Malu v. SECURITY NAT. INS. CO.
| Decision Date | 10 March 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. SC03-1327, No. SC03-1432. |
| Citation | 898 So.2d 69 |
| Parties | Sandra MALU, Petitioner, v. SECURITY NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent. Lazaro Padilla, et al., Petitioners, v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Carlos Lidsky of Lidsky, Vaccaro and Montes, Hialeah, FL, Diane H. Tutt and Sharon C. Degnan of Diane H. Tutt, P.A., Plantation, FL, for Petitioner.
Beth T. Vogelsang of Barranco, Kircher, and Vogelsang, P.A., Miami, FL, for Respondent.
Nina K. Brown, Mark S. Shapiro and Jennifer Cohen Glasser of Akerman Senterfitt, Miami, FL on behalf of Liberty Mutual Insurance Company; and Doreen E. Lasch of Conroy, Simberg, Ganon, Krevens and Abel, P.A. on behalf of Urban Insurance Company of Pennsylvania, for Respondents.
We have for review the consolidated cases of Malu v. Security National Insurance Co., 848 So.2d 373 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), and Padilla v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 870 So.2d 827 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003), in which the Fourth and Third District Courts of Appeal certified conflict with the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Hunter v. Allstate Insurance Co., 498 So.2d 514 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). We have jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 3(b)(4).
The facts in each of the cases before us are substantially similar.
Petitioner Sandra Malu was insured under a private passenger automobile insurance policy issued by respondent Security National Insurance Company (Security National). After sustaining injuries in a motor vehicle accident, Malu made a claim for personal injury protection (PIP) benefits under her insurance policy. Among the benefits she sought was payment for the use of her personal automobile for travel to and from her medical providers. According to its usual and customary practice, Security National paid Malu a standard, predetermined amount of 34.5 cents per mile as reimbursement for the medical travel expenses.
Malu filed a class action complaint in the Circuit Court for Broward County, alleging that she was entitled to be paid more than 34.5 cents per mile for medical transportation costs. Malu sought declaratory relief and damages for breach of contract based upon a violation of the PIP statute of the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law, section 627.736, Florida Statutes (2001). Malu alleged that the mileage rate paid by her insurer for medical transportation costs was not reasonable and asserted that a reasonable mileage rate was in the range of 50 cents per mile.
The trial court dismissed the case with prejudice, finding as a matter of law that the 34.5 cents per mile paid by Security National to its insureds was reasonable. On appeal to the Fourth District, Malu argued that the trial court erred in concluding that the amount was reasonable as a matter of law, asserting that such a finding was not susceptible to determination as a matter of law but, rather, could only be made by the trier of fact.
The Fourth District agreed and found that the trial court had erred when it considered facts from outside of the complaint in its dismissal of the case. Despite this error, the Fourth District held that it was obligated to affirm the trial court if an alternative theory supported affirmance. Consequently, the district court affirmed the trial court's dismissal on the alternate basis that the medical transportation expenses were not compensable under the PIP statute. The court stated:
Our reasoning is based on the fact that the legislature specifically included transportation by ambulance, but did not mention any other type of transportation in the PIP statute. The mention of one type of transportation implies the exclusion of other types. Moonlit Waters Apartments, Inc. v. Cauley, 666 So.2d 898, 900 (Fla.1996) ().
The Fourth District also reasoned that when the Legislature has intended to provide coverage for automobile transportation to obtain medical treatment in a statutory scheme, it has specifically provided for payment of such expenses in the statutory language. As examples, the Malu panel cited to the statutory scheme that provided benefits for birth-related neurological injuries, section 766.31(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2002), and a workers' compensation statute that was repealed in 1993, section 440.13(6), Florida Statutes (1993). Malu, 848 So.2d at 374.
On this basis, the Fourth District held that the PIP statute did not include the transportation expenses sought by Malu in her claim and certified conflict with Hunter, in which the Fifth District had expressly ruled that such expenses were compensable under the PIP statute. Malu, 848 So.2d at 374.
