOC that her charge would be dually filed). Under the EEOC-PHRC worksharing agreement,8 once the EEOC charge was filed, the PHRC's interest in the case was automatically terminated. Trevino-Barton v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 919 F.2d 874, 879 (3d Cir.1990). As a result, the lack of perfected filing with the PHRC could not have worked any prejudice in practical terms to either that agency or defendant. See EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U.S. 107, 108 S.Ct. 1666, 100 L.Ed.2d 96 (1988).

In an analogous setting, it was held that "a filing with the Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations constitutes actual and sufficient compliance with the PHRA." Kedra v. Nazareth Hosp., 857 F.Supp. 430, 433 (E.D.Pa.1994). See also Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 581 F.2d 335, 339 (3d Cir.1978) (Pittsburgh Human Relations Commission filing satisfied PHRA).9 But see Herbert v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., No. 93-5447, 1994 WL 493732, *1 (E.D.Pa.1994) ("The mere filing of a Title VII complaint with the EEOC, however, does not constitute processing by the PHRC or satisfy the PHRA administrative requirements which have been held to be preclusive"). Under Hicks v. ABT Assoc., Inc. and other defective filing cases, there appears to be ample basis for jurisdiction over plaintiff's PHRA claim.

II.

Defendant's motion also contests the sufficiency of the evidence. To establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge under Title VII,10 a plaintiff must show that: "(1) he was engaged in protected activity; (2) he was discharged after or contemporaneous with the activity; and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and threats to sue, and the loss of his job." Robinson v. SEPTA, 982 F.2d 892, 895 n. 1 (3d Cir. 1993), citing Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 501 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940, 112 S.Ct. 376, 116 L.Ed.2d 327 (1991), and Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 708 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1023, 110 S.Ct. 725, 107 L.Ed.2d 745 (1990). Defendant concedes the first two elements but maintains that plaintiff did not present the minimum quantum of evidence necessary for a jury to find the third element, the causal connection.

To review the evidence on this issue, plaintiff's administrative charges, filed in November, 1989 and February, 1990, were pending at the time of his discharge, in January, 1992.11 Two of the three evaluators who performed the "forced ranking" were aware of the charges when they assigned plaintiff the numerical grades that resulted in his termination. Feb. 9, 1995, N.T. 171-76, 187; Feb. 10, 1995, N.T. 9. Both the human services director and plaintiff's supervisor, who discussed these rankings with the evaluators during the ranking process, were also aware of his discrimination complaints. Feb. 9, 1995, N.T. 12; Feb. 10, 1995, N.T. 57-58. A "confidential work shedding memorandum" prepared by plaintiff's supervisor for the rankers predicted "An emotional reaction from plaintiff could result in an age/race discrimination claim," and an increase in employee racial tension. Plaintiff's exh. 69.12 These predictions could reasonably have been interpreted by the jury as warnings based on the previously filed discrimination chargesâ warnings that went unheeded.13

Earlier, when plaintiff had filed his second administrative charge of discrimination, he was given a written performance evaluation recommending that he consult a behavioral psychologist in North Carolina. Feb. 13, 1995, N.T. 78....

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3 cases
  • Woodson v. Scott Paper Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • May 6, 1997
    ...it believed to be erroneous and prejudicial jury instructions given by the district court. The court denied Scott's motions, Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 898 F.Supp. 298 (E.D.Pa.1995), and Scott now appeals on four separate grounds: (1) the district court erred in denying Scott's motion for ......
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    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of North Dakota
    • January 17, 1997
    ...in this case) and that to now apply separate standards of proof "would be illogical and unnecessarily confusing." Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 898 F.Supp. 298, 306 (E.D.Pa.1995). The Woodson court noted that Congress meant to overturn Price Waterhouse with the 1991 amendments and apply a "un......
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    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • September 28, 1995
1 books & journal articles
  • The emergence of self-directed work teams and their effect on Title VII law.
    • United States
    • University of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol. 148 No. 3, January 2000
    • January 1, 2000
    ...the burden of persuasion on the issue whether gender played a part in the employment decision."); see also Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 898 F. Supp. 298, 307 (E.D. Pa. 1995) ("Plaintiff at all times has the burden of showing by a preponderance that defendant was motivated by a discriminatory......

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