Petitioner Lazaro Padilla was insured under a private passenger automobile insurance policy issued by respondent Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual). Petitioners Eloy and Irma Rivero were likewise insured under a private passenger automobile insurance policy issued by respondent Urban Insurance Company of Pennsylvania (Urban).
After sustaining injuries in motor vehicle accidents, Padilla and the Riveros made claims for reimbursement of medical transportation costs under their respective insurance policies. According to their usual and customary practices, both Liberty Mutual and Urban paid their insureds a standard, predetermined amount of 32.5 cents per mile as reimbursement for the medical travel expenses.
Padilla and the Riveros filed separate class action complaints in the Circuit Court for Dade County against their respective insurers and asserted the same claims as Malu. In response to the complaints, both Liberty Mutual and Urban filed extensive motions to dismiss, arguing that the amounts they paid to their insureds in connection with transportation to obtain medical treatment were reasonable as a matter of law. They also argued that the complaints should be dismissed because the appropriate forum to decide the issue was not the trial court but, rather, the Department of Insurance (DOI), which the insurers claimed had "primary jurisdiction" over determinations of reasonable rates. The Padilla trial court dismissed Padilla's complaint without prejudice based on the "primary jurisdiction doctrine."1 The Rivero trial court dismissed the Riveros' complaint with prejudice based on the primary jurisdiction doctrine and upon a finding that the 32.5 cents per mile paid by Urban to its insureds was reasonable as a matter of law.
The appeals of Padilla and the Riveros were consolidated in the Third District Court of Appeal. The insureds challenged (1) the trial courts' application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine, and (2) the Rivero trial court's conclusion that the amount paid by Liberty Mutual and Urban to their insureds for medical transportation costs was reasonable as a matter of law, a finding that the insureds asserted could only be made by the trier of fact.
The Third District held that all issues raised by the parties throughout the proceedings were moot because the Third District was in agreement with the Fourth District's analysis in Malu. Padilla, 870 So.2d at 829. The Third District concluded that if the Florida Legislature "deems it appropriate" to provide for medical travel benefits under the PIP statute, it can "do so specifically." Id. On that basis, the Third District held that the PIP statute does not include reimbursement for the transportation expenses sought by the insureds and certified conflict with Hunter. Id.2
Before this Court, petitioners first argue that in Malu, the Fourth District misapplied the "tipsy coachman rule," which allows an appellate court to affirm a decision despite a finding of error in the lower court's reasoning as long as there is an alternative basis to justify affirming the decision. See, e.g., Dade County Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So.2d 638, 644 (Fla.1999) (). Petitioners assert that the Fourth District exceeded the scope of its appellate review when it affirmed the trial court's decision on the basis of an alternative theory which had not been raised in the trial court proceedings. The sole issue before the trial court was whether the mileage reimbursement rate offered by the insurers was sufficient. Petitioners argue that because respondents did not assert the issue of compensability at the trial court level, respondents waived their right to avail themselves of the issue on appeal.
In Radio Station WQBA, this Court held that the tipsy coachman rule does not limit an appellee to only those arguments that were raised in the lower court. In that decision, we stated:
If an appellate court, in considering whether to uphold or overturn a lower court's judgment, is not limited to consideration of the reasons given by the trial court but rather must affirm the judgment if it is legally correct regardless of those reasons, it follows that an appellee, in arguing for the affirmance of a judgment, is not limited to legal arguments expressly asserted as grounds for the judgment in the court below. It stands to reason that the appellee can present any argument supported by the record even if not expressly asserted in the lower court.... [A]n appellee need not raise and preserve alternative grounds for the lower court's judgment in order to assert them in defense when the appellant attacks the judgment on appeal.
Radio Station WQBA, 731 So.2d at 645. We have also stated that "a party who is content with the judgment below need not assign error in order to support that judgment and is not limited in the appellate courts to the theories of recovery stated by the trial court." MacNeill v. O'Neal, 238 So.2d 614, 615 (Fla.1970). Thus, even though...
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